DocketNumber: No. CV02-0514450S
Citation Numbers: 2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 14734
Judges: DUNNELL, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 11/18/2002
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
On April 25, 2002, the plaintiffs, Alexandra Medina and her mother, Sonia Velez, as next friend, filed a five count complaint against the defendants, National Union Fire Insurance Company, AIG Insurance Company, First Student, Inc., the City of Bristol (City), and the City of Bristol Board of Education (Board), seeking to recover additional damages. Counts three, four and five of the complaint allege that the City and Board breached their fiduciary duty to the plaintiff child by "[failing] to obtain adequate insurance to protect Alexandra from injury by careless and irresponsible motorists who do not carry sufficient liability insurance" and by "[failing] to require that the Defendant First Student obtain adequate UIM coverage for its school buses as a condition of the contract." (Complaint, pp. 3-5.) On August 22, 2002, the City and Board filed a motion to strike said counts on the ground that none state a claim for which relief may be granted. Specifically, the City and Board allege that no fiduciary relationship exists between the plaintiffs and the City or the Board. Moreover, the plaintiffs allege that even if such a relationship were to exist, neither the Board nor the City owed a duty to the plaintiffs to purchase, nor to require First Student, Inc. to purchase, underinsured motorist coverage in excess of the statutorily mandated minimum. (Motion to Strike, pp. 1-2.)
Counts three, four and five allege a breach of fiduciary duty as to the defendant City and Board. Specifically, the plaintiffs allege that the City and Board "owed [the minor plaintiff] a fiduciary duty to protect her from dangers while in their protective custody." (Complaint, p. 5, ¶ 15(a)). The plaintiffs allege that this "fiduciary duty" was breached in that the City and Board failed to require the defendant bus company to obtain adequate UIM coverage for its school buses, and that they failed to obtain their own insurance coverage to protect the minor plaintiff from injury caused by careless and irresponsible motorists who do not carry sufficient insurance. Id. The plaintiffs further allege that the defendant City and Board breached their duty to protect the minor plaintiff from "reasonably foreseeable dangers" and that the plaintiffs should be permitted to recover "all damages to which Alexandra would be entitled if there had been adequate UIM coverage." (Complaint, p. 5, ¶ 16.)
In order for the plaintiffs to prevail they must first establish that the City and the Board owed them a duty. General Statutes §
The statutory language pertaining to the City is virtually identical. See General Statutes §
The plaintiffs' complaint also fails as a matter of law to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. "Our law on the obligations of a fiduciary is well settled. [A] fiduciary or confidential relationship is characterized by a unique degree of trust and confidence between the parties, one of whom has superior knowledge, skill or expertise and is under a duty to represent the interests of the other." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Murphy v. Wakelee,
The plaintiffs seek to avoid the City and Board's motions to strike by asserting that the existence of a fiduciary relationship is a question of fact. Although it is true that the existence of a fiduciary relationship is generally a factual question for the trial court, "[i]n particular instances, certain relationships, as a matter of law, do not impose upon either party the duty of a fiduciary." Macomber v. Travelers Property Casualty Corp.,
It should be noted, moreover, that our Supreme and Appellate Courts have explored the duties imposed upon a board of education on several occasions and have held, in each instance, that a board of education is liable only for reasonably foreseeable injuries that result from dangerous conditions that are limited in geographic space and time. See, e.g., Purzycki v. Fairfield,
Despite the plaintiffs' creativity in seeking a "deep pocket" to redress their loss, only the legislature can provide the remedy they seek. In view of the above, it is unnecessary for the court to consider the City and the Board's immunity defense.
Accordingly, the motions to strike counts three, four and five are granted.
_____________________________ Christina G. Dunnell, Judge