DocketNumber: No. 262168 262169
Citation Numbers: 1991 Conn. Super. Ct. 10004, 6 Conn. Super. Ct. 1104
Judges: HEALEY, STATE TRIAL REFEREE.
Filed Date: 11/12/1991
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
The moving plaintiffs argue that to require that such property owners pay interest at the statutory rate of 18% is inequitable, particularly because this court has denied the plaintiffs' earlier motion that the 335 members of the classes be paid prejudgment interest in the amount of approximately $1,200,000.00. This argument is essentially equitable and their counsel acknowledges that the statutes providing that interest be paid on delinquent taxes are mandatory. The moving plaintiffs, however, offer no legal basis, statute or case law, that authorizes this court to grant their present request. The Town,1 on the other hand, claims that it is entitled to charge interest on the delinquent accounts at the statutory rate and to collect the lien fees involved. CT Page 10005
The moving plaintiffs' argument does not readily acknowledge that the basis for an award of prejudgment interest is a wholly different matter from their present request to bar interest payments on their unpaid sewer use assessments. This court recently set out at length the applicable law to be considered on a request for prejudgment interest in its October 30, 1991 "Memorandum of Decision on Plaintiffs' Motion for Entitlement to Prejudgment and Postjudgment Interest" in these two cases. It will not be repeated here, but it is apparent that the principles and considerations involved there are quite different from the issue to be decided here.
On the instant motion, wholly unlike the issue of prejudgment interest, this court has to deal with specific Connecticut statutory law. See Connecticut General Statutes
The statutory scheme plainly read makes the collection of interest in these circumstances mandatory. It is true that there is statutory authority for the abatement of taxes and interest but that is explicitly given to officials at he municipal level and not to a court. See e.g. Connecticut General Statutes
As already indicated, the moving plaintiffs ask that their motion be granted because it is equitable to do so. It is a fundamental maxim that "equity follows the law." See 27 Am.Jur.2d Equity 123 and cases there cited. Equity will generally conform to established rules and precedents and will not change or institute rights that are defined and established by existing legal principles. See 27 Am.Jur.2d Equity 123; 30 C.J.S. CT Page 10006 Equity 103 at 1066 (1965). This serves as the basis for this maxim which teaches that as a rule a court of equity will follow the legislation and common law regulations of rights. Dunkin Donuts of America v. Middletown Donut Corp.,
[6] II. In purely equitable claims equity will grant of refuse relief at its discretion, but when the claim is a legal claim or when the penalty is mandatorily fixed by statute, equity will as a rule apply the requirement of the statute and not relieve the claimant. Swartz v. Atkins, Tenn.,
315 S.W.2d 393 . The rule is well stated in 85 C.J.S. Taxation 1031c, page 599: `Although it has been held that the courts may, in the exercise of their equitable powers, abate or remit tax penalties under meritorious conditions, the more general rule is that, in the absence of statutory authorization, the courts have no power to receive delinquent taxpayers from penalties incurred by violations of the statutes providing therefore.' In 51 Am.Jr., Taxation, 975, p. 852, it is stated: `The penalty is imposed for failure to pay taxes when due, and the rule in most jurisdiction is that even though one in good faith litigates his liability to a tax until after it is due and payable, he is liable for the penalty or CT Page 10007 interest imposed upon delinquent taxpayers if the decision is adverse to him.' Also see Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Johnson,42 Cal. App. 2d 528 ,109 P.2d 447 ,448 ; Texas Co. v. Dyer, supra,179 Miss. 135 ,174 So. 80 .
Miller Oil Co. v. Abramson,
`In the absence of statutory authorization, the courts have no power to relieve delinquent taxpayers from penalties incurred by violations of the statutes proving therefor. * * *' 61 C. J. 1494, 2151; Lamont Savings Bank v. Luther,
200 Iowa 180 ,204 N.W. 430 ; People ex rel. v. N.J. Sandberg Co.,282 Ill. 245 ,118 N.E. 469 ; Cedar Rapids M. R. R. Co. v. Carroll County,41 Iowa 153 ; Wright v. Atwood,33 Idaho 455 ,195 P. 625 : People ex rel. Arkansas Valley, etc. v. Burke,72 Colo. 486 ,212 P. 837 , 30 A.L.R. 1085.
In Re Elvigin' Estate, 191 WA 614,
The moving plaintiffs have not persuaded the court that it possesses the power in equity to do what they ask. The statutory dictates are mandatory and the court has no authority to grant their request in these circumstances. The operation of the principles cited requires the court to deny their motions: these principles have been held to prevent equitable relief even where such interest has largely accumulated while litigation has been pending with reference to the validity of the tax involved. See Cedar Rapids M.R. Co. v. Carroll County, 85 C.J.S. Taxation, 1031K),
The motion to preclude and/or prohibit the paying of interest on the unpaid increased sewer use fee billings is denied. It follows that the lien fees imposed for such unpaid billings must be paid for by those plaintiffs against whose properties liens for such unpaid billings have been filed.
Arthur H. Healey, State Trial Referee
Hartford v. Hills , 72 Conn. 599 ( 1900 )
Miller Oil Co. v. Treasurer of State , 252 Iowa 1058 ( 1961 )
Swartz v. Atkins , 204 Tenn. 23 ( 1958 )
Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc. v. Middletown Donut Corp. , 100 N.J. 166 ( 1985 )
Lamont Sav. Bank v. Luther , 200 Iowa 180 ( 1925 )
Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Pangilinan , 108 S. Ct. 2210 ( 1988 )