Citation Numbers: 2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 3712
Judges: JONGBLOED, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 3/19/2002
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
On June 28, 2001, the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Willimantic (Mack, J.) found that respondent mother had defaulted in this matter, made adjudication findings on the allegations contained in the petition, and entered orders upholding the termination petition on the grounds of abandonment [17 C.G.S. § 112(j)(A)] and that there was no ongoing parent-child relationship with respect to the mother that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a continuing day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral or educational needs of the children and to allow further time for the reestablishment of the parent child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the children. [17 C.G.S. § 112(D)]. On the same date, the court accepted respondent father, Joseph B.'s, consent to termination of his parental rights to Brittany. Thereafter the matter was referred to the Regional Child Protection Session at the Middlesex J.D. for disposition. The court heard evidence with regard to disposition on November 20, 2001.1 Neither respondent mother nor respondent father Joseph B. appeared. For the reasons stated below, the court finds that termination of parental CT Page 3713 rights of Denise B. and Joseph B. is in the best interest of the children Kayla, Jonathan and Brittany.
"The termination of parental rights is defined as the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and his [or her] parent. . . . [As such, it] is a most serious and sensitive judicial action." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jonathan M.,
(1) As to the timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the respondent mother and the children by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the children with respondent, the court finds that in addition to case management and referral services through DCF, respondent mother was provided with services through the young parents program, parent aide services, Intensive Family Preservation Services, Birth to Three Program, the Department of Mental Retardation, Day Kimball Hospital Mental Health Services and the Thompson Ecumenical Empowerment Group. Ex. 1 at p. 22. These services were offered based on mother's young age at the time she gave birth to her children, her involvement with violent and abusive men and her mental health issues. CT Page 3714
(2) As to whether DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that respondent mother has demonstrated that she is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts., §
(3) As to the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under the terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, the court finds that due to the circumstances of this case, no specific steps were ordered. Ex. 1 at p. 23. DCF has fulfilled any obligations it had in order to facilitate reunification of the family.
(4) As to the feelings and emotional ties of the children with respect to the children's parents, any guardian of the children and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the children for at least one year and with whom the children have developed significant emotional ties, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that Kayla, Jonathan and Brittany do not have any bond or emotional ties with respondent mother. Respondent mother moved them frequently as she moved from one abusive relationship to another and finally abandoned them in December, 1997 leaving them in a horribly abusive home when they were 5, 3 and 2 years of age. They have not had contact with her since. They do not appear to have any positive memories of respondent mother and would not recognize her as a parent in the sense that they would not seek comfort from her or go to her to have their needs met. Brittany does not have any emotional ties or bond with her father. The father of Kayla and Jonathan is deceased.
The children are doing well in foster care. Kayla and Brittany are placed with one foster family and Jonathan, due to severe special needs, is placed with another. The girls have bonded well in their current foster home where they have been since 1999. Although Jonathan has significant behavioral issues, he too has made progress in his current foster home and has significant ties and an emotional bond with that family. Their foster families are providing the physical, emotional, moral and educational support these children need.
The Court finds that the children do have ties and an emotional bond to their maternal Aunt and Uncle, the Cs, with whom they have had regular contact.4 CT Page 3715
(5) As to the ages of the children, the court finds that Kayla is now 9 years of age, Jonathan is 8, and Brittany is 6. The Court further finds, as shown by clear and convincing evidence, that these children require stability of placement and continuity of care and that the children's attorney recommends termination.5
(6) As to the efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child; the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that respondent mother has made no effort to appear in this matter or to demonstrate any acceptable parental standards. On January 3, 2000, respondent mother left a notarized letter for the court stating that she was too mentally ill to care for her children and wanted them to be raised by the Cs. Ex. 1 at 7. She has had no contact with the children since 1998. She also has not maintained regular contact or communication with the guardian or custodian of the children to inquire as to their well being. Giving her additional time would not likely bring her performance, as a parent, within acceptable standards sufficient to make it in the best interests of the children to be reunited. In re Luis C.,
(7) As to the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the children by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that no unreasonable conduct by the child protection agency, foster parents or third parties is noted.
Further, there was no evidence that economic factors may have prevented regular, continuing contact with the children.
With respect to the best interests of the children contemplated by C.G.S. §
The court also finds that termination of the parental rights of respondent father, Joseph B., to Brittany, based on father's consent, is in the best interest of the child. Respondent father of Brittany is currently serving a 15 year sentence on charges of child molestation and sexual assault. He subjected these children to physical and sexual abuse. Ex. I at 9-14. He has had no role in Brittany's life for many years, having separated from respondent mother when Brittany was approximately 2. She would not recognize him as a parent.
These findings are made after considering the totality of circumstances including the children's sense of time and the children's need for a secure and permanent environment.
It is accordingly, ORDERED that the parental rights of Denise B. are hereby terminated as to the children Kayla P., Jonathan P. and Brittany P. and the parental rights of Joseph B. are hereby terminated as to Brittany P. The Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is hereby appointed the statutory parent. As stated in court on March 18, 2002 and by agreement of the Petitioner and all parties present, the court will retain jurisdiction to consider the pending motion for transfer of guardianship.
A permanency plan shall be submitted within 30 days of this judgment, and that such further reports shall be timely presented to the court as required by law.
Judgment may enter accordingly.
It is so ordered this 19th day of March, 2002.
Jongbloed, J.