DocketNumber: No. CV 94-0366807
Citation Numbers: 1996 Conn. Super. Ct. 4610
Judges: HODGSON, J.
Filed Date: 6/7/1996
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
At the charge conference, the court presented counsel for both parties with a proposed verdict form. The proposed form contained one line for economic damages and one line for noneconomic damages. Defendant's counsel objected to the proposed form, arguing that General Statutes §
The court revised the verdict form to included only one line for damages. On the record, both counsel agreed to the use of the revised form with respect to omission of separate awards for economic and noneconomic damages.
It is important to set forth the context in which the parties took the positions they did with respect to the text of the verdict form. The plaintiff claimed to have suffered a trimalleolar fracture of his ankle that required surgery and fixation with orthopedic hardware. Because he was suffering from cancer and had to undergo treatment for that condition at the same time his leg injury was being treated, the plaintiff's leg wounds did not heal well and he experienced complications that required intravenous antibiotics and other surgical treatment. The medical bills for treatment of the plaintiff's leg and other economic damages totalled approximately $200,000.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $700,000.
The following post-verdict motions have been filed:
1. Defendant's Motion to Set Aside the Verdict
2. Defendant's Motion for Collateral Source Hearing
3. Plaintiff's Motion to Add Prejudgment Interest
4. Defendant's Motion for 60 Day Extension Per Conn. Gen. Stat. §
The court will consider the various post-verdict motions in the order in which they are listed above.
I. Motion To Set Aside Verdict
The defendant has moved to set aside the verdict on a number of grounds. In its motion, it indicated that it was intending to add other unstated grounds that it might discover upon a review of the trial transcript. At oral argument, counsel for the CT Page 4612 defendant indicated that no additional grounds were being asserted in addition to those listed in the motion as originally filed. (The court therefore expresses no opinion as to the permissibility of this effort by the defendant to increase the amount of time available to assert grounds to set aside a verdict.)
With regard to the merits of the motion, this court finds that the defendant has not established any of its grounds. The notice provided to the town was not entirely accurate in every detail, however the jury was warranted in finding that it sufficiently complied with General Statutes §
The issue of constructive notice of the defective condition is one as to which the jury's conclusion is supported by sufficient evidence and reasonable inference. The evidence indicated that the location where the plaintiff fell was one prone to run off of water that froze and that there was ice on the area where the plaintiff fell for several hours before his fall. The jury was warranted in concluding that the icy condition was that of ice under newly falling snow and that the defendant had had several hours to discover that condition and remedy it.
The interrogatory to the jury to which the defendant objected, Interrogatory No. 4, was a shorthand reference to the more detailed and complex explanation in the charge to the jury of the issue of notice of the defect. The reference to that requirement in the interrogatory did not supersede the charge in any way; and the use of interrogatory, which reminded the jury of the plaintiff's duty to prove each element of his claim, is not a reason to set aside the verdict.
The remaining asserted grounds are complaints concerning rulings on the admissibility of evidence and exceptions to the charge that do not identify adequate reasons to set aside the verdict under the standard set forth in Palomba v. Gray,
II. Motion for Collateral Source Hearing
Upon motion of the defendant, this court conducted a hearing for two purposes: 1) oral argument as to whether benefits received CT Page 4613 by the plaintiff from collateral sources should be deducted from the amount of the verdict, and 2) the taking of evidence as to the amount of such benefits received, premiums paid for such benefits, and the nature of the entity from which the benefits were received. Both parties were provided with a full opportunity to adduce any and all evidence relevant to their respective claims with regard to all issues concerning deduction of collateral source benefits.
The parties have stipulated that the amount of collateral source benefits, as defined in Gen. Stat. §
Conn. Gen. Stat. §
a) In any civil action, whether in tort or in contract, wherein the claimant seeks to recover damages resulting from (1) personal injury or wrongful death occurring on or after October 1, 1987 . . . and wherein liability is admitted or is determined by the trier of fact and damages are awarded to compensate the claimant, the court shall reduce the amount of such award which represents economic damages, as defined in subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of section
52-572h , by an amount equal to the total of amounts determined to have been paid under subsection (b) of this section less the total of amounts determined to have been paid under subsection (c) of this section, except that there shall be no reduction for 1) a collateral source for which a right of subrogation exists. . . .b) Upon a finding of liability and an awarding of damages by the trier of fact and before the court enters judgment, the court shall receive evidence from the claimant and other appropriate persons concerning the total of collateral sources which CT Page 4614 have been paid for the benefit of the claimant as of the date the court enters judgment.
c) The court shall receive evidence from the claimant and any other appropriate person concerning any amount which has been paid, contributed or forfeited, as of the date the court enters judgment, by or on behalf of, the claimant or members of his immediate family to secure his right to any collateral source benefit which he has received as a result of such injury or death.
[Emphasis supplied].
The plaintiff has objected to the requested reduction of the verdict on a number of grounds:
1. At the insistence of the defendant, there was no determination of "economic damages" and it is therefore not possible for the court to "reduce the amount of such award which represents economic damages," the only reduction authorized by §
2. In the alternative, the plaintiff takes the position that a right of subrogation exists and that a reduction is therefore specifically precluded by §
III. Applicability of §
While the portion of the legislation known as Tort Reform II that is codified as §
It is not contested that this action is 1) a civil action 2) for personal injury 3) occurring after October 1, 1987 4) in which the trier of fact determined liability, and 5) in which damages were awarded to compensate the claimant. These elements constitute the statutory definition of the situation to which the statute applies. The next clause of the same sentence does not concern the scope of the statute but rather the mechanics of what the court is to do in cases so defined: ". . . the court shall reduce the amount of such award which represents economic damages as defined in subsection (1) of subsection (a) of §
The scope of a statute is to be determined by reference to the language actually used in the legislation. Vaillancourt v.New Britain Machine/Litton,
The plaintiff argues to the effect that even if the CT Page 4616 legislature provided for deduction of collateral source benefits in all personal injury suits arising after October 1, 1997, it provided that the deduction be done in a particular manner, that is, from the amount of the award "which represents economic damages" and that without an identification of such amount as a specific finding, it is not possible to comply with this provision. The plaintiff argues as if §
While §
The position of the plaintiff is that because the trier of fact did not specify which portion of the award was for economic damages, this court cannot reduce by the amount of collateral source benefits to comply with §
In the case before the court, however, the verdict far exceeds the amount of the economic damages about which the plaintiff presented evidence. The plaintiff presented $213,921.25 in bills for medical services as economic losses he had incurred, and his counsel argued to the jury that the award should include that amount. The amount of the verdict, $700,000.00, cannot be logically said to be an amount that leads to uncertainty whether economic as well as noneconomic damages were awarded.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that statutes must be construed to give effect to the intended purpose of the legislature. Office of Consumer Counsel v. DPUC,
In construing any statute, courts must seek to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. Dos Santosv. F. D. Rich Construction, Inc.,
General Statute §
The intent of the legislature in enacting §
Where, as in this case, the verdict is so ample that it seems fair to conclude that it includes compensation for economic damages claimed, the legislative purpose of §
Exemption by reason of right to subrogation
The plaintiff claims that even if §
The court finds that United States Life Insurance Company is an insurer and that it paid the plaintiff $191,065.97 in medical insurance benefits pursuant to the group insurance plan of which the plaintiff was an insured. Since §
The plaintiff acknowledges, however, that ERISA's preemption provision applies only to those "employee welfare benefit plans" that meet the definition of that term provided at
shall not include a group or group type insurance program offered by an insurer to employees or members of an employee organization under which CT Page 4619 (1) no contributions are made by an employer or employee organization; (2) participation [in] the program is completely voluntary for employees or members; (3) the sole function of the employer or employee organization with respect to the program are, without endorsing the program, to permit the insurer to publicize the program to employees or members to collect premiums through payroll deductions or dues checkoffs and to remit them to the insurer; and (4) the employer or employee organization receives no consideration in the form of cash or otherwise in connection with the program, other than reasonable compensation, excluding any profit, for administrative services actually rendered in connection with payroll deductions or dues checkoffs.
The parties adduced evidence relevant to the determination whether the medical benefits plan at issue is or is not a plan subject to ERISA and its preemption provisions. On the basis of that evidence, the court finds from February 8, 1994 to date that the plaintiff was employed at Pajor's Family Restaurant in Wallingford. The employer offered the medical benefit insurance plan of United States Life Insurance Company on a voluntary basis to employees who worked more than thirty hours. The restaurant did not pay for any benefits but only deducted the premiums from the pay of participating employees. All communications with regard to claims for benefits were conducted directly between the employees and United States Life Insurance Company.
While the plaintiff claimed in his brief that the employer "endorsed" the benefit program, he adduced no evidence to that effect.
This court concludes that the medical insurance plan that paid the collateral source benefits at issue was an outside insurance plan and not a plan funded by the employer. According to the definition supplied by the regulation and the interpretation of the federal courts, such a plan is not an ERISA plan. FMC Corp. v. Holliday,
General Statute §
Amount of reduction
The parties are in agreement that the plaintiff received collateral source benefits in the amount of $191,065.97. They do not, however, agree on the proper calculation of the statutory exemption for deduction for amounts paid by the claimant to secure his right to those benefits. See §
On the basis of the evidence presented, the court finds that the plaintiff paid $930 per month in order to obtain the benefits at issue. His injury occurred on February 8, 1994. The plaintiff presented no evidence to establish the inception date of the policy in force on that date. By paying monthly payments from February 1, 1994 to December 1995, the date of his most recent medical care in connection with the injury, the plaintiff secured the benefits at issue. The court finds the amount of such offsettable premiums to be $21,390 (23 months x $930.00). The defendant adduced testimony to the effect that another employee of Pajor's Family Restaurant, a single male, paid only $130 per month for medical insurance. The defendant claims that the court should infer that the higher premium paid by the plaintiff reflects premiums for family coverage and does not constitute amounts "paid . . . to secure his right to any collateral source benefit which he has received" within the meaning of §
Accordingly, the amount of $191,065.97 less $21,390.00, that is, $169,675.97, shall be deducted from the amount of the verdict, such that the amount to be recovered is $530,324.03.
Motion for Prejudgment Interest
The plaintiff points out in a motion for prejudgment interest that he filed an offer of judgment in the amount of $675,000 and the defendant failed to accept it. Because of the reduction of collateral source benefits, his recovery is not greater than the amount stated in the offer of judgment, and he is not eligible to receive prejudgment interest pursuant to General Statutes § 52%192a. Civiello v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp.,
Judgment
Judgment shall enter in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $530,324.03 plus costs to be taxed upon a hearing by the court as to the disputed claims for costs.
Pursuant to General Statute §
FMC Corp. v. Holliday , 111 S. Ct. 403 ( 1990 )
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. , 103 S. Ct. 2890 ( 1983 )
Colli v. Real Estate Commission , 169 Conn. 445 ( 1975 )
Schurman v. Schurman , 188 Conn. 268 ( 1982 )
Labatt v. Grunewald , 182 Conn. 236 ( 1980 )
New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans ... , 115 S. Ct. 1671 ( 1995 )