DocketNumber: No. CV00 0181112
Citation Numbers: 2003 Conn. Super. Ct. 2948
Judges: LEWIS, JUDGE TRIAL REFEREE.
Filed Date: 3/6/2003
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
On November 7, 2000, the plaintiff, Jason Ayres, filed a one-count complaint against the defendant,1 Marianne Leonard, personally and d/b/a Stew Leonard's, seeking damages for work-related injuries he allegedly sustained on June 1, 2000. The plaintiff alleges that because of the wilful and serious misconduct of the defendant, he was injured during the course of his employment when he was struck by a forklift operated by a co-worker, Haywood Ticking.2 The plaintiff filed a workers' compensation claim on June 9, 2000.
The defendant filed an answer and special defenses on February 20, 2001, in which she denies that wilful or serious misconduct on her part caused the injuries to the plaintiff and asserts as a special defense that the plaintiff's claims are barred by General Statutes §
On September 25, 2002, the defendant moved for summary judgment (#125) on the ground that the plaintiff's claims are barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act, specifically §
Pursuant to Practice Book §
As a preliminary matter, this court will address the plaintiff's motion in which he asks the court to deny the defendant's motion for summary judgment because the defendant wilfully and intentionally destroyed a video tape that was material to the plaintiff's proof. Practice Book §
When a party to a civil case intentionally spoils evidence, the problem is appropriately addressed, by having the "trier of fact . . . draw an inference . . . that the destroyed evidence would have been unfavorable to the party that destroyed it." Beers v. Bayliner Marine Corp.,
In this case, the evidence establishes that an inspector for OSHA visited the defendant's premises two days after the accident and returned about two weeks later to review the security tape. In her response to the plaintiff's interrogatories, the defendant acknowledges that a security videotape existed, but claims that "this tape cannot be located at this time and is presumed to have been taped over as the regular procedure." This evidence is sufficient to show that the defendant was aware that the tape should have been preserved, but does not necessarily prove that she intentionally disposed of it. Moreover, it is not clear that the tape would have been relevant to the issue of whether the plaintiff was injured as a result of the defendant's wilful or intentional conduct. Finally, as explained herein, the plaintiff fails to provide the court with any other evidence on this issue.
As to the defendant's motion for summary judgment, summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Practice Book §
"[A]lthough the party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any material fact . . ., a party opposing summary judgment must substantiate its adverse claim by showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact together with the evidence disclosing the existence of such an issue . . . It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact . . . are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court [in support of a motion for summary judgment]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) BuellIndustries, Inc. v. Greater New York Mutual Ins. Co.,
The defendant contends that her motion for summary judgment should be granted on the ground that the plaintiff cannot demonstrate that the defendant knew with substantial certainty that the plaintiff would be injured, and therefore the plaintiff's action is, as a matter of law, barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act. The defendant argues that although the plaintiff has alleged that Ticking has vision problems and had a prior accident with the forklift, this does not create a material fact as to whether the defendant knew that plaintiff's injuries were substantially certain to occur. The defendant further contends that plaintiff has not alleged that she took any affirmative action to injure the plaintiff, but instead alleges that she failed to take certain enumerated safety measures. As such, the defendant argues that the allegations are nothing more than simple negligence, and are insufficient to overcome the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act.
The plaintiff counters that genuine issues of material fact exist which must be decided by a jury. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that his injuries were caused by the defendant's wilful and serious misconduct in that she: allowed Ticking to operate the forklift despite her knowledge that Ticking had been involved in other incidents in which he injured other employees while he was driving the forklift; allowed Ticking to operate the forklift despite knowing that he had not been properly trained on the equipment; never warned the plaintiff that Ticking was not qualified to drive the forklift or advised him to avoid locations where he was likely to come into contact with Ticking; failed to train and sufficiently supervise Ticking to detect that he was unqualified to operate the forklift; or, did train and supervise Ticking, yet failed to revoke or suspend his driving privileges despite knowing he was incompetent to operate the forklift; and, knew or should have known that allowing a high turnover of managers in the plaintiff's department increased the risk of injury to employees. The plaintiff further alleges that the defendant's intentional conduct was substantially certain to cause the plaintiff's injuries. Therefore, the plaintiff asserts, the June 1, 2000 incident falls within the exception to the workers' compensation exclusivity rule set forth in Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics,
"Workers' compensation systems ordinarily are limited to recovery in tort actions for injuries arising in the workplace during the course of employment and compensate employees for such injuries . . . In most cases, the Connecticut act is a bar to independent actions filed by an employee against an employer for an injury that occurs at the workplace." CT Page 2952 (Citation omitted.) Morocco v. Rex Lumber Co.,
The Supreme Court has interpreted "the exclusivity provisions of . . . General Statutes §
In this case, the plaintiff contends that his action comes within the substantial certainty standard. "The substantial certainty test . . . still allows for a plaintiff to maintain a cause of action against an employer where the evidence is sufficient to support an inference that the employer deliberately instructed an employee to injure himself." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp.,supra,
In support of his objection to the motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff submits an affidavit in which he states that he and other co-workers knew that Ticking was incompetent, unqualified and unfit to drive the forklift. The only other competent evidence that supports his statement is Ticking's deposition testimony in which Ticking admitted to having a previous incident with a forklift, but that no one was injured. The plaintiff also submitted a copy of a report that the OSHA investigator filed in regard to the incident. The investigator evaluated the defendant's overall safety and health program and gave it an evaluation of average for its communication to employees, enforcement and safety training program. The OSHA inspector concluded the incident involving the plaintiff was caused by employee misconduct on the part of Ticking, but that the defendant had appropriate programs in place and the actions taken were adequate. The defendant submitted Ticking's deposition in which he stated that he has been employed by the defendant since 1988 and has operated a forklift since that time with a license. Ticking underwent training on the forklift on a regular basis with the defendant, and was last certified on the forklift on February 7, 2000. A written warning was given to Ticking on June 2, 2000, as a result of the incident with the plaintiff.
Therefore, although the plaintiff's evidence may show that the defendant was inattentive to safety precautions, it does not amount to evidence from which one might reasonably and logically infer that the defendant believed its conduct was substantially certain to cause injury to the plaintiff. The evidence submitted by the plaintiff amounts to no more than evidence that the defendant may have failed to institute appropriate safety or protective measures. An employer's "[f]ailure to take affirmative remedial action, even if wrongful, does not demonstrate an affirmative intent to create a situation that causes persons injury." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Morocco v. Rex Lumber Co., supra,
While the accident to the plaintiff undeniably caused the plaintiff pain and suffering, the circumstances of this case do not warrant applying the narrow exception to the exclusivity of the Workers' Compensation Act. The plaintiff has not offered evidence to establish a factual predicate that the defendant knew with substantial certainty that the plaintiff would be injured. Therefore, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.
So Ordered.
Dated at Stamford, Connecticut, this 6th day of March 2003.
William B. Lewis, Judge