DocketNumber: No. CV 97-0400690 S
Citation Numbers: 2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 12266
Judges: THOMPSON, JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
Filed Date: 8/17/2001
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
On January 12, 2001, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff's claims are insufficient as a matter of law and a supporting memorandum accompanied by documentary evidence. On February 20, 2001, the plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the defendant's motion for summary judgment accompanied by documentary evidence, including the affidavit of William Mazzella.
Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Practice Book §
Connecticut courts have allowed the use of a motion for summary judgment to test the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff's complaint, even though a motion to strike is the more appropriate vehicle for making such a challenge. Boucher Agency, Inc. v. Zimmer,
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The defendant claims that the plaintiff's cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress is insufficient as a matter of law because the plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to show that the defendant engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct that the defendant knew or should have known would cause emotional distress and that the plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress as a direct result. In response, the plaintiff argues that the actions of the defendant in attempting to collect the debt were "extreme and outrageous." Specifically, the plaintiff avers, in his affidavit of February 19, 2001, that as a result of the defendant's failure to accept a proposal of refinancing, the FDIC foreclosed on both his commercial and residential property causing his family to be evicted from their home. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff avers that his wife divorced him and that he suffered a stroke as a result of his situation.
To establish a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, "[i]t must be shown: (1) that the actor intended to inflict emotional distress or that he knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct; (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) that the defendant's conduct was the cause of the plaintiff's distress; and (4) that the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was severe." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)Appleton v. Board of Education,
"Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires conduct exceeding all bounds usually tolerated by decent society. . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) DeLaurentis v. New Haven,
In the present case, the plaintiff's cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress is insufficient as a matter of law because the plaintiff failed to present demonstrative evidence, in the form of an affidavit or otherwise, which demonstrates that the defendant's actions in attempting to collect a debt from the plaintiff were so "outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Id., 211. Neither the deposition testimony nor the letters submitted by the plaintiff in opposition to summary judgment demonstrate anything more than the usual correspondence between a debtor and a creditor who are trying to negotiate the payment of a debt. While the conduct of the defendant may have been offensive and harmful to the plaintiff, the court concludes, after considering the documentary evidence, that the conduct complained of does not rise to the level required, as a matter of law, to establish the basis for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. Accordingly, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted as to count one.
Breach of Fiduciary Duty
The defendant next claims that the plaintiff's cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty is insufficient as a matter of law because the plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to show that there was a duty on the part of the defendant to represent the interests of the plaintiff. In response, the plaintiff argues that there was a special relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant characterized by a unique degree of trust and confidence. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that he relied upon the defendant to assist him with the resolution of his outstanding indebtedness to the FDIC. CT Page 12270
A party alleging a breach of fiduciary duty must prove the existence of a fiduciary relationship. Dunham v. Dunham,
At issue in the present case is whether the defendant, a company hired by a credit or to collect a debt, owes a duty to the plaintiff debtor. "The determination of whether [such] a duty exists between individuals is a question of law." Jaworski v. Kiernan,
In the present case, the court concludes that a fiduciary relationship did not exist between the plaintiff and the defendant. The plaintiff fails to establish that anything more than an ordinary debtor creditor relationship existed between the plaintiff and the defendant. Neither the defendant nor its agents acted as a financial advisor to the plaintiff or gained his confidence. Moreover, there is no evidence that the defendant or its agents ever intended to act with the plaintiff's interests in mind. Indeed, "[a] lender has the right to further its own interest in a mortgage transaction and is not under a duty to represent the customer's interests." Id. The plaintiff's characterization of his relationship with the defendant as "fiduciary" in nature, without supporting facts, is a legal conclusion and, therefore, is insufficient to establish the existence of a disputed material fact for purposes of a motion for summary judgment. Hoskins v. Titan Value Equities Group, Inc.,
Bruce W. Thompson Judge of the Superior Court