DocketNumber: No. CV-98-0487397-S
Citation Numbers: 2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 2228, 29 Conn. L. Rptr. 301
Judges: SHAPIRO, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 2/2/2001
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
No motion to strike was filed by the defendant. Instead, she filed an answer and special defenses, dated September 10, 1998, followed by an amended answer and special defenses, dated November 3, 1998. By notice dated August 4, 2000, the court advised the parties that the matter had been scheduled for jury selection on January 18, 2001.
On December 6, 2000, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, dated November 29, 2000, seeking summary judgment "with respect to the prayer for relief requesting double, treble damages, attorneys' fees, and interest." In response, the plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the motion, dated December 12, 2000, in which she noted CT Page 2229 that the defendant had not complied with § 17-44 of the rules of practice, which provides that a "party must obtain the judicial authority's permission to file a motion for summary judgment after the case has been assigned for trial." The defendant then presented her motion for permission to file summary judgment, dated December 14, 2000, which was accompanied by a new motion for summary judgment of the same date. The second motion for summary judgment, and the memorandum of law submitted with it, appear to be identical in content to the papers filed in connection with the first motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff's objection to the motion for permission, dated December 19, 2000, then followed.
On January 8, 2001, only the original motion for summary judgment and the objection to the motion for permission were printed on the short calendar. On that date, by agreement of the parties, the court heard argument on both the motion for permission and concerning summary "judgment. The court issued an order, dated January 9, 2001, in which it denied the motion for permission to file summary judgment.
In response to the court's order, on January 22, 2001, the defendant filed a notice of intent to appeal, a motion for articulation, and a motion for reconsideration. The court has granted the latter two motions and now issues this memorandum of decision. Jury selection in this matter is currently scheduled to commence on March 1, 2001.
The plaintiff's Memorandum of Law In Opposition To Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment, at pp. 3-4, contends that a motion for summary judgment is not the proper method by which to challenge a prayer for relief. In her objection to the motion for permission, at p. 1, the plaintiff argues that the motion for summary judgment, which is addressed only to the prayer for relief, would only serve to delay the proceedings and do nothing to simplify the issues or the evidence to be presented at trial. CT Page 2230
Our Supreme Court has stated that a motion for summary judgment may be utilized to demonstrate that a "complaint . . . does not set forth a cause of action." Boucher Agency, Inc. v. Zimmer,
Numerous courts have held that a motion for summary judgment is an improper method by which to challenge a prayer for relief. "A prayer for relief does not constitute a cause of action. . . . . The only pretrial method to attack a prayer for relief is a motion to strike. Practice Book 152 [now
If the defendant has been prejudiced in any way, that is as a result of her having not filed a motion to strike. In any event, she has not been unduly prejudiced. At the time of trial, the defendant may, if she wishes, present a motion in limine. See rules of practice, §
BY THE COURT
ROBERT B. SHAPIRO JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT