DocketNumber: No. CV95 055 48 58S
Citation Numbers: 1997 Conn. Super. Ct. 11079, 20 Conn. L. Rptr. 541
Judges: MOTTOLESE, J.
Filed Date: 10/6/1997
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
The pertinent facts are as follows: On February 29, 1995 the plaintiff was the contract purchaser of 39.5 acres of land in the Town of Cheshire. In such capacity the plaintiff applied to the defendant Planning and Zoning Commission for (1) amendments to the zoning regulations designed to permit the construction of affordable housing in the town; (2) rezoning of the 39.5 acres into a zone that would permit the construction of affordable housing; and (3) a special permit for construction of a three hundred rental unit residential development in which at least 20% of the units would be dedicated to affordable housing within the meaning of §
The fact of such conveyance was first brought to anyone's attention by letter from the plaintiff's attorney, Timothy S. Hollister dated May 19, 1997. In response to this information the defendant moved for leave to file an amended answer in order ; to raise the special defense of lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the plaintiff's lack of standing and capacity to sue. That motion was granted by agreement and in accordance therewith, on July 9, 1997, the defendant filed its "Second Answer . . . with Special Defense" which has been denied by the plaintiff.
On June 5, 1997 the plaintiff filed a motion to add as parties plaintiff, Industrial Associates, Inc. (hereinafter "Industrial") alleging that Industrial is the new record title holder of the property, Paul Bowman and Frank DiNatali (hereinafter Bowman and DiNatali) alleging that they are the real parties in interest pursuant to §
Because of the complexity of the issues generated by the plaintiff's loss of ownership of the property and the ensuing CT Page 11081 motions to add parties' plaintiff, the court ordered a bifurcation of the trial limited to the issue of whether the court retains jurisdiction to entertain the appeal at this stage of the proceeding. Goldfeld v. Planning and Zoning Commission,
The fact that the plaintiff was divested of all interest in the property on March 29, 1996 was confirmed by the evidence at trial. The evidence also showed that Industrial was created in March 1996 and that it has qualified with the U.S. Internal Revenue Service as a subchapter S corporation.1 The plaintiff also proved that the plaintiff corporation was similarly qualified as a subchapter S corporation.
The testimony showed that Bowman and DiNatali are the sole officers, directors and shareholders of both of the plaintiff and Industrial. Finally, the evidence revealed that both Bowman and DiNatali personally guaranteed the mortgage loan which financed the purchase of the property and continued to be the guarantors at the time of trial.
It is on these facts that the plaintiff predicates its motion to add plaintiffs and amend the appeal. Ordinarily, motions made under §
"Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion." One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of the action or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy. "`Admare Construction Co. v. Freedman"',
Each of the parties has treated the concept of standing as being governed by the principles which control a person's status as an aggrieved party. Indeed, our Supreme Court has treated aggrievement as a subset of the broader concept of standing.Primerica v. Planning and Zoning,
The principle of standing, irrespective of whether it is analyzed from the stand point of aggrievement in its classical sense or on the basis of whether the plaintiff is a proper party to request an adjudication, Steeneck v. University of Bridgeport,
"Any person whose affordable housing application is denied or is approved with restrictions which have a substantial adverse impact on the viability of the affordable housing development or the degree of afford ability of the affordable dwelling units . . . may appeal such decision pursuant to the procedures of this section . . . Except as otherwise provided in this section, appeals involving an affordable housing application shall proceed in conformance with the provision of said sections §
8-8 , §8-9 , §8-28 , §8-30 or §8-30a , as applicable."
Until enactment of §
In D'Amato v. Orange, supra at 446, this court said the following:
"By its terms §
8-30g (b) creates a new level of standing for affordable housing appeals which is not wholly dependent upon ownership, possession or control of a property interest. See, Richards v. Planning and Zoning Commission,170 Conn. 318 (1976). This provision of the statute is conspicuous by its omission of the term "aggrieved". . . .Ostensibly § (b) confers standing to appeal on any person whether or not aggrieved whose affordable housing application is denied or approved with restrictions that adversely impact viability in a substantial way. "Affordable housing application" is defined in §
8-30g (a)(2) as `any application made to a commission in connection with an affordable housing development by a person who proposes to develop such affordable housing'". (Emphasis added).
Thus, without determining whether such a person must be aggrieved in the classical sense it must first be determined whether the plaintiff or any of the persons who seek to be added as parties are not only persons whose affordable housing application were denied but also whether they are persons who propose to develop the affordable housing. This inquiry simply asks "who is the real party in interest under the statute"?Richards v. Planning and Zoning Commission, supra at 323.
It is noted that the last sentence of §
Furthermore, the requirement that the applicant propose to build affordable housing implies an element of seriousness and provides ample protection against the unlikely possibility of filings by frivolous applicants who have no present or potential property interest in the site. As our Supreme Court stated inKaufman v. Danbury, supra at 141, the applicant must provide some "meaningful assurance" that he will build affordable housing. Thus, the threshold jurisdictional hearing under §
By way of example, a federally funded not-for-profit-applicant may make application under §
Each of the persons who claims standing in this proceeding will be considered in order.
Partners Equity, Inc, ("Partners").
While Partners was the applicant before the commission, was the option holder at the time the commission acted and continued in both capacities at the time that the appeal was taken, it divested itself of all CT Page 11085 connection with the application when it lost its interest in the property by virtue of the conveyance from Amba Realty (the owner-optionor) to Industrial. Moreover, there was no evidence at trial that Partners has anything whatsoever to do with either the property or the proposal to develop affordable housing that was embodied in the denied application.
Industrial
Because it was not formed until March 1996 this corporation could not have been a person whose application was denied within the meaning of the statute although it acquired title to the property during the pendency of this appeal. Curiously, no evidence was offered that Industrial intends to adhere to partner's plan to develop affordable housing or offer its own plan. Certainly there was no evidence of an assignment of Partner's rights to the application as denied or an assignment of the right to pursue this appeal. At oral argument, the court was asked to infer from the fact that Industrial moved to be added as a party plaintiff that it intended thereby to pursue Partner's proposal to develop affordable housing. In fact, the proposed amended appeal does not allege anything more than the fact of Industrial's ownership of the property since March 1996. It alleges neither that Industrial is aggrieved nor that it intends to develop affordable housing at the site. While names can be misleading, the court might be justified in inferring that the very title "Industrial Associates" connotes an intention to engage in some business other than the construction of affordable housing. It is further noted that there was no assignment of the option agreement to Industrial and no mention of affordable housing in the deed from Ambra Realty Corporation to Industrial (Exhibit D). There is no basis in the record for the inference requested.
Bowman and DiNatali
The proposed amended appeal alleges that Bowman and DiNatali are aggrieved by reason of their "exclusive and uncontested control" of both Partners and Industrial and their "exclusive and uncontested possession" of the property. They argue that they are aggrieved in their "derivative or affiliated capacity" which flows from their status as sole shareholders in subchapter S corporations, and the only officers and directors if both corporations. They further argue that by virtue of that status they are the parties who are actually in possession and control CT Page 11086 of the property. Finally, they argue that the "tight relationship" between the two shareholders and Industrial is reinforced by the fact that they became guarantors of Industrial's mortgage.
The difficulty with Bowman and DiNatali's position is that it ignores the legal distinction between a corporation and its shareholders. It does not matter that the corporation "is a so called closed corporation, with only [few] stockholders, it is nevertheless a legal entity with separate rights and powers conferred and duties and liabilities imposed by law." Betar v.United Sausage Co.,
Under certain circumstances however the court will disregard the corporate entity and look to the individuals who control it. "The cases where this will be done are those in which the corporation is a mere sham or device to accomplish some ulterior purpose or is a mere instrumentality or agent of another corporation or individual owning all or most of its stock . . . or whether the purposes is to evade some statute or accomplish some fraud for an illegal purpose . . . or in some other like situation . . . unless something of this nature is established, to refuse to recognize the corporate entity as such is in the words of Chief Judge Cardozo, to `thwart the public policy of the state instead of defending and upholding it.'" (Citations omitted.) Hoffman Wallpaper Co. v. Hartford,
In a similar context, the Appellate Court in D.S. Associatesv. Planning and Zoning Commission,
D.S. Associates is a partnership, Twin Pines is a corporation. Even though shareholders of the corporation and the partners are all the same the partnership and the corporation have a separate legal identity and are separate persons under the law. Fidelity Trust Co. v. B.V.D. Associates,
196 Conn. 270 ,279-81 ,492 A.2d 180 (1985). "`If they adopt a corporate form, with the corporate shield extended over them to protect them against personal liability, they cease to be partners and have only the rights, duties and obligations of stockholders. They can not be partners inter sese and the corporation as to the rest of the world.'" Karanian v. Maulucci,185 Conn. 320 ,324 ,440 A.2d 959 (1981)."
Despite the fact that they identified themselves to the commission as the principals of Partners there is nothing in the record to suggest that they as individuals as opposed to their corporation were the persons who proposed to develop this property for affordable housing or were to be personally responsible for it in any way. The fact that they are personal guarantors of the note and mortgage given to finance the purchase of the property does not in any way make them responsible for the development of affordable housing on the property. The plaintiff offered no evidence or argument that the mortgage documents even mentioned affordable housing.
Even if Bowman and DiNatali were successfully to establish identity between themselves as shareholders and their corporations they would still have to demonstrate that the interest which they seek to have protected in this appeal falls arguably within the zone of interests to be regulated by § CT Page 11088
Based upon the foregoing analysis there is no one before the court who has standing to maintain this appeal.
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
MOTTOLESE, J.
Mystic Marinelife Aquarium, Inc. v. Gill , 175 Conn. 483 ( 1978 )
Bator v. United Sausage Co. , 138 Conn. 18 ( 1951 )
Hoffman Wall Paper Co., Inc. v. Hartford , 114 Conn. 531 ( 1932 )
Silberman v. Blodgett , 105 Conn. 192 ( 1926 )
Saphir v. Neustadt , 177 Conn. 191 ( 1979 )
Richards v. Planning & Zoning Commission , 170 Conn. 318 ( 1976 )
Blodgett v. Silberman , 48 S. Ct. 410 ( 1928 )