DocketNumber: No. CV 99 0428475S
Citation Numbers: 2000 Conn. Super. Ct. 6995
Judges: DEVLIN, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 6/7/2000
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
Townsend's complaint in the present action alleges six counts. Count one alleges professional negligence in connection with Shipp's level of representation in the federal case. In paragraph 17 of count one, Townsend claims that his "right to recover damages for discrimination is irreparably damaged." Count two alleges breach of contract based on the same alleged facts. Count two incorporates paragraph 17 of count one. Count three alleges negligent misrepresentation. Count three also incorporates paragraph 17 of count one. Count four alleges intentional misrepresentation and is otherwise identical to count three. Count five alleges unfair trade practices in violation of General Statutes §
"As a result of defendant's conduct, the plaintiff has suffered an ascertainable loss of money equal to the amount of damages he would have recovered in his suit against Clairol Inc. and Richard Thompson."
Count Six also alleges a CUTPA violation based on reckless indifference to the rights of the plaintiff. Paragraph 30 of count six makes the same claim as paragraph 29 of count five quoted above.
Shipp has moved to dismiss Townsend's complaint asserting that because the controversy is not ripe, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to decide the case. For the reasons set forth below, the motion to dismiss is granted.
LEGAL STANDARD
"Jurisdiction of the subject matter is the power [of the court] to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong." Figueroa v. CS Ball Bearings,
A case that is nonjusticable must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Mayer v. Biafore, Florek and O'Neill,
In an attorney malpractice action, the plaintiff must establish: (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship; (2) the attorney's wrongful act or omission; (3) causation; and (4) damages. Mayer v.Biafore, Florek O'Neill, supra,
DISCUSSION
Shipp argues that because the federal employment discrimination case remains pending, Townsend has not suffered a present loss. It is undisputed that the federal case remains pending.
In essence, in each of the six counts of the present complaint, Townsend seeks as damages the difference between the amount he should have recovered in the federal case and the amount he actually recovered. This is not a case where Townsend seeks damages that are completely independent of these sought in the underlying case. See Tillery v.Mosley, 1998 WL 310866, (Conn.Super. 1998) (claim for emotional distriss); Tomback v. Lyons, 1997 WL566046, Conn. Super. 1997 (plaintiff alleged damages independent of underlying foreclosure suit). Nor is this a case where principles of judicial economy apply so as to relieve the plaintiff from commencing a separate action to resolve an issue that can be adjudicated in the malpractice case. See Mayer v. Biafore, Florek O'Neill, supra,
In his brief Townsend claims to seek damages for his time and effort in handling his federal case pro se. The file reflects that Townsend initially commenced the federal lawsuit pro se. Thereafter, he hired Shipp as his lawyer. Townsend subsequently discharged Shipp and the district court granted Shipp's motion to withdraw. Even assuming that the work associated with self representation are recoverable damages, their extent cannot be determined until resolution of the federal case.Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Town of Groton,
In sum, because all of Townsend's claims for damages are derivative of the result anticipated in the yet unresolved federal case, the claims are not ripe. Since claims that are not ripe are not justiciable, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly the motion to dismiss must be granted.
For the reasons set forth above, the defendant's motion to dismiss is granted.
So ordered at New Haven, Connecticut this 8th day of June, 2000.
Devlin, J.