DocketNumber: No. CV02 018 9311
Citation Numbers: 2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 13714
Judges: D'ANDREA, JUDGE TRIAL REFEREE.
Filed Date: 10/29/2002
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
On May 3, 2002, the plaintiffs filed a summons and seven count complaint seeking from the defendant accountings for and distributions from Adam and Locia's trusts and estates, an accounting for and distributions from Christine's trust and estate, and damages for violation of trustee obligations, failure to distribute profits from the Florida partnership, and diversion of partnership and trust funds.
On June 3, 2002, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of insufficient service of process and lack of personal jurisdiction and filed a memorandum in support thereof. The plaintiffs filed a memorandum in opposition to the defendant's motion to dismiss on June 11, 2002, to which the defendant replied on June 27, 2002. It is in the defendant's reply that he first argues that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case.
"A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Blumenthal v. Barnes,
"Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it. . . . [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction." Id., 52. Although the defendant first raised this issue in his reply to the plaintiffs' opposition to his motion to dismiss, "[t]he objection of want of jurisdiction may be made at any time. . . . The requirement of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by any party and can be raised at any stage in the proceedings. . . . If at any point, it becomes apparent to the court that such jurisdiction is lacking, the [complaint] must be dismissed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 52.
Because the defendant has questioned this court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case, whether subject matter jurisdiction exists must be determined before any other analysis. "Whenever the absence of jurisdiction is brought to the notice of the court or tribunal, cognizance of it must be taken and the matter passed upon before it can move one further step in the case; as any movement is necessarily the exercise of jurisdiction." Federal Deposit Ins. Co. v. Peabody. N.E.,Inc.,
This case can be viewed as involving three separate, albeit interrelated, issues: how Adam and Locia's estates were administered or executed and how Adam's trust was managed and distributed; how Christine's estate was executed; and how Christine's trust was managed and distributed, which includes the defendant's involvement with and activities regarding the partnership. Therefore, this court will address jurisdiction over the subject matter of each in turn.
On February 17, 1982, in Florida, Adam executed a document creating an inter vivos trust and naming Locia, the defendant, and Peter M. Dunbar (Dunbar) as the co-trustees, with Dunbar also serving as independent trustee. (Plaintiffs' Complaint, Exhibit A, page 1.) While he was living, the trustees were to pay Adam the net income from the trust. Upon his death, and after paying to his estate funds to cover, inter alia, funeral expenses, debts and administration fees, the body of the trust CT Page 13716 was to be divided into two trusts: a marital trust, for Locia's benefit, and a residuary trust, for the benefit of Locia and Adam and Locia's children or other issue. Upon Locia's death, the body of the marital trust was to be distributed according to Locia's will, or, if no will, the principal and income were to be added to the residuary trust. Upon Locia's death, the principal of the residuary trust was to be distributed equally to Adam and Locia's children who survived Locia, or, if a child predeceased Locia, to that child's issue. The trust document contained the provision: "This Agreement and the Trust hereby created shall be governed and interpreted in the courts for the laws of the State of Florida." (Plaintiffs' Complaint, Exhibit A, p. 14.)
The current issue is whether this court has jurisdiction over Adam's inter vivos trust and the powers to order an accounting and to determine whether the trust assets were distributed properly. It is well-established that "[t]he settlor [of an inter vivos trust] can select the laws of a state other than that of his domicile that will govern the validity and administration of the trust and thereby assure the ability of his trustee to act." G. Bogert, Trusts and Trustees (2d Ed. 1992) § 233, p. 18. It follows that the settlor can select the laws of his domicile to govern the validity and administration of the trust, and, because "Connecticut case law is clear that the courts will uphold an agreement of the parties to submit to the jurisdiction of a particular tribunal"; Pheonix Leasing, Inc. v. Kosinski,
Although the court in Friedman v. Jamison Business Systems, Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. CV 01 0343518 (February 25, 2002, White, J.) (
This court concludes that the forum selection clause in Adam's trust agreement confers exclusive jurisdiction over matters arising from the agreement, and interprets the provision to require not only that the agreement and trust created be governed by Florida law, but that the agreement and trust be interpreted in Florida's courts. It is worthy to emphasize that the trust itself, not only the trust agreement, is to be governed by and interpreted in Florida's courts. Because the language of the choice of law provision is broad and extends to the actual trust; seeMessler v. Barnes Group, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 96 0560004 (February 1, 1999, Teller, J.) (
Because both Adam and Locia were residents of Florida when they died, and because the defendant, a Florida resident, was appointed either the sole or co-fiduciary of their estates, this court has no jurisdiction over these estates and has no power to order an accounting of or distributions from the estates. Additionally, because Adam, a resident of Florida, conveyed a parcel of land situated in Florida, this court has no jurisdiction over the conveyance.
It follows, then, that because the court lacks subject matter, count one and count two must be dismissed.
Christine Priest, the mother of the plaintiffs, died on September 20, 1996, as a resident of Norwalk, Connecticut. Her brother, the defendant, was appointed by the Probate Court in Norwalk as the executor of her estate. The estate was settled in 1998. (Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Exhibit B.) The plaintiffs now seek an accounting of Christine's estate and termination of the defendant as fiduciary for the estate. The plaintiffs, however, have not set forth in the complaint any factual allegations regarding the defendant's management of the estate.
General Statutes §
"The Superior Court, in equitable proceedings, has the power to grant relief against probate judgments only if it concludes that the probate decree attacked is, or at least should be treated as, void because of fraud, mistake or a like equitable ground." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dunham v. Dunham,
In light of the fact that Christine's estate was settled by the Probate Court in 1998, a decision the plaintiffs now attempt to attack collaterally without any showing of fraud, the court is without subject matter jurisdiction pertaining to Christine's estate and has no power to order an accounting of or distribution from the estate.
Connecticut's courts of probate have "jurisdiction of accounts of the actions of trustees of [certain] inter vivos trusts. . . ." General Statutes §
The probate court's jurisdiction, however, is not exclusive. "Prior to 1963 the Superior Court, as the only court of general equitable jurisdiction, had exclusive jurisdiction over the final settlement of the accounts of inter vivos trusts. See [Preston v. Preston,
Christine and the defendant entered into a trust agreement on April 6, 1984. (Plaintiffs' Complaint, Exhibit C, p. 1.) Christine, the grantor, designated herself and the defendant as co-trustees of the revocable inter vivos trust created by the trust document; at the time the agreement was signed, Christine was a resident in Connecticut and the defendant was a resident of Florida. While Christine was living, the trustees were to pay her the net income, and, if appropriate, the principal, from the trust fund. Upon Christine's death, the principal was to remain in trust for her children, or their descendants, until her children reached thirty years of age, when the trust would terminate. Upon termination, the principal of the trust was to be distributed to her children or their descendants. If Christine's children predeceased her, leaving no issue, the balance of the trust was to be distributed to the defendant or his issue should the defendant predecease Christine. Unfortunately, Christine died in 1996 while a resident of Norwalk, Connecticut. Julia Priest reached thirty years of age on October 9, 1994. Alexander Priest reached thirty years of age on June 16, 1997.2
Revocable inter vivos trusts are designed to avoid probate. See G. Bogert, Trusts and Trustees (2d Ed. 1992) § 233, p. 18. As such, trust assets are not usually included in the decedent's probated estate. Neither the plaintiffs nor the defendant have offered any evidence that the trust was included in Christine's probated estate. In fact, counts CT Page 13720 three through seven of the complaint contain allegations pertaining to the management of and distributions from Christine's trust, and as the defendant points out, the "claims set forth in the Plaintiffs' Complaint do not arise out of the Defendant's role as executor of Christine Priest's estate . . . (Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss, p. 7.)
The plaintiffs are clearly beneficiaries of Christine's inter vivos trust. Christine, the settlor of the trust, resided in Norwalk, Connecticut immediately prior to death. See General Statutes §
Section §
In counts five through seven of the complaint, the plaintiffs' allege violation of trustee obligations, failure to distribute profits from the partnership, and diversion of partnership and trust funds. Although not specifically named as such, this court interprets these allegations to be claims of a breach of fiduciary duty. "[T]he interpretation of pleadings is always a question of law for the court. . . . We have pointed out that [t]he burden [is] upon the pleaders to make such averments that the material facts should appear with reasonable certainty; and for that purpose [the pleaders are] allowed to use their own language. Whenever that language fails to define clearly the issues in dispute, the court will put upon it such reasonable construction as will give effect to the CT Page 13721 pleadings in conformity with the general theory which it was intended to follow, and do substantial justice between the parties." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United Components, Inc. v. Wdowiak,
The Superior Court has jurisdiction over claims for breach of fiduciary duty. It follows that the Superior Court has jurisdiction over claims for breach of fiduciary duty by a trustee for an inter vivos trust. Furthermore, "[u]nder existing law, the question of whether there are adequate grounds for the removal of a trustee is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. . . ." Jackson v. Conland,
Therefore, based on the reasoning above, this court has jurisdiction over the management of and distributions from Christine's trust. Because the partnership is so connected to Christine's trust, jurisdiction extends to the management of the partnership.
The claims pertaining to the management of Adam and Locia's trusts and estates, Adam's conveyance of land situated in Florida, and the management of Christine's estate are dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; thus, the only question remaining before this court is whether the service of process effected on the defendant was proper.
The only counts of the complaint that remain are counts three through seven, which pertain to the management of and distribution from Christine's trust, and the alleged breach of fiduciary duty owed to the plaintiffs by the defendant. To effectuate service of process on the defendant, the plaintiffs served the Judge of the Probate Court of Norwalk with the writ, summons and complaint pursuant to General Statutes §§
"[T]he Superior Court . . . may exercise jurisdiction over a person only if that person has been properly served with process . . . [unless the person] has waived any objection to the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kim v. Magnotta,
"The process of statutory interpretation involves a reasoned search for the intention of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. In seeking to determine that meaning, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Schiano v. BlissExterminating Co.,
Section
Section
Based on the foregoing, because the plaintiffs have not properly served the defendant with process, the complaint must be dismissed in its entirety.
D'Andrea, JTR
John Boutari and Son, Wines and Spirits, S.A. v. Attiki ... , 22 F.3d 51 ( 1994 )
Phillips v. Moeller , 147 Conn. 482 ( 1960 )
Second Nat. Bk., New Haven v. Harris Trust Sav. , 29 Conn. Super. Ct. 275 ( 1971 )
Preston v. Preston , 102 Conn. 96 ( 1925 )