DocketNumber: No. CV-H9003 0492
Citation Numbers: 1994 Conn. Super. Ct. 10058-B, 12 Conn. L. Rptr. 609
Judges: DiPENTIMA, J.
Filed Date: 10/31/1994
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
On August 3, 1992, the court certified the class of plaintiffs as those persons who resided in housing operated by the defendants between March 1, 1984 and July 1, 1992, whose income at any time during that period consisted solely of general assistance payments and whose rent was not calculated in accordance with
On September 14, 1992, a Consent Judgment entered, granting the relief sought in the complaint. On December 3, 1993, the plaintiff filed this Motion for Fees, seeking an award for both attorney and paralegal fees.
The defendants raise three grounds for their objection to CT Page 10058-C the plaintiff's Motion for Fees: 1) lack of subject matter jurisdiction for the plaintiff's failure to exhaust her administrative remedies; 2) neither the federal or state statutes authorize an award of fees to this plaintiff; and 3) public policy would not be served by an award of fees against the defendant non-profit organization.
As to the first objection, the court finds that since the parties entered into a Consent Judgment resolving the merits of the underlying action the defendants cannot now raise the issue of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Further, as the plaintiff notes in her Supplemental Memorandum (p. 4) the grievance procedure does not apply to class actions. See
As to the defendants' second argument, there is ample authority to support an award of fees in this case. The federal statute,
. . . once it has been determined that plaintiff obtained benefits for the class in the settlement on some claim, plaintiff is `the prevailing party' within the meaning of the statute [
42 U.S.C. § 1988 ].
There the court determined that the consent decree gave the plaintiff "virtually all" the relief she sought in the complaint and noted that "[t]he consent decree was the product of the litigation and plaintiff is entitled to use it to justify as award."
As to the third ground of the defendants' objection, the court notes the purpose behind the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976,
The purpose of § 1988 is to ensure `effective access to the judicial process' for persons with civil rights grievances. H.R. Rep. No 94-1558, p. 1 (1976)
Hensley v. Eckerhart,
The amount of a fee award to the prevailing party is within the discretion of the trial court. At oral argument the defendants suggest that the case was resolved more through "bookkeeping" than through lawyering and that the award should be reduced accordingly.
The plaintiffs seek fees in the amount of $23,723.00. A portion of that amount ($7,437.50) is attributable to paralegals and the balance ($16,285.50) to Attorney David Pels. The plaintiff provided contemporaneous time records indicating the number of hours spent on specific tasks. Affidavits regarding Attorney Pels' experience and skill, the hourly rates charged by attorneys of similar skill and experience and paralegal hourly rates were provided to the court to support the claimed hourly rates of $175 for Attorney Pels and $70 for the paralegals. The court finds the hourly rates reasonable.
The court applied the lodestar approach and then considered the more subjective factors such as risk of litigation, the complexity of issues and the skill that was required of the attorneys. New York Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey,
The court has examined the time records of Attorney Pels and the paralegals, has considered the outcome and legal complexity of the underlying action and accordingly concludes that a total award of $11,850 is reasonable.
Alexandria Davis DiPentima, J.