DocketNumber: No. CV 950380475
Citation Numbers: 1996 Conn. Super. Ct. 2895-YYY, 16 Conn. L. Rptr. 641
Judges: FREEDMAN, J.
Filed Date: 4/26/1996
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
On March 8, 1996, the defendant filed its answer to the plaintiffs complaint alleging three special defenses. The CT Page 2895-ZZZ defendant alleges in the first special defense that the amount of underinsured motorist benefits available to the plaintiff under the policy are limited to $300,000 less any other collateral amounts already received by the plaintiff. In the second and third special defenses, the defendant alleges the theories of sudden emergency and unavoidable accident, respectively. On March 12, 1996, the plaintiff filed a motion to strike the defendant's three special defenses.
A motion to strike tests the legal sufficiency of a special defense. Practice Book § 152(5); Nowak v. Nowak,
The defendant alleges in its first special defense that the underinsured motorist benefits available to the plaintiff under the policy are limited to $300,000 less any collateral source payments received by the plaintiff. Although Practice Book § 195A states that "no pleading shall contain any allegations regarding receipt by a party of collateral source payments as described in [General Statutes] §
The defendant alleges the theory of sudden emergency in its second special defense. In Silvernail v. Barsalou, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, CT Page 2895-AAAA Docket No. 513412, 8 CONN. L. RPTR. 70 (December 10, 1992) (Wagner, J.), the court held, in a personal injury action arising out of a motor vehicle accident, that the issue of sudden emergency should be pleaded as a simple denial to the plaintiffs negligence allegations. Accordingly, the court granted the plaintiff's motion to strike the defendant's special defense of sudden emergency. Id. Since the facts of the present case are similar to Silvernail v. Barsalou, the court grants the plaintiffs motion to strike the defendant's second special defense.
The defendant's third special defense concerns the theory of unavoidable accident. In Bikakis v. Alcock, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. 313691, 15 CONN. L. RPTR. 161 (August 1, 1995) (Freedman, J.), a case similar to the present case, this court granted the plaintiff's motion to strike the defendant's special defense of unavoidable accident because the defendant should also plead this issue as a simple denial. Therefore, the court follows the holding ofBikakis v. Alcock, supra, and grants the plaintiff's motion to strike the defendant's third special defense.
The motion to strike the defendant's first special defense is denied. The motion to strike the defendant's second and third special defenses is granted.
FREEDMAN, J.