DocketNumber: No. CV 98 0411721
Citation Numbers: 2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 10759
Judges: BOOTH, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 8/19/2002
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
The facts reveal that the defendant, acting in his official capacity as commissioner of consumer protection, initiated a law suit against the plaintiff. Part of the complaint requested that a receiver be appointed pursuant to General Statutes §
On April 13, 1998, the plaintiff filed suit against the defendant.3
The defendant answered the complaint and filed special defenses on May 3, 1999. On February 27, 2002, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. The defendant argues in his motion that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction due to sovereign immunity. The defendant also contends that he has statutory immunity, pursuant to General Statutes §
The defendant argues that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because of sovereign immunity. The plaintiff argues, however, that he has sued the defendant in his individual capacity and, therefore, sovereign CT Page 10761 immunity has not been implicated.
"Although the present action was brought against the defendant in his personal capacity, the state is correct in asserting that [t]he fact that the state is not named as a defendant does not conclusively establish that the action is not within the principle which prohibits actions against the sovereign without its consent. . . . The vital test is to be found in the essential nature and effect of the proceeding. . . . The [Supreme Court has] laid down the following criteria for determining whether the suit is, in effect, one against the state and cannot be maintained without its consent: (1) a state official has been sued; (2) the suit concerns some matter in which that official represents the state; (3) the state is the real party against whom relief is sought; and (4) the judgment, though nominally against the official, will operate to control the activities of the state or subject it to liability." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Spring v.Constantino,
In deciding whether the suit is really against the state, the court must look to the four criteria set fourth in Spring. Clearly, the first two criteria, that a state official has been sued and that the suit concerns a matter in which the official represents the state, have been met. Shiffrin was a state official and has been sued for a matter in which he represented the state. The final two criteria require more analysis.
The third criteria requires that the state be the real party from which relief is sought. Though not often analyzed, Somers v. Hill,
The complaint in the present case makes the state the real party in interest. The commissioner of consumer protection is alleged to have caused the injury complained of while carrying out a duty entrusted upon him by §
The fourth criteria, concerning whether the judgment will control the activity of the state, also requires some analysis. Most often this factor has been critical in cases where school agencies have been sued because their activities are sometimes state functions and sometimes municipal functions. See, e.g., Purzvcki v. Fairfield,
The judgment in the present case would control the activities of the state. If the plaintiff were to obtain a judgment against the commissioner in the present case, it would affect how the office of consumer protection would bring future lawsuits against businesses allegedly engaged in unfair trade practices.
All four criteria are met. The defendant has sovereign immunity. "Sovereign immunity does not bar suits against state officials acting in excess of their statutory authority or pursuant to an unconstitutional statute." Shay v. Rossi,
What constitutes action that is in excess of statutory authority is not clearly defined. "Although we cannot. . . . at this stage of our jurisprudence, define with any degree of specificity where the line is, we think it is somewhere between . . . two poles, namely, at "one pole, the standard for abrogation of judicial immunity, and at the other pole, that a process of statutory interpretation yields a conclusion that the state officials acted beyond their authority." Id., 172.
In order to determine whether the demonstrated facts implicate this exception to sovereign immunity, the court must look at the documents submitted by the parties. See Id., 141. The defendant avers that DCF employees, in preparation for the underlying case, investigated the case by "inspecting Adoption Services' records and obtaining statements from its employees, former employees, clients and former clients." The defendant avers that "[t]he evidence and testimony gathered in the course of the DCF investigation supported both the allegations and the relief sought in the proposed CUTPA complaint against Adoption Services and Kenneth Keller . . . " without explaining how that evidence supported the complaint. Keller claims, from his knowledge as the chief executive officer of Adoption Services, that the state's case against Adoption Services and himself was ill-founded. The affidavit, in great detail, goes through the complaint to illustrate that the underlying complaint was baseless and that the defendant did not verify his allegations.
These claims of the plaintiff, at most, demonstrate that the defendant instituted the state's case without probable cause. The question, however, is whether this conduct would operate to allow the plaintiff to continue suit against the defendant because the defendant acted in excess of his statutory authority.
In the seminal case of Shay v. Rossi, 253, Conn. 134 (2000) the Supreme Court looked to several facts to determine whether the plaintiffs had properly alleged that the defendants had acted in excess of their statutory authority. Overturning a motion to dismiss a complaint predicated upon an investigation by the department of families and children, the court found that "the critical factual allegations in the plaintiffs' complaint are that: (1) the neglect and abuse petitions were filed without probable cause and in the face of overwhelming evidence of the absence of abuse and neglect; (2) the defendants' refusal to withdraw CT Page 10764 the petitions and their insistence that Stephen Shay undergo in-home supervision and counseling were contrary to the evidence in the record and the advice of department staff; and (3) the defendants' conclusion that neglect and abuse of the Shay children had been confirmed was without foundation, unreasonable, arbitrary, wilful, wanton, reckless and malicious, and designed to vindicate and legiti[mize] their handling ofthe Shay case which was, from the outset, unlawful, uncaring, andunnecessary. (Emphasis added.) These allegations, including the last allegation in particular, read broadly in the plaintiffs' favor, as they must be . . . charge the defendants with improper and self-serving motives in filing the neglect and abuse petitions, in pursuing them for as long as they did, and in pursuing the in-home supervision of the family for as long as they did." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 173.
The facts of the present case are much less severe. Though the plaintiff has perhaps demonstrated the defendant's initiation of the suit without probable cause, the defendant and the plaintiff both have shown that the defendant, upon having the preliminary case dismissed, withdrew the whole case against the plaintiff. The defendant did not, in the face of contrary findings in the record and in court, continue to pursue the matter and force a settlement or courtroom victory against the plaintiff, unlike the alleged actions of the defendants in Shay v.Rossi.5 Cf., Hultman v. Blumenthal, supra,
The court,
By: _______________________ Kevin E. Booth, Judge