DocketNumber: No. CV89 257140
Citation Numbers: 1994 Conn. Super. Ct. 10058-Q, 9 Conn. L. Rptr. 1226
Judges: FREEDMAN, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 10/21/1994
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
Bridgeport city attorney for plaintiff.
Stratford town attorney for defendant.
The plaintiff, City of Bridgeport, seeks a declaratory judgment, a writ of mandamus and injunctive relief against the defendant, Town of Stratford (Town). Other named defendants are the Planning Zoning Commission of the Town of Stratford (PZC), Michael Bobko, a planning administrator, Edward Carroll, a building official, and the individual members of the PZC (in their official capacities). The plaintiff seeks to compel the Town (and its named officials and agencies) to adopt airport zoning regulations and to create a joint airport zoning board pursuant to General Statutes §§
The dispute concerns the Sikorsky Memorial Airport located in the Town of Stratford, but owned and operated by the plaintiff. In a three count complaint filed on February 15, 1989, the plaintiff alleges that the Town failed to include the airport in its comprehensive zoning plan; that at various times since 1981, it made demands upon the Town to include the airport in the Town's comprehensive zoning plan and to adopt zoning regulations that specifically address the airport; and that the Town's failure to take such action caused the plaintiff to lose federal grants.
In the first count of its complaint, the plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, and argues that General Statutes §
On or about March 10, 1989, National Properties, Inc., a contract purchaser for a parcel of land located within the proposed airport impact zone, was added as a party defendant. On August 1, 1994, Joseph Garamella and Nicholas Mainiero pursuant to their motion, were added as party defendants (the intervening defendants). The intervening defendants own the parcel of land that National Properties, Inc., has contracted to buy. The intervening defendants allege that their property will be impacted by the plaintiff's requested relief.
On August 4, 1994, the intervening defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff lacks standing to bring its claims, and therefore, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. CT Page 10058-S
Practice Book § 384 provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp.,
"Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
Standing is . . . a rule of judicial administration based upon the principle that the appropriate parties to litigate a dispute are those who are injured or about to be injured. The purpose of this requirement is generally said to ensure the existence of that concrete adverseness between the parties that guarantees "that the questions will be framed with the necessary specificity, that the issues will be contested with the necessary adverseness and that the litigation would be pursued with the necessary vigor. . . ."Manchester Environmental Coalition v. Stockton,
"When standing is put in issue, the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of the issue and not whether the controversy is otherwise justiciable, or whether, on the merits, the plaintiff has a legally protected interest that the defendant's action has invaded."Connecticut Assn. of Boards of Education, Inc. v. Shedd,
The intervening defendants argue that the plaintiff has no standing under General Statutes §
Any person who violates any provision of sections
15-88 to15-96 , inclusive, or any regulation, order, zoning ordinance or ruling promulgated or made pursuant thereto, shall be fined not more than twenty-five dollars. . . . In addition, either the municipality within which the property is located or the commissioner may institute . . . an action to prevent, restrain, correct or abate any violation thereof, or of airport zoning regulations adopted thereunder, or of any order or ruling made in connection with their administration or enforcement, and the court shall adjudge to the plaintiff such relief, by way injunction, which may be mandatory, or otherwise, as may be proper under all the facts and circumstances of the case, in order fully to effectuate the purpose of said sections. . . .
General Statutes §
Furthermore, §
"The question of standing to pursue a declaratory judgment is essentially one of aggrievement." New Haven Firebird Society v.Board of Fire Commissioners,
The file does not reflect whether the parties had the opportunity to either establish or contest the issue of the plaintiff's aggrievement. Such a determination cannot be made based on the record before the court. Accordingly, the court denies the intervening defendant's motion for summary judgment as to the first count.
In moving for summary judgment on the plaintiff's second count, the intervening defendants argue that mandamus is inappropriate in the present case because the Town and its officials do not have a clear legal obligation to perform the acts that the plaintiff seeks to compel them to perform (i.e., to adopt airport zoning regulations and to form a joint airport zoning board).
"If the duty is imposed on an individual holding a public office . . . the writ runs against that individual. . . . If the duty must be performed by several persons holding different offices, the writ runs to each and all. . . ." Venditto v. Auletta, CT Page 10058-V
The intervening defendants also move for summary judgment on the third count of the complaint. Pursuant to this count, the plaintiff sought a temporary restraining order for the purpose of preventing the Town from issuing building permits with respect to properties which are located within the "airport impact zone." On February 2, 1989, the court, Thompson, J., issued a temporary restraining order directing the Town and its officials to refrain from issuing building permits to the intervening defendants and other person who own property located within the "airport impact zone." On July 27, 1989, the intervening defendants filed a motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order. The file does not reflect whether any action has been taken or whether any decision has been rendered with respect to the motion to dissolve.
Even assuming that the motion to dissolve was previously denied, it would not be proper for the court to address the propriety of the temporary restraining order in the context of ruling on the present motion for summary judgment. The parties first need to resolve the issues of standing which is also germane to the plaintiff's right to seek injunctive relief. See Unisys Corp. v.Department of Labor,
Freedman, Judge