DocketNumber: No. CV 89-0367300S
Citation Numbers: 1994 Conn. Super. Ct. 11101-I
Judges: SHELDON, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 11/9/1994
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
In November and December of 1986, the ERB conducted hearings on the plaintiff's appeal. On February 8, 1987, it issued a written decision, with findings of fact, upholding the State's dismissal of the plaintiff.
The plaintiff did not appeal the ERB's decision to this Court, as authorized by General Statutes §
(1) "because [he] filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits," a violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. §
31-290a ;(2) "because [he] otherwise exercised the rights afforded him pursuant to the provisions of Workers' Compensation Act]," a violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. §
31-290a ;(3) "because [he] report[ed], verbally or in writing, a violation or a suspected violation of any state . . . law," a violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. §
31-51m (b), CT Page 11101-K commonly known as the Whistle Blower Statute; [and](4) "on account of the exercise by him of [his right to petition the government for redress of grievances] guaranteed by the
first amendment to the United States Constitution or section 3, 4, or 14 of the article first of the constitution of the state," a violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. §31-51q .
On December 10, 1993, the defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, claiming that the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and therefore that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction as a matter of law. The defendant has filed both a memorandum and a supplemental memorandum in support of its position. The plaintiff has filed a memorandum in opposition, dated May 16, 1994.
Although not binding, it is worthy of note that this Court, Freed, J., in a memorandum of decision dated January 23, 1990 [1 CONN. L. RPTR. 226], addressed this same issue on a Motion to Dismiss. Judge Freed, in denying the defendant's Motion to Dismiss, held that since the plaintiff's four counts fell within an exception to the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine, the plaintiff was not required to exhaust his administrative remedy.
Summary judgment is "designed to eliminate delay and expense incident to a trial when there is no real issue to be tried." Dowling v. Kielak,
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Strada v. Connecticut Newspapers,Inc., supra,
A jurisdictional prerequisite to seeking relief in a court of law is that all available administrative remedies have been exhausted. See City of Norwich v. NorwalkWilbert Vault Co., Inc.,
In Cianci v. Connecticut Council for AmericanFederation of State, County and Municipal Employees(AFSCME),
Recognizing the initial concurrent jurisdiction of this Court4 and the administrative agency itself, the Connecticut Appellate Court, affirmed the trial court's CT Page 11101-M decision, as follows:
[T]he plaintiff in the present action elected initially to proceed before the board, thereby taking advantage of the specialized skills and procedures enjoyed by it . . . . By her election, the plaintiff was constrained to exhaust the remedies available in the manner prescribed, including the manner by which to appeal . . . . This requirement "`foster[s] an orderly process of administrative adjudication and judicial review in which a reviewing court will have the benefit of the agency's findings and conclusions."
(Emphasis added; citations omitted.) Id., 201-202; see also Riley v. City of Bridgeport,
The foregoing analysis applies with equal force to the case at bar. Since the plaintiff initially elected to proceed in the administrative forum, he was required to exhaust that remedy before pursuing that action.
Furthermore, in his memorandum of decision denying the defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Judge Freed reasoned that the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint have nothing to do with the ERB's review, which, the Court decided, CT Page 11101-N encompassed only the defendant's charges that the plaintiff was incompetent, guilty of misconduct or involved in activities detrimental to the Board. This Court respectfully disagrees.
As previously stated, it was the plaintiff who chose to appeal his dismissal to the ERB pursuant to General Statutes §
Since the plaintiff elected first to appeal the agency's decision to dismiss him to the ERB, he was required to exhaust his administrative remedies by appealing that decision to this Court rather than commencing this independent action. Accordingly, the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
Michael R. Sheldon Judge