DocketNumber: No. CV 94 366855
Citation Numbers: 1998 Conn. Super. Ct. 1887, 22 Conn. L. Rptr. 697
Judges: HARTMERE, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 8/14/1998
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
The defendants move for summary judgment as to counts one and two on the grounds that the waiver release signed by the plaintiff relieves the defendants of any liability. As to counts three and four, the defendants move for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff has failed to allege facts to demonstrate a serious emotional injury in order to sustain an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. In support of their motion, the defendants have submitted with the memorandum in support a student instruction form, a copy of General Statutes §
The defendants rely on Lombardo v. Maguire Group, Inc., "Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex at Middletown, Docket No. 077767 (June 6, 1997, Arena, J.) (3 Conn.Ops. 760), to support their motion. In Lombardo, the court held that parties may not stipulate for protection against liability for negligence in the performance of a duty imposed by law or where public interest requires performance. Id., 761. Here, the defendants assert that the release signed by Carendi did not violate any duty imposed by law nor any public policy. Therefore, the defendants contend that the waiver serves to release the defendants of any liability.
The defendants' reliance on Lombardo is misplaced, however. The court in Lombardo granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant due to the plaintiff s failure to raise any factual issues regarding the scope of the waiver, the intent of the parties, or the adequacy of notice. Id. By contrast, Carendi has raised issues of fact in his affidavit regarding the scope of the waiver and the parties' intent. (Plaintiffs' Opposing Memorandum; Jan Carendi's Affidavit ¶¶ [6, 7, 8.) Carendi asserts that the release in question could be interpreted to mean that he would only be liable for injuries sustained where he failed to abide by the rules of the stable. (Plaintiffs' Opposing Memorandum; Jan Carendi's Affidavit ¶ 16.) Furthermore, by signing the release, Carendi was not contemplating that he was giving up his right to bring a claim under any and all circumstances, nor was he apprised that he was releasing the defendants from responsibility for their own negligence. (Plaintiffs' Opposing Memorandum; Jan Carendi's Affidavit [¶¶ [7 8.) A question of intent raises an issue of material fact, which cannot be decided on a motion for summary CT Page 1890 judgment. Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp,
"[T]he general rule [is] that a contract is to be interpreted according to the intent expressed in its language and not by an intent the court may believe existed in the minds of the parties . . ." (Citations omitted.) Levine v. Massey,
"[A]ny ambiguity in a contract must emanate from the language used in the contract rather than from one party's subjective perception of the terms . . ." (Citations omitted.) Id., 279. "Absent a statutory warranty or definitive contract language, the trial court's interpretation of a contract, being a determination of the parties' intent, is a question of fact . . ." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lawson v. Whitey'sFrame Shop,
Although the defendants contend that the terms of the release are clear and unambiguous, at least one court has found that a release must specifically exempt liability for negligence in order for it to be effective. See Bashura v. Strategy Plus, Inc.,
Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia/Milford at Milford, Docket No. 050871, 21 CONN. L. RPTR. 59 (November 20, 1997, Corradino, J.). The release in question here does not have explicit language releasing the defendant from liability for their own negligence . . ." Moreover, "[t]he law does not favor contract provisions which relieve a person from his own negligence. (Citations omitted.) Griffin v. Nationwide Moving Storage Co.,
"Here, even though the plaintiff signed a release, the plaintiffs deposition and counter affidavit raise a genuine issue of material fact as to her assent to the terms of the release. If there was no mutual assent, the release was not valid . . ." (Citations omitted.) DiUlio v. Goulet,
The defendants have submitted a transcript of Carendi's deposition showing that Stephanie Carendi's emotional injury does not rise to the level of seriousness as required under Clohessy. (Defendant's Memorandum, Exhibit C, Deposition of Jan Carendi.) In his deposition Carendi states that Stephanie Carendi has not required any professional assistance, has not suffered any eating or sleeping disorders, and has not experienced scholastic problems, since the alleged incident; furthermore, Stephanie remained active and excelled with honors in regards to her scholastic achievement. (Deposition of Jan Carendi, pp. 49-51.)
The plaintiffs have not opposed the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to counts three and four. Therefore, the plaintiffs have failed to raise a genuine issue of fact as to serious emotional injury. As a result, the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law under Clohessy. Accordingly, the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to counts three and four will be granted.
In conclusion, the defendants' motion for summary judgment (#140) is denied as to counts one and two, and granted as to counts three and four. CT Page 1892
HARTMERE, J.