DocketNumber: No. CV97 0573396
Citation Numbers: 1998 Conn. Super. Ct. 397, 21 Conn. L. Rptr. 331
Judges: WAGNER, J.
Filed Date: 1/16/1998
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
Defendants' move to strike the complaint on the ground that the conduct of defendants described in the complaint did not rise to the level of "extreme or outrageous" conduct necessary to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. DeLaurentis v. New Haven,
Plaintiff claims the question of whether the alleged conduct amounts to "extreme or outrageous" conduct is one for the trier of fact, but offers no authority for this claim of law except one Superior Court decision Mascia v.Faulkner, Superior Court, New Haven judicial district, Docket No. 399036, (Facasse, J., 1995). All other cases cited by him bear on a litigant's right to have the jury rather than the court determine issues of fact and do not contravene the obligation of the court to determine the legal sufficiency of the allegations of extreme or outrageous conduct.
This court has previously followed the prevailing view in our Superior Court that the determination of whether alleged conduct is sufficiently extreme or outrageous CT Page 398 resides in the first instance with the court. Randall v.Halloran Sage, et al., Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford/New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. 532629 (Wagner J.) (February 14, 1995); Parsons v. SikorskyAircraft, Inc., Superior Court, Judicial District of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. 280394 (Ford J.) (April 5, 1994); Rosario v. Firine, 9 CONN. L. RPTR. 447,
Because of the history of this tort and its relatively recent viability in Connecticut, this court continues to adhere to the prevailing view that whether alleged conduct is sufficiently extreme or outrageous is for the determination of the court in the first instance.
In the context of the defendant Board's non-renewal of the coaching contract, the inquiry about slander, as unjustified as it may have been, and the Board's basing its non-renewal on the admitted use of a curse word to a high school teen does not amount to the extreme or outrageous conduct required as an element of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Since the complaint is insufficient as a matter of law, the motion to strike is granted.
WAGNER, J. CT Page 399