DocketNumber: No. CV 94 054 44 81
Citation Numbers: 1995 Conn. Super. Ct. 14468, 15 Conn. L. Rptr. 513
Judges: MALONEY, J.
Filed Date: 12/20/1995
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
The plaintiff was awarded the degree of Bachelor of Veterinary Science and Animal Husbandry by Punjab Agricultural University, Punjab, India, in 1985. In 1992, he applied to the defendant commissioner for a license to practice veterinary medicine in Connecticut The commissioner denied that application on the basis that the plaintiff had not graduated with a degree of doctor Of veterinary medicine or its equivalent, as required by General Statutes §
In May 1994, the plaintiff requested a declaratory ruling on his eligibility for licensure. At that time, evidence in the record showed that he held licenses to practice veterinary medicine in Michigan, Illinois and Massachusetts. There were also allegations in the record before the commissioner that one or more other persons who had attended the same university as the plaintiff, and had been awarded the same degree, had been licensed by the commissioner to practice in this state. Although there was no hard evidence of such disparate treatment in the record, the allegations are not entirely unsupported. Communications from the commissioner's office that are in the record acknowledge, at least implicitly, that the allegations may be true.
Prior to the issuance of the declaratory ruling, the plaintiff twice requested that the department hold a hearing in accordance with General Statutes §
The department refused to hold a hearing, but it did issue a declaratory ruling, signed by the commissioner on October 15, 1994. In her ruling, the commissioner reiterated the earlier position of the department that the degree received by the plaintiff at Punjab Agricultural University did not satisfy the requirement in General Statutes §§
The plaintiff advances two arguments in support of his appeal of the commissioner's ruling: (1) that the plaintiff has fully satisfied the requirements of §
In Karan v. Adams,
The Karan court did not hold that every professional who holds a license in another state is entitled to a hearing on his or her application for a license in Connecticut. Rather, the court noted that "due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands,'" Karan v. Adams,
supra,
The Karan court cited three factors to consider in determining what process is due in a particular case: "(1) the nature of the private interest sought to be protected; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedure used and the probable value of additional safeguards and (3) the government's interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens that would be placed on it by additional procedures." Id., 911. See, also, to the same effect Harkless v. Rowe,
In the present case, the plaintiff's private interest is essentially the same as the private interest identified in the Karan case; that is, "an interest in being permitted to take the Connecticut licensure examination (or to satisfy the examination requirement through [waiver])." Id., 909.
The risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest under the procedure that was used in the present case is plain. Under the procedure that was used, the plaintiff had no opportunity to develop and present evidence of disparate treatment. Such evidence would be relevant to a variety of material issues — whether the commissioner's interpretation of the statutory requirements for licensure was consistent with prior rulings; whether the interpretation was reasonable; whether the commissioner's CT Page 14472 ruling in the plaintiff's case was arbitrary or discriminatory; and whether the ruling on the plaintiff's application was an abuse of discretion. A hearing, which would be subject to the discovery and evidentiary provisions of General Statutes §§
Finally, the court sees little fiscal or administrative burden on the commissioner or her department in holding a hearing limited to the narrow subject matter requested by the plaintiff. See Karan v.Adams, supra,
Because the court concludes that due process considerations required the commissioner to hold a hearing in accordance with the plaintiff's request, it was an abuse of discretion to refuse to do so. General Statutes §
In view of the court's decision ordering an administrative hearing and a new declaratory ruling, it would be premature at this time to consider the plaintiff's other grounds for appeal.
The appeal is sustained and the case is remanded, in accordance with §
MALONEY, J.