DocketNumber: No. 0053899
Judges: DRANGINIS, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 12/18/1991
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
On July 18, 1990, following public hearings conducted by the defendant, Lot 4 was rezoned from its twenty year old designation as Local Business to an R-10 classification, thereby requiring that it be utilized for single-family residential lots with a minimum area of 10,000 square feet. The plaintiff asserts that the defendant's decision in this latter was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable and illegal. The plaintiff further alleges that the defendants decision to alter the classification of Lot 4 constitutes a taking of the plaintiff's property. The final issue briefed by the plaintiff is that the defendant's decision was reached in violation of the plaintiff's due process rights. On September 26, 1991, the defendant submitted its brief regarding this matter.
This appeal is taken pursuant to General Statutes
The appeal to this court shall be commenced by service of process within fifteen days from the date that notice of the decision was published as required by the general statutes. General Statutes
The plaintiff, in its brief, alleges that the defendant's decision altering Lot 4 from a local business designation to an R-10 designation was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable and illegal. The plaintiff further alleges that the defendant's decision to alter the classification of Lot 4 constitutes a taking of the plaintiff's property. The final issue raised by the plaintiff is that the defendant's decision was reached in violation of the plaintiff's due process rights. The defendant, in its brief, defends its decision.
When a zoning commission amends the classification of zones within a town, it will ordinarily be upheld on appeal unless its actions have been patently arbitrary, unreasonable, illegal or in abuse of its CT Page 10300 discretion. First Hartford Realty Corporation v. Planning and Zoning Commission,
General Statutes
The zoning commission of each city, town, or borough is authorized to regulate, within the limits of such municipality, the height, number of stories and size of buildings and other structures; the percentage of the area of the lot that may be occupied; the size of yards, courts and other open spaces; the density of population and the location and use of buildings, structures and land for trade, industry, residence or other purposes, including water-dependent uses as defined in section
22a-93 , and the height, size and location of advertising signs and billboards. Such zoning commission may divide the municipality into districts of such number, shape and area as may be best suited to carry out the purposes of this chapter; and within such districts, it may regulate the erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration or use of buildings or structures and the use of land. . . Such regulations shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan and shall be designed to lessen congestion in the streets; to secure safety from fire, panic, flood and other dangers; to promote health and general welfare; to provide adequate light and air; to prevent the overcrowding of land; to avoid undue concentration of population and to facilitate the adequate provision for transportation, water, sewerage, schools, parks and other public requirements. Such regulations shall be made with reasonable consideration as to the character of the district and its peculiar suitability for particular uses and with a view to conserving the value of buildings and encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout such municipality. Such regulations shall also encourage the development of housing opportunities for all citizens of the municipality consistent with soil types, terrain and infrastructure capacity. Zoning regulations shall be made with reasonable consideration for their impact on agriculture. Zoning regulations may be made with reasonable consideration for the protection of existing and potential public CT Page 10301 surface and ground drinking water supplies. . . .
Id.
Where "the zoning authority acts to limit the amount of commercial development in the best interests of the community as a whole and in accordance with a comprehensive plan, the requirement of 8-2 that zoning regulations be designed to promote the general welfare, ``with a view to, . . encouraging the most appropriate use of land' throughout the community, is satisfied." First Hartford Realty Corp. supra at 543-44 (quoting Samp Mortar Lake Co. v. Town Plan Zoning Commission,
The record reflects that the proposed zone changes are in compliance with the land use map adopted as part of the city's plan of development. Thus the defendant's actions in adopting the proposed changes are in harmony with its regulations and the comprehensive plans. Consequently, its action cannot be deemed to be arbitrary or illegal. Fenn, supra.
"Until it appears that the plaintiff has been finally deprived by the commission of the reasonable and proper use of the property, it cannot be said that there has been an unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation." Manor Development Corporation v. Conservation Commission,
Zoning reclassifications "can constitute an unconstitutional taking when they leave a property owner with no economically viable use of his land other than exploiting its natural state." Gil v. Inland Wetlands Watercourses Agency,
In the present matter, no cease and desist order, or the equivalent thereof, has been issued. Rather, the decision of the defendant merely restricts the plaintiff from expanding the current use of his land. The zone change does not require him to stop using his land as he is, currently. Furthermore, nowhere in the record does the plaintiff proffer evidence to the effect that his property's value has been diminished. Mr. Moscarillo does state that he intends "to continue to use [his land] for commercial [purpose]," and that he believes his "land is more profitable to [him] as commercial property. And if it is rezoned to residential, it will lose considerable value." Consequently, in light of the standard espoused in Manor Development Corporation, supra, there has been no unconstitutional taking of the plaintiff's property.
General Statutes
While the plaintiff claims that he was limited to a five minute presentation, he is not supported by the record. Indeed, during the public hearing held April 26, 1990, the following conversation took place:
ATTORNEY GALLICCHIO: "I have five minutes per client."
CHAIRMAN HOGAN: "You get a chance to come back to speak."
Additionally, the following conversations took place: CT Page 10303
MR. McKEON: ". . . I want my time."
MS. PACHECO: ". . . When you finish your part of the presentation [five minutes], you can sign up again to speak up again."
CHAIRMAN HOGAN: "You can sign up again and then the five-minute limit is off. You can carry on after that. We want to get through everybody first."
Record Item 5, page 60, 74.
Thus, the five minute limitation policy was only effective during the "first round" of presentations as a means of permitting all those who so desired to speak. Consequently, the public hearings were held in accordance with General Statutes
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.
DRANGINIS, JUDGE
DeMaria v. Enfield Planning & Zoning Commission ( 1970 )
Lathrop v. Planning & Zoning Commission ( 1973 )
Ferndale Dairy, Inc. v. Zoning Commission ( 1961 )
Dooley v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission ( 1964 )
Parks v. Planning & Zoning Commission ( 1979 )
Summ v. Zoning Commission ( 1962 )
Bartlett v. Zoning Commission ( 1971 )
Samp Mortar Lake Co. v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission ( 1967 )