DocketNumber: No. CV99 033 68 86 S
Citation Numbers: 2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 3332
Judges: WHITE, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 3/2/2001
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
The relevant facts alleged in the complaint are as follows. The plaintiff resides at 30 Bear Mountain Road located in New Fairfield, Connecticut.1 In 1993, Danbury's highway department issued a certificate of completion for a house built by the Coluccis on the property across the road from the plaintiff's property. In August of 1997, water from the Coluccis' property and from Bear Mountain Road deposited onto the plaintiff's property thereby creating sinkholes on the property. The drainage of water from the Coluccis' property and Bear Mountain Road has a tendency to create sinkholes on the plaintiff's property, thereby damaging the property and creating a danger to those who walk on the property. The draining of water is a continuing danger and is the proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages. The complaint alleges that Danbury's use of Bear Mountain Road in draining water onto the plaintiff's property is an unreasonable and unlawful use of the road and interferes with the use and enjoyment by the plaintiff of his property. The plaintiff is asserting the claim of nuisance under General Statutes §
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. . . . A motion to strike admits all facts well pleaded; it does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings. . . . [W]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) D'Amico v.Johnson,
A common law claim of nuisance consists of four necessary elements: "(1) the condition complained of had a natural tendency to create danger and inflict injury upon person or property; (2) the danger created was a continuing one; (3) the use of the land was unreasonable or unlawful; [and] (4) the existence of the nuisance was the proximate cause of the CT Page 3334 plaintiffs' injuries and damages." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)Elliot v. Waterbury,
Danbury argues that the plaintiff fails to allege that Danbury created the condition constituting the nuisance through a positive act of the city. The plaintiff argues that the standard for a claim of nuisance is a standard with the burden of proof for trial and therefore is not a burden required to rebut a motion to strike. The plaintiff clearly misconstrues the intention of many courts that have held that a plaintiff must sufficiently allege that the defendant town has created the nuisance through an intentional positive act and therefore the issue may be decided on a motion to strike. See Brown v. Branford, supra,
The plaintiff further argues that the required positive act by Danbury is the issuance of the certificate of completion to the Coluccis regarding the placement of their home, driveway and final slope of property once the construction was completed. This is a far extension of the law of nuisance. See Elliot v. Waterbury, supra,
The issuance of the certificate of completion can not be reasonably viewed as establishing that Danbury, by some positive act, intentionally
created the conditions alleged to constitute a nuisance to the plaintiff. The conditions constituting a nuisance are set forth in the complaint as water drainage into the plaintiff's property thereby creating sinkholes. It seems impossible that an inspection can create the problems that the property inspected may create. The failure of Danbury to remedy the conditions of the Coluccis' property is not considered a positive act for a nuisance claim. Wright v. Brown, supra,
Based on the reasoning set forth above, this court holds that the plaintiff has failed to allege in the complaint that Danbury, by some positive act, intentionally created the conditions alleged to have constituted a nuisance. Accordingly, the complaint fails to state a claim of nuisance against Danbury and the motion to strike count four is granted.
White, J.