DocketNumber: No. CV 98 0164524
Citation Numbers: 1998 Conn. Super. Ct. 11564, 23 Conn. L. Rptr. 199
Judges: MINTZ, J.
Filed Date: 10/14/1998
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
On May 21, 1998, Cablevision filed a motion to dismiss counts ten and twelve of the plaintiffs' complaint. The defendant's grounds for its motion to dismiss are: (1) that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction; and (2) that the court lacks personal jurisdiction. The defendant argues in support of its motion to dismiss, that the plaintiffs' cause of action against Cablevision is barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act, General Statutes §
"[T]he court, in deciding a motion to dismiss, must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light." (internal quotation marks omitted.) Savage v. Aronson,
The defendant argues in its memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss that count ten of the plaintiffs' complaint should be dismissed because "the Workers' Compensation Act provides the exclusive remedy by an employee against his employer for an injury occurring during the regular course of his employment." Additionally, the defendant argues that count twelve, which alleges economic loss as well as loss of consortium on the part of felice Walls, should be dismissed because it is "derivative of the Tenth Count."
The plaintiffs argue in their memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss that the "allegations [in the complaint] bring the case within one or more of the acknowledged exceptions to the exclusivity rule." Further, the plaintiffs argue that "Connecticut law does not permit the granting of a motion to dismiss under the circumstances of this case."
The defendant's exclusivity claim should be raised as a special defense and not by way of a motion to dismiss. The Connecticut Supreme Court has noted the following regarding the exclusivity rule of the Workers' Compensation Act: "It is true that our compensation act provides . . . that as to an employee covered by it, the employer shall not be liable to any action for damages on account of personal injury. This provision, however,is not at all a denial of jurisdiction in the Superior Court, assuch, but is basically a destruction of an otherwise existentcommon-law right of action. The facts alleged in the plea to the jurisdiction would, if proven, establish such a destruction. Consequently, they constitute matter in bar. The confusion, if there be any, arises from the fact that the compensation procedure which is substituted for the common-law right of action involves a special tribunal, rather than the Superior Court. However, this is a mere incident of the destruction of the common-law right of action. In other words, there is not a lack
CT Page 11566of jurisdiction in the court but a want of a cause of action inthe plaintiff." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Grant v. Bassman,
Furthermore, "a claim that an injured plaintiff has made an exclusive election of workers' compensation is properly raised by special defense . . . The purpose of a special defense is to plead facts that are consistent with the allegations of the complaint but demonstrate, nonetheless, that the plaintiff has no cause of action. Practice Book § 164 [now Practice Book (1998 Rev.) §
Under the holding of Grant v. Bassman, supra,
Based on the foregoing, the court denies the defendant's CT Page 11567 motion to dismiss counts ten and twelve of the plaintiffs' complaint.
MINTZ, J.