DocketNumber: No. 301797
Citation Numbers: 1992 Conn. Super. Ct. 1696, 7 Conn. Super. Ct. 301
Judges: ROBERT A. FULLER, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 2/10/1992
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
The party opposing summary judgment must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed material factual issue. Daily v. New Britain Machine Co.,
Most of the essential facts in this case are not disputed. The plaintiff was struck by a baseball bat wielded by the defendant Dows, when the plaintiff was leaving a Grand Union Store in Newtown. Grand Union was the operator of the store. Eton owned the store property and the adjacent parking lot where the plaintiff was injured. Dows had no connection with Eton, who was unaware of his presence or conduct prior to the assault on the plaintiff. CT Page 1698
In order for a plaintiff to recover from a defendant, in addition to proving negligence, it must be shown that the defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. The complaint in this case alleges that Eton was negligent in several respects, including failure to inspect and provide security guards in the parking area, that it had no established security procedures to provide safety for persons on its property, and that it failed to exercise reasonable and ordinary care and control to protect persons on the property from activities taking place there. While Eton does not contest negligence for purposes of the motion, it claims that any acts or omissions on its part are not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.
The test of proximate cause is whether the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's injuries. Wu v. Fairfield,
The evidence presented on the motion does not show that anyone other than Eton had control over the area where the injury occurred. The parking lot was open to the general public, and the plaintiff was in the status of a business CT Page 1699 invitee. The defendant has the duty of exercising reasonable care and control to protect persons in the parking lot from dangers which might reasonably be anticipated to arise there from its condition or the activities taking place there. Merhi v. Becker, supra, 520. The evidence submitted in opposition to the motion shows that the parking lot was an area where youths frequently gathered and that the police frequently had to come to the parking lot due to disturbances, noise and unruly behavior near the Grand Union store.
Several cases have discussed the question of premises liability of the property owner to a plaintiff injured by an intervening, wilful or criminal act of a third party. As recognized in Doe v. Manheimer, supra, 748, the fact that a violent criminal act occurs on the property does not necessarily make that act sufficiently foreseeable to require the property owner to take precautions to prevent it. Id., 762; Burns v. Gleason Plant Security, Inc., supra, 480. On the other hand, cases have concluded that it is a question of fact for the trier whether the intentional or criminal act was foreseeable by the owner or possessor of property. Merhi v. Becker, supra, 519, 520. In short, the result depends upon the facts of each case. In this case, the plaintiff has submitted enough evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to avoid summary judgment. While the claim of liability here is weak, a plaintiff has as much right to submit a weak case as a strong case. While it can be seriously questioned whether the plaintiff can prove proximate cause by a preponderance of the evidence at the trial, and the plaintiff may not survive a motion for a directed verdict, the evidence in opposition to the motion for summary judgment is sufficient to give the plaintiff a chance to prove his case. The previous track record of the parking lot and the defendant's apparent knowledge of it arguably creates the element of foreseeability which was lacking in Doe v. Manheimer, supra.
The motion for summary judgment is denied.
ROBERT A. FULLER, JUDGE.
Peterson v. Town of Oxford , 189 Conn. 740 ( 1983 )
Bartha v. Waterbury House Wrecking Co. , 190 Conn. 8 ( 1983 )
Trzcinski v. Richey , 190 Conn. 285 ( 1983 )
Merhi v. Becker , 164 Conn. 516 ( 1973 )
Miranti v. Brookside Shopping Center, Inc. , 159 Conn. 24 ( 1969 )
Pine Point Corporation v. Westport Bank & Trust Co. , 164 Conn. 54 ( 1972 )