DocketNumber: No. CV99 0151784
Citation Numbers: 2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 7031
Judges: DOHERTY, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 5/30/2001
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
On May 8, 2000, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, along with a supporting memorandum of law, copies of photographs and excerpts from the plaintiff's deposition, arguing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. On February 20, 2001, the plaintiff filed an objection to the defendants' motion for summary judgment.
"Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doucette v.Pomes,
In their motion for summary judgment, the defendants argue, inter alia, that liability for injuries caused by defective premises is not based upon the ownership of such property, but rather upon the person in possession and control of the property. The defendants maintain that they had neither possession nor control of the premises, and note that there were at least three different ways to enter and exit the house without using the grassy slope upon which the plaintiff fell. In response, the plaintiff argues that the defendants were in possession and control of the property because they retained the only key to the garage and the back door could not be opened from the inside. The plaintiff argues that the only reasonable means by which to enter and exit the house from the driveway was by way of the grassy slope and through the kitchen door. The plaintiff concludes that by limiting the means by which the tenants and their invitees could enter and exit the house, the defendants retained control over the entire premises.
Generally, "[t]he status of an entrant on another's land, be it trespasser, licensee or invitee, determines the duty that is owed to the entrant while he or she is on a landowner's property." Salaman v.Waterbury,
In this case, the central issue is whether the defendants, as owners of the property, were in exclusive control of the portion of the property upon which the plaintiff slipped and fell. Generally, a tenant "takes the premises as he finds them and bears the risk of any defective conditions which are within the area under his exclusive possession and control. . . . This rule, however, does not apply to defects which are the result of faulty design or disrepair and which existed at the beginning of the tenancy, were not discoverable by the tenant on reasonable inspection, and were known, either actually or constructively, to the landlord." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gore v. People's Savings Bank,
While the issue of whether landowners have exclusive control over the premises is a question of fact; Skuzinski v. Bouchard Fuels, Inc.,
Furthermore, while Lombardi states that the defendants were aware of the "dangerous nature" of the grassy slope, she also states that she knew of such defect and continued to use the slope as a means of ingress and egress. A landlord is not liable for defective conditions which may exist on portions of the premises which are not within the possession and control of the landlord and which are discoverable by the tenant upon reasonable inspection. Gore v. People's Savings Bank, supra,
In light of the foregoing, the court grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment because there are no genuine issues of material fact and the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The defendants also argue, in the alternative, that even if the court CT Page 7034 finds that there are genuine issues of material fact with respect to whether the defendants retained control over the grassy slope, they are nevertheless entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the alleged defective condition was "open and obvious." Our courts generally recognize that "[t]he possessor of land has no duty to warn an invitee of a dangerous condition when the invitee has actual knowledge of the condition." Warren v. Stancliff,
In support of their argument, the defendants submit excerpts of the plaintiff's deposition, dated March 7, 2000, in which she states that she would walk up the lawn whenever she would visit her niece. Additionally, Lombardi's affidavit admits that "[e]veryone . . . used this grassy path to and from the inside of the house." It is submitted, therefore, that because it is undisputed that both the plaintiff and the tenant were aware of the fact that the grassy slope was dangerous, and the fact that both continued to use it as a means of ingress and egress to the house, there are no genuine issues of material fact as to whether the grass slope was open and obvious. Accordingly, the court finds that because the alleged dangerous condition was open and obvious, as a matter of law, the defendants did not owe a duty to the plaintiff.
For the foregoing reasons, the court hereby grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment.
By the Court, Joseph W. Doherty, Judge