DocketNumber: No. CV93 030 95 80 S
Citation Numbers: 1994 Conn. Super. Ct. 7400
Judges: McGRATH, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 7/15/1994
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
The facts in this case are as follows. The plaintiff, June Mazzone, filed a complaint on December 11, 1993, alleging in a single count that on September 19, 1992, she was on the premises of the defendant, Stop Shop Companies, Inc. ("Stop Shop"), when she was caused to slip and fall on corn meal or other gritty substance located on the floor. The plaintiff alleges that she sustained various personal injuries as a result of this incident. The plaintiff further alleges that the defendant was negligent in, inter alia, failing to keep its premises in a reasonably safe condition and failing to warn the plaintiff of the defective, dangerous and unsafe condition of the floor.
On January 25, 1994, the plaintiff's immediate employer, C.A. Demos, Inc., filed a motion to intervene as a co-plaintiff, alleging that it has paid workers' compensation benefits to the plaintiff. On February 2, 1994, the defendant Stop Shop filed an answer and two special defenses. In its second special defense, the defendant alleges that the plaintiff's action is barred by the principal employer defense, a codified in General Statutes §
On April 27, 1994, the plaintiff filed a motion to strike the defendant's second special defense on the ground that CT Page 7402 General Statutes §
As required by Practice Book § 155, the plaintiff has filed a memorandum in support of its motion to strike and the defendant has timely filed a memorandum in opposition.
Pursuant to Practice Book § 152, a motion to strike may be brought to contest the legal sufficiency of a complaint or any of its counts. Pratt v. Town of Old Saybrook,
In her memorandum of support of the motion to strike, the plaintiff argues that "a plain reading of [General Statutes §
In response, the defendant argues that it has alleged in its second special defense that it provided workers' compensation insurance to the plaintiff, as an additional insured under a certificate of insurance issued by Liberty Mutual Insurance Company. Accordingly, the defendant argues that the requirements of General Statutes §
At the time of the incident, General Statutes §
When any principal employer procures any work to be done wholly or in part for him by a contractor, or through him by a subcontractor, and the work so procured to be done is a part or process in the trade or business of such principal employer, and is performed in, on or about premises under his control, such employer shall be liable to pay all compensation. . .to the same extent as if the work were done without the intervention of such contractor or subcontractor. The provisions of this section shall not extend immunity to any principal employer from a civil action brought by an injured employee or his dependent under the provisions of section
31-293 to recover damages resulting from personal injury or wrongful death occurring on or after May 28, 1988, unless such principal employer has paid compensation benefits under this chapter to such injured employee or his dependent for the injury or death which is the subject of the action. (Emphasis added.)
The incident in the present case occurred on September 19, 1992, a date after which Public Act 88-226 took effect. Thus, the amended statute is applicable to the present case.
Where the language used by the legislature is plain and unambiguous, there is no room for statutory construction by the courts and the statute will be applied as its words direct.Keleman v. Rimrock Corp. ,
The defendant does not allege in its second special defense that it paid compensation benefits to the plaintiff. Thus, the defendant has not alleged sufficient facts to invoke the principal employer defense and shield itself from liability for the plaintiff's injuries.
Accordingly, the plaintiff's motion to strike the CT Page 7404 defendant's second special defense on the ground that it is legally insufficient is granted.
WILLIAM J. McGRATH, JUDGE