DocketNumber: No. CV94 04 83 49
Citation Numbers: 2000 Conn. Super. Ct. 4614
Judges: GROGINS, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 3/14/2000
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
The plaintiff's first and fifth counts allege that the plaintiff was terminated from his employment in retaliation for complaining to his employers about potential hazards and safety violations. The defendants argue that, pursuant to the so-called CT Page 4615 whistle-blower statute, §
In Sheets v, Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc.,
In the present case, the plaintiff has alleged that the defendants violated health and safety standards and operated in violation of §
The court holds that the plaintiff's failure to do so is not fatal for the purposes of this motion for summary judgment. At least one court has found, in similar circumstances, that where a discharge has occurred after violations have been reported, and the plaintiff has not presented his allegations to the appropriate regulatory agency, that the plaintiff is without remedy and thus able to allege a public policy discharge underSheets. Wolf v. Servco Oil, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. 327651 (September 8, 1998, Moraghan, J.).
The plaintiff's failure to report the violations to the appropriate regulatory agency does not entitle the defendants to summary judgment as a matter of law. The defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the first and fifth count, therefore, must be denied as the plaintiff is not proceeding under §
In the second and fourth counts of his complaint, the plaintiff alleges that he was terminated without cause. The defendants move for summary judgment on these counts and argue that the plaintiff was an "at-will" employee and thus subject to discharge.
"[T]he public policy exception to the general rule allowing unfettered termination of an at-will employment relationship is a narrow one that is only to be invoked when the reason for [the employee's] discharge . . . involves impropriety derived from some important violation of a public policy." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Parsons v. United TechnologiesCorp. ,
As to the second and fourth count, the plaintiff has neither alleged that he was terminated in violation of a public policy nor shown that his employment was anything other than an employment at-will. There appears to be no material facts in dispute that would preclude the defendants from being able to discharge the plaintiff. The defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the second and fourth counts.
The plaintiff's third and sixth complaint allege that there existed an implied employment contract and that the defendants breached said contract by terminating the plaintiff. The defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law because there is no evidence of any implied contract.
In order to prevail on his claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate an actual agreement by the defendant to have an employment contract with him. "A contract implied in fact, like an express contract, depends on actual agreement. . . ." (Citations omitted.) Coelho v. Posi-Seal International, Inc.,
In the present case, the plaintiff has presented no evidence to suggest that there was an implied contract. While oral representations, employer's guidelines or past conduct may occasionally support an implied contract of employment; see Id; the plaintiff has failed to establish even one of these. As there is no evidence whatsoever tending to establish even questions of fact concerning an implied employment contract, the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The defendants' motion for summary judgment on the third and sixth counts is granted.
To summarize, the court grants the motion for summary judgment as to the second, third, fourth and sixths counts. The motion for summary judgment is denied as to the first and fifth counts.
GROGINS, J.