DocketNumber: No. CV 90 027 75 41S
Citation Numbers: 1992 Conn. Super. Ct. 6656
Judges: KATZ, JUDGE
Filed Date: 7/14/1992
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
The defendant in response maintains that C.G.S.
This court agrees with the plaintiff that C.G.S. 57-572n does not per se eliminate a cause of action under
The purpose behind the act was to merge the numerous causes of action that have been asserted in common law product liability actions and to create one statutory cause of action, embracing the various theories of liability. Winslow v. Lewis-Shepard, supra at 470. While no Connecticut case addresses the question raised today, there are some federal decisions that raise the question of whether the products liability act bars actions pled simultaneously under CUTPA. In West Haven School District v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., Civ. No. H-85-1056 (AHN), Judge Nevas developed a "functional test" to determine whether the CUTPA claim is coextensive with the product liability claim. "[I]f the cause of action being pressed . . . is essentially identical — in wrongs asserted and in relief sought — with that being pursued under the PLA, then it comes within the statute's scope and must be precluded." Ruling at p. 6 — A similar test was held in Gnazzo v. G.D. Searle Co., H-90-381 (PCD), Ruling on Motion to Dismiss (November 29, 1990) (wherein the Court held that because no additional allegations existed which placed the plaintiff's claim outside the PLA's broad scope, the motion was granted.) and in Utica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Denwat Corp., supra at 598 (wherein the Court found that the particular claims did fall outside the preclusive scope of the PLA and so denied the motion to dismiss the CUTPA claim.) CT Page 6658
All of the above cases dealt with multiple count complaints. Nevertheless, the principals set forth in the above cases extend to situations wherein the plaintiff in a one count complaint makes allegations that would otherwise fall within the product liability act's purview. The allegations set forth in plaintiff's complaint do just that. (Complaint paras. 3a-h) Additionally, the plaintiff has claimed damages that can only be claimed in connection with a products liability claim. Therefore, at a glance, a rose is still a rose.
There is an even more obvious problem, however, with the plaintiff's position. Conn. Gen. Stat.
The second argument advanced by the plaintiff raises the issue of whether the defendant fraudulently concealed the plaintiff's cause of action, thereby tolling the statute of limitations pursuant to Conn. Gen. Statutes
The problem for the plaintiff however is her failure to specifically raise this notion. She points to paragraphs 3 d and e of her complaint as being sufficient allegation of fraudulent concealment as required by Beckenstein v. Potter and Carrier,
However, the allegations set forth in those paragraphs relate to the alleged misrepresentations about the product's safety and to the lack of warning on the product. These serve as the basis for the cause of action and say nothing about CT Page 6659 fraudulent concealment. Therefore, in the absence of sufficient pleading to raise this issue, it is not before the court as a material fact to be left open for consideration.
The third argument raised by the plaintiff in opposition to the defendant's motion of summary of judgment is that the defendant's failure to warn of its products dangerousness serves as a continuing defect/course of conduct which defeats the defendant's statute of limitations defense because "when the wrong sued upon consists of a continuing course of conduct, the statute does not begin to run until that course of conduct is completed." Handler v. Remington Arms Co.,
These cases reflect the concern by the Court for prospective plaintiffs who are unaware of the problem with a product which was sold, produced, etc. long before injury caused by the product is sustained. By holding the party responsible for issuing proper warnings accountable for as long as it fails to warn of its product's dangerous propensities through this "continuing course of conduct" theory, the Court shows sensitivity to unsuspecting persons who fail to discover the problem with the product more than ten years from the date the defendant parted with its possession or content. See Beckenstein v. Potter Carrier, Inc., supra at 161-162.
However, in this case this doctrine offers no greater protection to the plaintiff. The injury occurred on November 13, 1986 but the suit was not instituted until November 1990. The date the defendant last parted with the product is not the date which the defendant claims triggers the time within which suit should have been instituted. Rather, the date of the injury is the date which the defendant seeks to have trigger litigation. Certainly, at the point of injury, the plaintiff was put on notice as to the potential problems with the product. The furnace in Giglio had been converted more than eight years prior to the commencement of suit; however, if the injury had occurred within eight years of the conversion, there would have been no need to rely on this continuing course of conduct theory. Indeed, the injury itself would have been sufficient to cause the plaintiff to question the products safety. CT Page 6660
The theory proposed by the plaintiff only makes sense when the parting of possession or control of the product occurs more than ten years prior to the injury. Otherwise, plaintiff could forever avoid the statute of limitations despite actual injury (and thus notice) until the defendant altered its warnings and thus inferentially admitted liability for its earlier failure to warn that caused the injury in the first place.
Consistent with the earlier parts of this opinion the court finds that suit was not brought timely within the three year statute of limitations pursuant to C.G.S.
JOETTE KATZ, JUDGE