DocketNumber: No. HCNO 9512-027
Citation Numbers: 1996 Conn. Super. Ct. 2824
Judges: TIERNEY, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 4/26/1996
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
FACTS
The plaintiffs, residential tenants, filed this payment into court action on December 18, 1995. The plaintiffs used the proper Judicial Department form for their complaint, JD-CV-28 Rev.
On January 25, 1996 the court raised, sua sponte, the question as to whether or not the allegations of the plaintiff's lawsuit complied with the statutory requirements of ConnecticutCT Page 2825General Statutes
On March 7, 1996 the defendant offered the testimony of a deputy sheriff. He testified that he made abode service of a Notice to Quit for nonpayment of rent at 1:30 p.m. on December 18, 1995. The court took judicial notice that the statutory complaint filed by the plaintiff in accordance with ConnecticutGeneral Statutes
This court found that a valid notice to quit for nonpayment of rent was served at 1:30 p.m. December 15, 1995 which was prior to the "institution of an action under this section."Connecticut General Statutes §
The issue for the court to decide is whether or not the failure of the plaintiffs to comply with the specific requirements of Connecticut General Statutes §
DISCUSSION OF LAW
"Standing focuses on whether that party is the proper party to request adjudication of the issues. . . . The emphasis is whether the party has a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, . . . and whether the dispute touches upon the legal relations of the parties having adverse legal interests." (Internal quotations and citations omitted) Shaskan v. WalthamIndustries Corporation,
Although it appears that the plaintiffs, as tenants, may have standing, their lawsuit is based solely on a statute. The court is deprived of subject matter jurisdiction if the statutory conditions have not been complied with.
"The plaintiff's cause of action was purely statutory. The requirement of notification to the housing code enforcement agency is not directory but mandatory. Compliance with this essential condition was a requisite for the court's jurisdiction. General Dynamics Corporation v. Groton,
184 Conn. 483 ,493 ,440 A.2d 185 (1981). A condition precedent to the maintenance of the action required that the plaintiff, at least five days prior to the date on which she filed her complaint, make a complaint to the municipal agency responsible for the enforcement of the housing code. The allegation required by the act was a vital part of the plaintiff's case. It went to the very existence of the action, which, in the absence of compliance with the requirements of the act, does not exist at all. State v. Aetna Casualty Surety Insurance Co.,138 Conn. 363 ,367 ,84 A.2d 683 (1951); Crocker v. Hartford,66 Conn. 387 ,391 ,34 A.2d 98 (1895); see Guilford Yacht Club Assn., Inc. v. Northeast Dredging Inc.,192 Conn. 10 ,13 ,468 A.2d 1235 (1984)." Dugan v. Milledge,196 Conn. 591 ,595 (1985)
The statute in question entitled "Payment of rent into court" was promulgated by the legislature in 1983. P.A. 83-510CT Page 2827S.
"Any tenant who claims that his landlord has failed to perform his legal duties, as required by section
47a-7 , or subdivisions (1) to (13), inclusive, of subsection (a) of section21-82 , may institute an action in the superior court having jurisdiction over housing matters in the judicial district in which he resides to obtain the relief authorized by this section and sections47a-20 and47a-68 . No tenant may institute an action under this section if a valid notice to quit possession or occupancy based on nonpayment of rent has been served on him prior to his institution of an action under this section or if a valid notice to quit possession or occupancy based on any other ground has been served on him prior to his making the complaint to the agency referred to in subsection (b) of this section, provided any such notice to quit is still effective." Connecticut General Statutes §47a-14h (a)
The statute sets the following requirements concerning the institution of the complaint. "The action shall be instituted by filing a complaint, under oath, with the clerk of the court. The complaint shall allege (1) the name of the tenant; (2) the name of the landlord; (3) the address of the premises; (4) the nature of the alleged violation of section
The Supreme Court has visited this statute only once.Dugan v. Milledge,
One month prior to Dugan v. Milledge, the Appellate Court considered a dismissal by the trial judge of a payment into court action concerning failure of compliance with the statute. The decision upheld the court's right to dismiss but overruled the trial court on other grounds. Rivera v. Santiago,
In 1988 the Appellate Court again visited §
Therefore compliance with the statutory requirements of §
A subject matter jurisdiction issue was brought to the attention of the court. The court may consider a Motion to Dismiss at any stage of the pleadings, despite the order of pleading requirements of Practice Book § 112(2), based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. "Any claim of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived; and whenever it is found after suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action." Practice Book § 145. A motion to dismiss can be considered after an answer has been filed, after pleadings have been closed, during the trial, after judgment has been entered or by the Appellate Court or Supreme Court on appeal, either sua sponte or by motion of the parties.Kolenberg v. Board of Education,
The Motion to Dismiss the complaint is hereby granted.
The court will now consider the special defenses, counterclaims and further pleadings filed by the defendant and special defenses and counterclaims filed by the plaintiffs in response to the defendant's pleadings. The dismissal or withdrawal of the underlying complaint does not dismiss or withdraw any counterclaims filed. C.G.S. §
The statutory action, having been dismissed, the court has no power to grant relief under the payment into court statute to the plaintiff. Reynolds v. Vroom,
The defendant has filed special defenses and two counterclaims regarding breach of lease and non payment of rent. The counterclaims seek money damages. Her counterclaims are not specifically authorized by the language of statutory payment into court action. "The landlord, by counterclaim, may request and the court may issue an order compelling the tenant to comply with his duties under section
In the statutory action of summary process, counterclaims are limited to those that reflect the statutory purpose; i.e. a determination of who has the higher possession right or title to the property. Filosi v. Hawkins,
Since this is a statutory action its remedy is narrow. Like CT Page 2830 a summary process action, strict time constraints are contained in the statute. "Upon receipt of the complaint, the clerk shall promptly set the matter down for hearing to be held not more than fourteen days after the filing of the complaint." C.G.S. §
Complaints and counterclaims seeking money damages are not permitted in summary process lawsuits, either tenant against landlord or landlord against tenant. Atlantic Refining Co. v.O'Keefe,
The legislature is presumed to know the above referred status of the law and presumably the legislature took the summary nature of eviction cases into consideration. It is of note that the legislature permitted only one counterclaim, tenant's non compliance with §
Connecticut General Statutes §
Therefore the remedies sought by the defendant in her counterclaims seeking money damages are beyond the import of the statute. The damages sought by the plaintiffs in their counterclaims against the defendant are equally beyond the scope of the statute.
The counterclaims filed by both parties are outside the CT Page 2831 statutory mandate. "Compliance with its mandate is a necessary prerequisite to . . .court's subject matter jurisdiction."Iovieno v. Commissioner of Correction,
The entire case is dismissed.
BY THE COURT,
KEVIN TIERNEY, JUDGE
Jo-Mark Sand & Gravel Co. v. Pantanella , 139 Conn. 598 ( 1953 )
Alarm Applications Co. v. Simsbury Volunteer Fire Co. , 179 Conn. 541 ( 1980 )
Boothe v. Armstrong , 76 Conn. 530 ( 1904 )
Atlantic Refining Co. v. O'Keefe , 131 Conn. 528 ( 1945 )
Reynolds v. Vroom , 130 Conn. 512 ( 1944 )
Webb v. Ambler , 125 Conn. 543 ( 1939 )
General Dynamics Corp. v. City of Groton , 184 Conn. 483 ( 1981 )
State v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. , 138 Conn. 363 ( 1951 )