DocketNumber: No. 0125987
Citation Numbers: 1996 Conn. Super. Ct. 58, 15 Conn. L. Rptr. 632
Judges: KULAWIZ, J.
Filed Date: 1/5/1996
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
The issues presented to the court are the following:
Did the Commissioner properly suspend the plaintiff's drivers license after his arrest by the Wolcott Police for driving under the influence of liquor where the stop and arrest occurred in Waterbury?
Was the plaintiff's drivers license properly suspended for one year given the fact that his driving record was not part of the administrative record?
The Commissioner's decision was mailed on March 10, 1995. (Return of Record [ROR], Item 5.) The appeal was filed with the clerk of the Superior Court on April 4, 1995. On April 5, 1995, the plaintiff served the Commissioner by leaving the appeal CT Page 59 papers at the Department of Motor Vehicles in Wethersfield. On April 7, 1995, the plaintiff left copies of the appeal papers at the Attorney General's office in Hartford.
The Commissioner filed an answer and return of record.1 The parties each filed briefs. The appeal was heard by the court on September 15, 1995.
The record of the administrative proceeding discloses the following facts. On February 18, 1995, at approximately 2:00 a.m., the plaintiff, Robert E. Yarington, was operating a motor vehicle on Meriden Road in Wolcott, Connecticut (ROR, Item 3). At this time, he was observed not wearing a seat belt by officers of the Wolcott Police Department (ROR, Item 3). The officers followed the plaintiff for approximately .25 miles and stopped him at the corner of Meriden and Pierpont Roads in the City of Waterbury for this infraction (ROR, Item 2). The officers approached the plaintiff's vehicle and noticed a strong odor of alcohol on his breath (ROR, Item 3). The officers also observed that the plaintiff's eyes were red and glassy and that his speech was slurred (ROR, Item 3). When asked to produce his drivers license, registration and insurance card, the officers observed that the plaintiff was "fumbling around" and "displayed poor motor skills" (ROR, Item 3).
Based upon these observations, the officers asked the plaintiff to exit his vehicle so that they could perform field sobriety tests (ROR, Item 3). The plaintiff refused to perform the tests and was placed under arrest for driving under the influence of liquor (ROR, Item 3). The plaintiff was then transported to the Wolcott Police Department and was informed of his implied consent to submit to a blood alcohol test (ROR, Item 3). The plaintiff refused to perform the test and was issued a temporary license and summons for driving under the influence (ROR, Item 3). The plaintiff was then released on a written promise to appear (ROR, Item 3).
On March 9, 1995, an administrative license suspension hearing was held pursuant to General Statutes §
1. The police officers had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for operating while under the influence CT Page 60 of an intoxicating liquor;
2. The plaintiff was placed under arrest;
3. The plaintiff refused to submit to a blood test or analysis;
4. The plaintiff was operating the motor vehicle.
(ROR, Item, 5). Based upon these findings, the Commissioner suspended the plaintiff's drivers license for one year (ROR, Item 5).
As part of his appeal, the plaintiff has also attached a copy of the transcript of the criminal proceedings arising from this incident. The transcript reveals the following facts. On March, 17, 1995, the state sought to nolle the charges against the plaintiff due to its belief that probable cause could not be established. The defendant then sought a dismissal of the charges and the state did not object. The court, Grogins, J., then dismissed the charges. It is important to note, however, that this transcript is not part of the administrative record.
Judicial review of an administrative agency decision requires a court to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the agency's findings of basic fact and whether the conclusions drawn from those facts are reasonable. Schallenkamp v. DelPonte,
The scope of review is very limited, and the court may not retry the case or substitute its own judgment for that of the Commissioner. Buckley v. Muzio,
General Statutes §
(1) Did the police officer have probable cause to arrest the person for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drug or both or while his ability to operate such motor vehicle is impaired by the consumption of intoxicating liquor; (2) was such person placed under arrest; (3) did such person refuse to submit to such test or analysis; and (4) was such person operating the motor vehicle.
General Statutes §
The plaintiff advances two arguments in its memorandum in support: (1) The officers lacked probable cause to stop and arrest the plaintiff; and (2) The one year suspension was improper because the plaintiff's driving history was not part of the administrative record. In order to illustrate the issues raised by the plaintiff's appeal, I shall address each of these arguments separately. CT Page 62
The plaintiff's probable cause argument attacks both the legality of the initial stop of his vehicle by the police as well as the officer's subsequent determination of probable cause to arrest him.
The plaintiff first argues that the initial stop was unlawful because the officers had no authority to stop him outside of their jurisdiction for a motor vehicle infraction. Based upon this premise, the plaintiff further argues that his subsequent arrest was unlawful and, therefore, cannot support a license suspension. The Commissioner counters that the stop was a valid exercise of the extra-territorial jurisdiction of the Wolcott Police Department.
Under Connecticut law, operators of motor vehicles are required to wear seat belts. The Connecticut "Seat Belt" statute, General Statutes §
The authority of a municipal police officer to arrest is usually limited to geographical boundaries of the municipality that appointed the officer. General Statutes §§
(c) Members of any local police department . . . when in immediate pursuit of one who may be arrested under the provisions of this section, are authorized to pursue the offender outside of their respective precincts into any part of the state in order to effect the arrest.
In State v. Harrison,
The Appellate Court has applied the Harrison decision in the context of motor vehicle infractions under General Statutes
In the present case, the police report, which was in evidence, sets forth the officer's observation that the plaintiff was not wearing his seat belt in violation General Statutes §
The second prong of the plaintiff's probable cause argument is that the officers had no probable cause to arrest him after the stop. "In order to establish probable cause it is not necessary to produce a quantum of proof sufficient to establish guilt . . . probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the officer and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that (a crime) has been committed." State v. Torres,
The plaintiff's second argument is that the Commissioner improperly imposed a one year suspension rather than a six month suspension. The basis of this argument is the plaintiff's assertion that his driving history was not made part of the administrative record. The Commissioner counters that a driving history may be considered despite the fact that it was not introduced into evidence.
General Statutes §
The commissioner shall suspend the operator's license . . . of a person . . . against whom, after a hearing, the commissioner . . . renders his decision . . . for a period of . . . one year if such person has previously had his operator's license or nonresident operating privilege suspended under this section.
General Statutes
Turning now to the facts of the present appeal, the court finds that the Commissioner correctly calculated the suspension period. General Statutes §
Having resolved all issues in favor of the defendant Commissioner, this court dismisses the plaintiff's appeal.
KULAWIZ, J.