DocketNumber: No. CV 00 0161054
Citation Numbers: 2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 3173
Judges: DOHERTY, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 3/12/2001
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
In response to the aforementioned action, the defendants (counterclaim plaintiffs) filed a nine-count counterclaim against the plaintiff (counterclaim defendant).1 In count seven of their counterclaim, the counterclaim plaintiffs allege that the counterclaim defendant was a business providing services and/or merchandise from its principal place of business located in Woodbury, Connecticut. The counterclaim plaintiffs also allege that they were the owners of certain furniture and furnishings that were removed by the counterclaim defendant. The counterclaim plaintiffs allege that despite demanding the return of the property, the counterclaim defendant has refused to return it. The counterclaim plaintiffs further allege that the counterclaim defendant converted the property for its own use.
On September 25, 2000, the counterclaim defendant filed a motion for summary judgment as to count seven of the counterclaim with an affidavit and other supporting evidence. On November 27, 2000, the counterclaim plaintiffs filed a memorandum in objection with a supporting affidavit.
A counterclaim "has been defined as a cause of action existing in favor of a defendant against a plaintiff which a defendant pleads to diminish, defeat or otherwise affect a plaintiff's claim and also allows a recovery by the defendant." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Home Oil Co. v.Todd,
"Once the moving party has presented evidence in support of the motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue. . . . It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact . . . are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court. . . . The movant has the burden of showing the nonexistence of such issues but the evidence thus presented, if otherwise sufficient, is not rebutted by the bald statement that an issue of fact does exist. . . . To oppose a motion for summary judgment successfully, the nonmovant must recite specific facts . . . which contradict those stated in the movant's affidavits and documents." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Reynolds v. Chrysler First Commercial Corp.,
In the present case, the counterclaim defendant argues that no issues of fact remain with regard to the counterclaim plaintiffs' conversion count. In response, the counterclaim plaintiffs argue that they have sufficiently alleged the necessary elements to make out a prima facie case of conversion. "We have defined conversion as [a]n unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over goods belonging to another, to the exclusion of the owner's rights. . . . It is some unauthorized act which deprives another of his property permanently or for an indefinite time; some unauthorized assumption and exercise of the powers of the owner to his harm. The essence of the wrong is that the property rights of the plaintiff have been dealt with in a manner adverse to him, inconsistent with his right of dominion and to his harm." AetnaLife Casualty Co. v. Union Trust Co.,
After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the CT Page 3176 counterclaim plaintiffs; Miles v. Foley, supra,
To rebut the counterclaim defendant's evidence, the counterclaim plaintiffs submitted the affidavit of I. Bradley Hoffman. As a preliminary matter, Hoffman's affidavit is nothing more than a reprinted version of the counterclaim. Hoffman's affidavit contains the same language, including the same legalese, that is found in the counterclaim. Moreover, Hoffman fails to allege specific facts necessary to defeat the counterclaim defendant's motion for summary judgment. Reynolds v.Chrysler First Commercial Corp., supra,
For the foregoing reasons the counterclaim defendant's motion for summary judgment is hereby granted as to count seven of the counterclaim.
By the Court,
Joseph W. Doherty, Judge