DocketNumber: No. CV98 0165440
Citation Numbers: 1999 Conn. Super. Ct. 13575
Judges: D'ANDREA, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 10/14/1999
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
Next, the third-party plaintiffs filed a third-party complaint against the third-party defendant seeking contribution or indemnification as a result of the third-party defendant's alleged negligence. Judge Mintz granted the third-party defendants motion to strike the original third-party complaint on April 19, 1999. Thereafter, the third-party plaintiffs filed an amended third-party complaint, and the third-party defendant filed a motion to strike that complaint.
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaints . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. . . . A motion to strike admits all facts well pleaded; it does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings. . . . [W]hat is necessarily implied in an allegation CT Page 13576 need not be expressly alleged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) D'Amico v. Johnson,
The third-party defendant argues that the third-party plaintiffs are not entitled to contribution because there has not been a final judgment in the underlying action, which claim the third-party plaintiffs do not challenge. "There is no common law right of contribution among joint tortfeasors in Connecticut.Skuzinski v. Bouchard Fuels, Inc., [
The third-party defendant also contends that the court must strike the complaint because the third-party plaintiffs have not stated a legally sufficient cause of action for indemnification. The third-party plaintiffs argue that their complaint is legally sufficient because the amended third-party complaint alleges that the third-party defendant was "in control of the situation which lead to the alleged injuries of the plaintiff to the exclusion of the third-party plaintiffs."
"[I]ndemnity involves a claim for reimbursement in full from one on whom a primary liability is claimed to rest, while contribution involves a claim for reimbursement of a share of a payment necessarily made by the claimant which equitably should have been paid in part by others." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Crotta v. Home Depot, Inc.,
There is a split of authority in the superior court concerning whether an allegation in a third-party complaint that a third-party defendant was in "exclusive control of the situation" is legally sufficient to support an indemnity claim arising out of an automobile accident when both parties are alleged to have committed active negligence. Compare Pettyway v.CT Page 13578Gonzales, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. 345423 (January 12, 1999, Nadeau, J.) (concluding that it is possible that the third-party defendant driver was in exclusive control when the third-party plaintiffs alleged that he negligently slowed and stopped the vehicle with the plaintiff as a passenger); Gladding v. Saren, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. 327219 (holding third-party plaintiffs may state a cause of action for indemnification if the allegations are capable of being proven) with Sanclemente v. Wlaz, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. 394430 (May 12, 1992, Aurigemma, J.) (followingMahoney v. Gibson, infra); and Mahoney v. Gibson, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. 055256 (June 26, 1984, Lewis, J.) (holding that when the locus of the accident is a public highway and the defendants are two drivers charged with active negligence, it is not really possible for either driver to have control over the accident site).
According to both complaints, Borges and the third-party defendant operated their vehicles in a negligent manner. The third-party plaintiffs allege that the third-party defendant was negligent in several respects, including failing to keep a proper lookout for other vehicles on the highway, entering the path of the vehicle which constituted an immediate hazard to him in violation of General Statutes §
The underlying allegations of this case present an automobile accident that occurred when Borges attempted to pass the third-party defendant on the right as the third-party defendant attempted to make a right turn. Based upon this factual scenario, a jury could not reasonably conclude that the third-party defendant was in exclusive control of the situation. Therefore, the third-party defendant's motion to strike must be granted.
So Ordered.
D'ANDREA, J. CT Page 13579