DocketNumber: No. CV 96 0153343 S
Citation Numbers: 2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 610
Judges: MINTZ, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 1/17/2002
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
The defendants allege the following pertinent facts in their counterclaim: On or around February 10, 1988, Ceruzzi executed a promissory note in favor of Citytrust in the principal amount of $355,000. On or around, March 15, 1988 Ceruzzi executed a promissory note in favor of Citytrust in the principal amount of $800,000. On or around August 9, 1991, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was CT Page 611 appointed the receiver of Citytrust and holder of the two aforementioned notes. On or around June 30, 1992, the FDIC agreed to release Ceruzzi from liability on the two aforementioned notes. In consideration for this release, Ceruzzi entered into a settlement agreement with the FDIC and executed a third promissory note for the principal amount of $178,500 (the note). On or around July 26, 1994, the FDIC assigned the three aforementioned notes to the plaintiff. On or around November 13, 1995, the plaintiff assigned the three aforementioned notes, among other things, to Shelton Asset Corporation (Shelton), Seaview Asset Corporation (Seaview) and Princeton Asset Corporation (Princeton) but did not disclose this assignment to Ceruzzi. On or around July, 1997, the plaintiff notified Ceruzzi that it was the current holder of the note. At the same time, the plaintiff began sending Ceruzzi invoices reflecting monthly payments due and owing to the plaintiff on the note, and Ceruzzi made payments to the plaintiff.
On July 13, 2001, the plaintiff filed a motion to strike the defendants' counterclaim on the ground that it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
"A motion to strike tests the legal sufficiency of a cause of action and may properly be used to challenge the sufficiency of a counterclaim."Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Romano's Auto Service,
The plaintiff argues, inter alia, that its motion to strike should be CT Page 612 granted because the defendants' counterclaim fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The plaintiff contends that the counterclaim is a CUTPA claim based on a vexatious litigation and that the party asserting such a claim must allege the termination of an underlying action in that party's favor. The plaintiff, therefore, argues that it is improper to assert a vexatious litigation in a CUTPA counterclaim because the underlying cause of action has not yet terminated in the defendants' favor. The plaintiff also argues that the defendants have violated the pleading rules by not pleading their counterclaim as clearly and precisely as possible.2 The defendants respond that the motion to strike should be denied because their CUTPA counterclaim is alleged properly in that it is based on negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent nondisclosure, breach of contract and conversion.3
This court will first analyze whether the defendants' counterclaim sufficiently states a cause of action. "The policy behind CUTPA is to encourage litigants to act as private attorneys general and to bring actions for unfair or deceptive trade practices." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Suarez v. Sordo,
"It is well settled that in determining whether a practice violates CUTPA [the Connecticut Supreme Court has] adopted the criteria set out in the cigarette rule by the federal trade commission for determining when a practice is unfair: (1) [W]hether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise — in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers, [competitors or other business persons]. . . . All CT Page 613 three criteria do not need to be satisfied to support a finding of unfairness. A practice may be unfair because of the degree to which it meets one of the criteria or because to a lesser extent it meets all three." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 367-68.
The defendants argue that the allegations in their counterclaim amount to a CUTPA cause of action based on negligent misrepresentation. With regard to the first prong of the "cigarette rule," the Connecticut Supreme Court "has long recognized liability for negligent misrepresentation. [It has] held that even an innocent misrepresentation of fact may be actionable if the declarant has the means of knowing, ought to know, or has the duty of knowing the truth." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Williams Ford, Inc. v. Hartford Courant Co.,
In this case, the defendants allege that the plaintiff held itself out to be the holder of the note when in fact the note had already been assigned to Shelton, Seaview and Princeton. These allegations imply unethical conduct on behalf of the plaintiff. Therefore, viewing the CUTPA counterclaim in a light most favorably to the defendants, this court finds that the defendants have stated a valid cause of action under CUTPA based on the plaintiffs negligent misrepresentation.
The defendants also argue in their memorandum of law that their allegations in their counterclaim amount to a CUTPA cause of action based on the plaintiffs fraudulent nondisclosure. "A violation [of CUTPA] may be established by showing . . . an actual deceptive practice. . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Muniz v. Kravis,
In this case, the defendants allege that the plaintiff, despite not being the proper holder of the note, notified Ceruzzi that it was the current holder of the note. Moreover, the plaintiff began sending Ceruzzi invoices reflecting monthly payments due and owing to the plaintiff on the note. Viewing the counterclaim in a light most favorably to the defendants, this court finds that because the plaintiff voluntarily engaged in this conduct a duty is imposed upon it to disclose the proper owner of the note to Ceruzzi. For this reason, this court finds that the defendants have stated a valid cause of action under CUTPA based on the plaintiffs fraudulent nondisclosure.4
As to the plaintiffs second argument regarding the clarity of the counterclaim, "if the [plaintiff was] in doubt as to the nature of this claim or the legal theory underlying it, [it] could have sought a more particular description of the [counterclaim] by filing a request to revise." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) D'Ulisse-Cupo v. Board ofDirectors of Notre Dame High School,
This court notes that the plaintiff relies on a line of cases that holds that a vexatious litigation claim may not be asserted as a counterclaim in the same action claimed to be vexatious.6 However, these cases and the plaintiffs argument are misplaced because the defendants' counterclaim is not based on a vexatious litigation theory of liability. For this reason, the line of cases relied on by the plaintiff is unhelpful and cannot serve as a basis to grant the plaintiffs motion to strike. CT Page 615
Given the liberal construction of CUTPA and the standard for a motion to strike, this court finds that, the defendants, by alleging deceptive practices based upon theories of negligent misrepresentation and/or fraudulent nondisclosure, have sufficiently stated a CUTPA cause of action in their counterclaim. Accordingly, the plaintiffs motion to strike the defendants' counterclaim is denied.
___________________ MINTZ, J.