DocketNumber: No. CV98-0087101
Citation Numbers: 2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 14823
Judges: WOLVEN, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 10/17/2001
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
FACTS
In September, 1997, the defendant, Dale Biscoglio, completed a "rental application" for property owned by the plaintiff, Diane Wilson. On the application, Mr. Biscoglio stated that his current landlord was Terrance Finnegan, whose address and phone number were also listed on the document. The plaintiff called the defendant, Terrance Finnegan, on September 16, 1997 and requested a reference pertaining to her prospective tenants, Dale Biscoglio and Kimberly Doak. Mr. Finnegan told her that he was their landlord; that they were very good tenants and that they paid their rent on time.
Based on this representation, Ms. Wilson rented the property to the defendants, Biscoglio and Doak, who failed to pay rent for the months of April, May, June and July, 1998. Subsequently, the plaintiff learned that Terrance Finnegan was not the landlord of the two other defendants, but rather the owner of The Factory Pub and Restaurant where one of them was employed.
Pursuant to the Connecticut Code of Evidence §§
DISCUSSION
"The essential elements of an action in fraud, as we have repeatedly held, are: (1) that a false representation was made as a statement of fact; (2) that it was untrue and known to be untrue by the party making it; (3) that it was made to induce the other party to act on it; and (4) that the latter did so act on it to his injury." Miller v. Appleby, CT Page 14825
The plaintiff has met her burden of proof on each of these elements by clear and convincing evidence. The defendant, Terrance Finnegan, posed as the landlord of the defendants. Biscoglio and Doak. He provided the plaintiff with information regarding these defendants that he knew to be false, for the purpose of inducing Ms. Wilson to rent her property to them. The plaintiff relied on this information when she decided to rent the property to Biscoglio and Doak, and she suffered a financial loss as a result of that decision.
For the above reasons judgement may enter for the plaintiff in the amount of $3221.78.
CAROL A. WOLVEN JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT