DocketNumber: No. CV99 0175131 S
Citation Numbers: 2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 3543
Judges: D'ANDREA, JUDGE TRIAL REFEREE.
Filed Date: 3/21/2002
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
The following pertinent facts are alleged in the plaintiff's complaint. In 1993, the plaintiff and Capital entered into an oral agreement (the agreement) under which, the plaintiff was to assist Capital with the marketing and sale of Jason Bankshares, Inc.'s (Bankshares) stock. Bankshares was a holding company that owned a substantial amount of stock in two other banks. Pursuant to the agreement, the plaintiff was to receive a 15 percent commission of Capital's fees from the successful sale of Bankshares' stock in the two banks to a third party. Capital successfully consummated the sale and was paid $101,800 in fees. On or about August 26, 1998, Capital paid the plaintiff $3,000. Capital has not paid the plaintiff the $12,270 that the plaintiff believes remains due and owing under the agreement.
The third and fourth counts of the complaint relate to an action the plaintiff commenced against the defendants in June of 1999 in the district court of Edward County, Kansas (the Kansas action). The Kansas action asserted the same breach of contract rights as counts one and two of this Connecticut action. In the third count, the plaintiff alleges that Capital failed to file an appearance in the Kansas action and on August 11, 1999, the district court rendered a default judgment (the Kansas judgment) in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $12,270 (plus prejudgment interest at 10 percent, post judgment interest at 8.5 percent and $66.50 in costs). In the fourth count, the plaintiff alleges that Romero failed to appear in the Kansas action and thus, the aforementioned default judgment was also entered against him.
On December 27, 1999, the defendants filed an answer and three special defenses in this Connecticut action. The defendants asserted the special defenses of statute of limitations, statute of frauds and that the third and fourth counts fail to state viable causes of action. Subsequently, on CT Page 3545 April 13, 2000, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment and supporting memorandum as to the third and fourth counts on the grounds that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a mailer of law. The defendants filed an objection and supporting memorandum on July 2, 2001 to which the plaintiff filed a response on October 24, 2001.
A motion for summary judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Milesv. Foley,
The plaintiff argues that summary judgment is warranted because the Kansas judgment is entitled to full faith and credit in Connecticut. The plaintiff asserts that service in the Kansas action was effectuated by in hand service of the writ, summons and complaint on June 16, 1999. The plaintiff evinces service by providing a copy of the sheriff's signed return of service of summons. Additionally, the plaintiff contends that the defendants' failure to appear resulted in a default judgment being entered against them. Thus, the plaintiff contends that under the full faith and credit doctrine, the Kansas judgment is enforceable in Connecticut. The plaintiff acknowledges that a judgment debtor may collaterally attack a sister state's judgment by establishing facts that would render the judgment void or otherwise show that the rendering court lacked the power to grant the relief contained in the judgment. The plaintiff, however, concludes that in this case, the defendants have failed to establish any facts which would render the Kansas judgment void.
In opposition to the summary judgment motion, the defendants make two arguments. The defendants' first argument asserts that the Kansas court lacked jurisdiction because the Kansas action was barred by a previous bankruptcy court order. The defendants' second argument is based on the Kansas statute of limitations for breach of an oral agreement. The defendants cite to Kansas Statute §
As a preliminary matter, this court notes that because the Kansas judgment was obtained by default based on the defendants' failure to appear, the plaintiff could not proceed under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act General Statutes §
The enforcement of a foreign judgment implicates the full faith and credit clause of the United States constitution, which explicitly provides in article four, § 1, that: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the . . . judicial Proceedings of every other State." The United States Supreme Court has held that interpretation of the full faith and credit clause is a question of federal law and that state courts are bound by its decisions concerning the criteria for applying the clause. Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co.,
To successfully attack a foreign judgment "[the party attacking the judgment] must establish that the [foreign] judgment is void, not merely voidable . . . Broadly stated, this would require proof of the lack of a legally organized court or tribunal; lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties, or both; or want of power to grant the relief contained in the judgment." (Citation omitted.) Phoenix Leasing,Inc. v. Kosinski, supra,
Similarly, the defendants' second argument, regarding the Kansas statute of limitations, does not raise a defect which would render the Kansas judgment void. The Kansas Supreme Court has stated that "[u]nder the provisions of K.S.A. [§] 60-512 a cause of action for breach of contract not in writing must be instituted within three years. It is axiomatic that the three year period commences to run from the date of the breach of the contract." Wolf v. Brungardt,
As there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the validity of the Kansas judgment, the plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment as a CT Page 3548 matter of law. Accordingly, the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to the third and fourth counts of the complaint is hereby granted.
So Ordered.
D'ANDREA, J.T.R.