DocketNumber: No. CV 97-0574415
Citation Numbers: 2000 Conn. Super. Ct. 3165
Judges: WAGNER, JUDGE TRIAL REFEREE.
Filed Date: 3/21/2000
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
A prior action was commenced on March 14, 1995 against Murphy and Redman, and on October 23, 1995, the court, Schimelman, J., granted Murphy's motion to cite in Church as a third party defendant. On January 16, 1995, the court. Hennessey, J., granted Church's motion to strike the third party complaint on procedural grounds. On July 18, 1996, Judge Hennessey granted Murphy's second motion to cite in Church as a party defendant and ordered that on or before August 1, 1996, the plaintiff amend her complaint to state facts showing the interests of Cheryl Drauss [Church] in this action and summon her to appear as a defendant in this action on or before the second day following August 13, 1996. . . ." On December 27, 1996, the court dismissed the action due to Privitera's failure to prosecute with reasonable diligence pursuant to Practice Book § 251 [now §
The present action against Murphy, Redman and Church brought under General Statutes §
On November 10, 1999, Church filed this motion for summary judgment on the ground that Privitera had two years from the April 23, 1993 incident to file suit, and since Privitera failed to serve her complaint against Church within the two year period of that statute, Church is entitled to summary judgment. Privitera argues that Church was a party to the first action and, therefore, pursuant to General Statutes §
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court's function is not to decide issues of material fact, but rather to determine whether any such issues exist. Nolan v. Borkowski,
Church has submitted an affidavit in support of her motion for summary judgment claiming she was not served with a complaint nor informed that she was a defendant in a personal injury action by Mary Privitera prior to April 23, 1995, accompanied by a copy of the original summons and complaint dated March 14, 1995, as evidence that Murphy and Redman were the only named defendants in the original action. Church asserts that she was unable to obtain a certified copy of the plaintiffs original complaint because, pursuant to court rules, the original court file was destroyed two years after the dismissal. Hence, Church submits a Clerk's Certificate dated October 29, 1999, that states "the action brought by Mary Privitera against Christine Murphy, et al. . . . was dismissed by the court on December 27, 1996, pursuant to Practice Book § 251."
As evidence that Church was a party to the first action, Privitera submits a copy of the motion to cite in Cheryl Drauss as a third party defendant dated October 6, 1995, along with a copy of Judge Schimelman's order dated October 23, 1995, granting this motion. Additionally, Privitera submits a copy of the second motion to cite in Cheryl Drauss as a party defendant dated June 5, 1996, along with a copy of Judge Hennessey's order dated July 18, 1996, granting this motion. Finally, Privitera submits a copy of the summons, third party complaint and sheriff's return which were served on Church in the First action and a copy of an appearance dated December 12, 1995, as evidence that Church appeared in the first action through Attorney William O'Brien.
In considering a motion for summary judgment this court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party; Rivera v. Double A Transportation, Inc., supra,
Since it appears to this court that a genuine issue of material CT Page 3168 fact exists regarding whether Church was a party to the original action Church's motion for summary judgment is denied.