DocketNumber: No. 502754
Citation Numbers: 1992 Conn. Super. Ct. 2028
Judges: BURNS, J.
Filed Date: 3/4/1992
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
In the first count, the plaintiffs allege that the Probe LX has various manufacturing and design defects. The plaintiffs also allege that Ford failed to give adequate warnings regarding the vehicle's acceleration capacity and the "unusual characteristics" of a skidding front wheel drive vehicle. In the second count, the plaintiffs incorporate the acts alleged in support of their product liability claim, and add that Ford violated CUTPA by "knowingly providing the . . . improperly designed and manufactured vehicle for sale" to the owner, Steven L. Hluchnik. The third count also incorporates the facts alleged in the first count, and adds that as a result of Ford's allegedly defective product, the named plaintiffs lost the love, affection and consortium of Andrea L. Notman.
On December 9, 1991, the defendant filed a motion to strike the second and third counts of the plaintiffs' complaint as legally insufficient, on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed to allege facts which would permit recovery under CUTPA, and that Connecticut does not allow recovery for loss of consortium between parent and child, or between siblings.
Ford filed a memorandum in support of its motion to strike CT Page 2029 as required by Practice Book 155, and plaintiffs timely filed a memorandum in opposition, on December 24, 1991. On December 30, 1991, defendant filed a reply brief in support of its motion to strike and on January 14, 1992, the plaintiffs filed a reply memorandum in opposition.
A motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Practice Book 152, Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority,
With respect to the plaintiffs' second count, the defendant argues that the plaintiffs cannot bring a CUTPA claim and a product liability action based on the same factual allegations, as the statutory product liability remedy bars such a claim. The plaintiffs argue that the statutory product liability remedy does not pre-empt a CUTPA claim, and that unfair trade practice claims can be brought in the same action as a product liability claim. The plaintiffs also contend that, by adding the phrase "knowingly providing the . . . improperly designed and manufactured vehicle for sale . . .," a legally sufficient CUTPA claim is made, as this phrase converts the plaintiffs' product liability pleadings into pleadings which constitute a valid CUTPA claim.
A CUTPA claim, arising out of the same transaction or occurrence, may be pleaded as a separate count in an action under the Connecticut Product Liability Statutes. D'Alfonso v. Jacobs Suchard, Inc., 4 Conn. L. Rptr., No. 7, p. 220 (July 1, 1991, Aronson, J.); Haeshe v. Kissner,
General Statutes 52-272n(a) states:
A product liability claim . . . may be asserted and shall be in lieu of all other claims against product sellers, including actions of negligence, strict liability, and warranty for harm caused by a product.
This statute provides an exclusive remedy and precludes a common law cause of action for a claim within the scope of the statute. Winslow v. Lewis-Shepard, Inc.,
In contrast, CUTPA deals with actions that cause unjustified consumer injury rather than a personal injury based upon negligence. A-G Foods, Inc. v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc.,
No person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce . . . .
and with General Statutes 542-110g(a) which provides that:
Any person who suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment of a method, act or practice prohibited by
42-110b , may bring an action to recover actual damages.
Thus, a violation of CUTPA may be established by showing "either an actual deceptive practice or a practice amounting to a violation of public policy." Daddona v. Liberty Mobile Home Sales, Inc.,
In the present case, the plaintiffs attempt to support their CUTPA claim by incorporating the facts pleaded in support of their product liability claim, and by adding the legal conclusion that Ford violated CUTPA by "knowingly providing the . . . improperly designed and manufactured vehicle for sale to Mr. Steven L. Hlunchnik. . ." (the owner of the vehicle). The CT Page 2031 product liability statutes preclude any claim that is "basically co-extensive with" or "functionally identical to" a simultaneously pled product liability claim. West Haven School District v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., supra, 23. A CUTPA claim, accompanied by allegations that the defendant sold a product "with the deficiencies alleged in the product liability count of the complaint," does not create a functional distinction between the allegations of the product liability count. Jaconski v. Harley-Davidson Co., Inc.,
Plaintiffs' act of incorporating their product liability allegations in support of their CUTPA claim amounts to a "functionally identical" claim which is precluded by the product liability statutes. Plaintiffs' conclusion that Ford "knowingly" provided a defective product is not a legally sufficient fact, as "knowledge . . ., either constructive or actual, need not be proven to establish a violation of CUTPA." Web Press Services Corp. v. New London Motors, Inc.,
In its memorandum in support of its motion to strike the third count of the plaintiffs' complaint, the defendant argues that, in Connecticut, loss of consortium does not extend to the parent-child, or sibling-sibling relationships. The plaintiffs claim that, based on a footnote in an appellate decision, the law in Connecticut is unsettled, and a claim for loss of filial consortium should be allowed because other states now recognize such a claim.
The Connecticut Supreme Court recognizes a cause of action on behalf of a spouse for the loss of consortium of an injured marital partner. Hopson v. St. Mary's Hospital,
Accordingly, the court grants defendant's motion to strike the third count of the complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs have failed to state a legally sufficient cause of action.
The defendant's motion to strike the second and third counts of the plaintiffs' complaint is granted.
BURNS, JUDGE