DocketNumber: No. CV92 29 46 03 S
Judges: FULLER, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 7/25/1994
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
The parties have entered into a stipulation of facts which forms the underlying factual basis for both motions. The relevant facts are as follows. Joan Corcoran Adamkowski died on October 22, 1989, and her will was admitted to probate in the Bridgeport Probate Court. The plaintiff, Anna Corcoran, is both the executrix and the sole beneficiary of the estate of Joan Corcoran Adamkowski. The will contains the standard clause directing the executrix to pay the decedent's debts (except those secured by mortgage on real estate) out of the residuary estate. There was no specific devise of the property at 129 Minturn Road in Bridgeport, and it passed to the plaintiff under the residuary clause of the estate which covered both real and personal property of the decedent. The decedent had acquired title to the subject property by warranty deed dated June 9, 1984, recorded in the Bridgeport Land Records. On June 29, 1987, the Department of Income Maintenance of the State of Connecticut, now known as the Department of Social Services (hereafter referred to as DSS) recorded a lien on the real property pursuant to §§ 17-82c and 17-83e of the General Statutes for all public assistance payments made to Joan Adamkowski prior to and subsequent to the recording of the lien.1 On or about January 4, 1990, the plaintiff's attorney notified the Department of Administrative Services, Bureau of Collection Services of the State of Connecticut of the decedent's death and that it had 90 days from that date to file a claim for reimbursement from the decedent's estate. On or about March 8, 1990, the Bureau of Collection Services (BCS) filed a claim against the estate in the amount of $29,791.66, stating that this was the amount due the State for payments made to the decedent under the provisions of Chapter 302 of the General Statutes. The 90 day claim period expired about April 4, 1990. On or about August 6, 1990, the Department of Income Maintenance claimed, by letter to the plaintiff's attorney, that its statutory lien amounted to $56,093.69. The additional amount claimed was for medical benefits paid to the decedent after she reached 65 years of age until her death. After receipt of that letter, the plaintiff's attorney filed a petition for determination of claim with the Bridgeport Probate Court on or about August 9, 1990. The Probate Court held a public hearing on October 23, 1990. No one from the Department of Administrative Services appeared to defend the claim. The Probate Court determined that there was no authority for the increased claim after the 90 day claims period CT Page 7705 had expired, and that the amount of the claim presented within the time period was $29,791.66, which was to be paid by the fiduciary to the State of Connecticut. The court order also stated that upon tender of that amount to the Department of Administrative Services, which was to be accepted as full payment, the Department was directed to provide a release of the lien. The order of the Probate Court of October 30, 1990 was not appealed by the State. The plaintiff's attorney sent a cashiers check of $29,791.66 to the BCS on December 12, 1990 together with a copy of the Probate Court order. The BCS negotiated the check and advised the Probate Court on December 17, 1990 that the claim had been fully paid. The defendant later refused to provide a release of the lien despite two written demands for a release by the plaintiff's attorney.
In addition to these undisputed facts, the defendant has submitted an affidavit and documentation to support a claim that the amount paid by the State to the decedent was $56,093.69, and that the difference from the amount of the claim presented was $26,570.69 in medical benefits paid to the decedent. An affidavit from an investigator at the Department of Income Maintenance dated October 20, 1993 contains other facts which have not been agreed to by the plaintiff. This affidavit indicates that DSS was not contacted by the BCS as to the amount of the lien, its release, or the amount of public assistance reimbursable to the State prior to August 6, 1990. On that date DSS was again contacted by the estate's attorney, prompting the letter claiming $56,560.69. Around November 2, 1990 DSS received from BCS a copy of the Probate Court petition for the determination of the claim dated August 9, 1990. DSS was not aware of the petition or the hearing on it prior to November 2, 1990. DSS became aware of the $29,791.66 payment to BCS when contacted by it on February 7, 1991.
Summary judgment maybe granted under § 384 of the Connecticut Practice Book if the pleadings and documents submitted with the motion show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Connelly v. Housing Authority,
The admissible facts in the affidavit, if accepted as true, amount to a claim that DSS was ignorant of the actions taken by BCS, part of the Department of Administrative Services, until after the amount of the claim was presented to and decided by the Probate Court. In determining whether there is a material issue of fact preventing summary judgment, the evidence is considered in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Connell v. Colwell,
The presentation of claims against a solvent estate is governed by §
The statute requires notice to be given to the Department of Administrative Services, not DSS or any other state agency. The executrix gave proper notice, and the only claim presented then was for $29,791.66. That amount and the additional sum claimed by DSS after the 90 day claims period had expired were both debts of the decedent. Under the terms of the will all of the claims of the State were debts of the decedent which were to be paid from the residue of the estate. There is no provision in the statute for a creditor to submit an amended claim, increasing its amount after the claims period has expired. That would defeat the entire purpose of the statute.
The defendant argues that since this is an action to force the release of the State's statutory lien that presentation of the claim was not required, relying upon Beard's Appeal,
"The distinction between these two lines of cases is clear. Those cases cited above and others in our reports which hold that the presentation of a claim is essential involve claims which are the personal obligation of the decedent. In those cases in which the cause of action is for the recovery of or the determination of interests in specific property and therefor is at least quasi in rem and in personam, it is not an essential prerequisite that a claim be presented. In other words the purpose of the statute of nonclaim is to make sure that an administrator is informed as to what claims there are which must be paid out of the estate as a whole. It is not to apprise him of what the apparent property of his decedent is to be inventoried or what encumbrances, if any, are on that property."
The decedent's will directs the executrix to pay all of the decedent's debts, except those secured by a mortgage on real property. Since an authorized state agency submitted a claim for only $29,791.66, the late claim for additional $56,093.69 is barred by the clear statutory language of §
The defendant contends that the probate court had no authority to order the lien released upon payment of the amount of the claim initially presented. While a probate court has no power to make a final determination of title where title is disputed, it can make such incidental determinations of questions of title as are necessary to enable it to carry out its statutory duties. HartfordNational Bank Trust Co. v. Willard,
Even if the Probate Court's jurisdiction does not go so far as to allow it to order the State to release the statutory lien on the decedent's property, the Probate Court clearly had authority to determine the amount of the claim. It also had authority to allow the executrix to pay the amount of the claim that was property presented to the executrix, and to deny any claim not presented as provided by statute. The State never appealed the order of the Probate Court allowing only $29,791.66. Since the Probate Court had jurisdiction to determine the amount of the claim, that order became a final judgment when the State failed to take an appeal. The decree is not subject to collateral attack at this time. See §
It is undisputed that the State has been paid the amount determined to be the debt by the Probate Court, namely $29,791.66. By the negotiation of the check by an agency of the State, the debt has been fully paid. There is no genuine issue as to any material fact in this case. Whether the lien must be released under the circumstances is a question of law. Under § 17-82c of the General Statutes, the Commissioner of Income Maintenance can place a lien against property of a person receiving assistance "to secure the claim of the State for all amounts which it has paid or may thereafter pay to him or in his behalf under the provisions of" Chapter 302. It is undisputed that the lien was filed as provided in § 17-82c. That statute also states that the "lien shall be released by the Commissioner upon payment of the amount by its secured." CT Page 7710
The amount secured was reduced to $29,791.66 as a result of the proceedings on the estate in the Probate Court and §
The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is granted. The defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied.
ROBERT A. FULLER, JUDGE
Bartha v. Waterbury House Wrecking Co. ( 1983 )
Hartford National Bank & Trust Co. v. Willard ( 1978 )
Sherwood v. City of Bridgeport ( 1937 )
Conference Center Ltd. v. TRC—The Research Corp. ( 1983 )
Interstate Fur Manufacturing Co. v. Redevelopment Agency ( 1967 )
Beard, Appeal From Probate ( 1906 )
Connecticut Co. v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad ( 1919 )