DocketNumber: Nos. CV97-0569705, CV97-0570020
Citation Numbers: 1998 Conn. Super. Ct. 1519, 21 Conn. L. Rptr. 335
Judges: McWEENY, J.
Filed Date: 2/3/1998
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
The Commission on June 14, 1996, received a complaint dated June 8, 1996, which alleged a violation of §
The Commission, based on substantial evidence in the record, made the following findings:
2. It is found that Regional School District No. 17 is solely comprised of the towns of Haddam and Killingworth.
3. It is found that at all times relevant to this complaint the district board was comprised of the following ten members: Helen Reeve, Jeannetta U. Coley, Robert H. Lentz, Robert J. Bilafer, Edward A. Vynalek, Anne E. Wolak, Rebecca L. Bergeron, Michael F. Dagostino, Robert S. Daves and James E. Sheppard. It is further found that the town of Haddam has six members and the town of Killingworth has four members on such district board in accordance with each town's percentage of population in the total district.
15. It is found that a referendum on the regional school district budget was held simultaneously in the towns of Haddam and Killingworth on May 7, 1996, and that such referendum was defeated. A revised budget referendum passed on June 1, 1996.
16. It is found that at its April 9, 1996 meeting, the respondent board voted to adopt the CT Page 1521 legal call for the district annual meeting on May 6, 1996, and to set the voting hours for a referendum on the budget for May 7, 1996.
17. It is found that the budget subcommittee of the respondent board met on February 29, 1996, with respondents Reeve, Lentz, Coley, Sheppard, Wolak and Sweetman present, and discussed the complained of budget flyer (hereinafter "the budget mailer"). It is further found that all members of the board are members of the budget subcommittee.
18. It is found that the budget subcommittee of the board met again on April 4, 1996, with respondents Reeve, Lentz, Coley, Bergeron, Daves, and Vynalek present, and discussed the budget mailer.
19. It is found that the budget subcommittee of the board met on April 16, 1996, with respondents Reeve, Lentz, Bilafer and Sweetman present, discussed, finalized and approved the budget mailer for distribution to households in the district.
20. It is found that the format of the budget mailer is based upon that of previous flyers, including an introductory letter authored by respondent Lentz as budget chairman. The introductory letter went through several drafts, and in response to respondent Reeve's suggestion that it was too strong, a specific exhortation to vote for the budget was removed from the first draft.
22. It is found that neither the respondent board nor the respondent superintendent had the budget mailer reviewed by an attorney prior to its mailing.
23. It is found that prior to the referendum vote on May 7, 1996, the approximately 4,800 households within the district received the twelve page budget mailer, which included charts, graphs, a question and answer section, and statements such CT Page 1522 as: "We need to set aside monies for such basic capital improvements as roof and oil tank replacement and black top resurfacing . . . It is imperative to maintain our facilities . . . Please think for a minute of your own budget over the last few years. Have you or your friends had an increase in income to keep pace with inflation? If not, how did you or they cope? What did you cut or adjust? . . . we on the Board are faced with the same realities . . . We look forward to a high turnout at the polls. We need voter participation to validate our educational priorities and directions."
24. It is found that the return address of the budget mailer reads, in pertinent part: "REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 17, Office of the Superintendent . . ."
25. It is found that the budget mailer cost $1,950 to print and $623.68 to mail, and such printing and distribution was at the expense of the school district.
The Board and its ten members appealed the Commission's decision on April 11, 1997, and Sweetman appealed on April 24, 1997. The cases were consolidated on May 15, 1997. The answer and record were filed on May 24, 1997. Briefs were filed by the Board on July 7, 1997. Sweetman on July 3, 1997, and the Commission on August 18, 1997. The plaintiffs adopted all arguments presented in their various briefs. The parties were heard at oral argument on January 7, 1998.
The plaintiffs argue: 1) that §
The issues relating to the scope of coverage and constitutionality of §
Section
The plaintiffs focus on the statute's reference to "municipality" and omission of any reference to boards of education or more specifically regional boards of education. The Commission relies on a sentence within the text of §
"[T]he process of statutory construction involves a reasoned search for the intention of the legislature." Frillica v.Westport,
The legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment are unusually instructive. Section
The legislative history, the context of Chapter 152 and the language of the statute illuminate the policy advanced by the statute. If an issue is before the public in a referendum, then neither side may use public funds to advocate on the issue. The use by public officials of public funds as in this case, is precisely the evil addressed by the legislature in enacting Public Act 89-159. In that public officials and public employees are more likely to direct the expenditure of public funds they are most likely to be restricted by this act. There is no plausible reading of the policy or statute which would allow the exclusion of individuals because of their status as elected officials or public employees. They are the intended targets of the limits on publicly funded advocacy on local referenda. Section
The plaintiffs dispute the characterization of the regional district's funds as "municipal funds." The Commission's conclusion is supported by the educational laws of the state. General Statutes §
In a further attempt to preclude the application of the statute to regional boards of education the plaintiffs suggest that the vote on the district budget was not the "local proposal or question approved for submission to electors of a municipality at a referendum." What occurred in the district budget vote were simultaneous municipal referenda. The referenda were submitted to the constituent municipalities and involved the "local proposal" of the pro rata contribution of the municipality to the budget.
The plaintiffs next assert that §
In order to prevail on its claim of facial vagueness the plaintiffs "must demonstrate that the statute has no core CT Page 1525 meaning. Put another way, a determination that the statute is not vague with respect to at least one application will defeat the challenge. The burden is augmented by the strong presumption in favor of the statute's constitutionality." Benjamin v. Bailey,
The core meaning of §
The permissible regulations of campaign financing have been addressed in Buckley v. Valeo,
In the instant case the prohibition on any expenditure of public funds by any person to advocate a position on a local referenda is unusually vivid. The governmental interest in the insulation of the democratic process of local referenda from the partisan use of public funds is fundamental and compelling. The state also has a compelling interest in the use of public funds by its political subdivisions.
The plaintiffs' vagueness claim may also raise the related issue of overbreadth. Smith v. Goguen,
"The essence of the overbreadth challenge is that a statute that proscribes certain conduct, even though it may have some permissible applications, sweeps within its proscription conduct protected by the first amendment." State v. Proto, supra,
A party has standing to raise an overbreadth claim only if there is a realistic danger that the statute will significantly CT Page 1526 compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the court. Broadrick v. Oklahoma,
The plaintiffs are unable to articulate any recognized First Amendment protection of public officials to use of public funds to advocate their view on public issues in local referenda.
In determining whether a communication constitutes advocacy under §
The plaintiffs contend that the "style, tenor and timing" standard is a regulation which has been enacted in violation of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) §
In applying the terms "advocate" and "influence" to the facts, "The Commission was doing its duty. It was interpreting the statute, which was enacted for its guidance and which it was charged with administering. . . ." Eagle Hill Corp. v. Commissionon Hospitals,
The court finds that the "style, tenor and timing" standard is not a regulation of the Commission. It does not add any additional prohibition to what was prohibited by statute.
The plaintiffs' challenges to the evidentiary basis of the Commission's ruling is measured by the substantial evidence rule.
"Judicial review of an administrative agency decision requires a court to determine whether there is substantial CT Page 1527 evidence in the administrative record to support the agency's findings of basic fact and whether the conclusions drawn from those facts are reasonable. . . . Neither this court nor the trial court may retry the case or substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the weight of the evidence or questions of fact." (Citations and internal quotation marks.)Dolgner v. Alander,
"The substantial evidence rule governs judicial review of administrative fact-finding under the UAPA. General Statutes §
The court's review of the record reveals insufficient evidence to support the Commission's order with respect to the plaintiff Dagostino. Mr. Dagostino was not present at any of the meetings at which the budget brochure was discussed or approved.7 The mere fact that Dagostino was a board member at the time of the consent agreement is insufficient to support the order of reimbursement as to him.
The findings and orders as to all other plaintiffs are supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Sweetman argues that the commission improperly found that he authorized the budget mailer. In paragraph 31 of its decision, the commission specifically finds that Sweetman violated §
Not only was Sweetman present at two of the budget mailer meetings, he also sent the final version of the budget mailer to Chairperson Helen Reeve with a letter that on the one hand disavowed his responsibility for the mailer. In the same letter, however, Sweetman stated that absent further instructions, the final version of the budget mailer would be forwarded to the printer. The return address on the budget mailer read "REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 17, OFFICE OF THE SUPERINTENDENT." Significantly, Sweetman testified that he would not have "allowed [a first draft of the introductory message] to go out. . . . I would not have allowed what I would have considered advocacy to have been in there." (Transcript p. 106) As the Commission points out, this evidence indicates that Sweetman had authority over whether the budget mailer was published.
The challenge to the penalties is unavailing. Section
The Commission found a serious offense, an improper expenditure of public funds; and a history of noncompliance evidencing an absence of good faith. (R.
Furthermore, the amount of the fine was clearly a matter of discretion with the Commission. The standard of judicial review require that "an agency's factual and discretionary determinations are to be accorded considerable weight by the courts." Board of Administration v. Bridgeport CommunityTelevision Co.,
The appeal of the plaintiff Dagostino is affirmed. All other appeals are dismissed. The case is remanded to the Commission pursuant to §
Robert F. McWeeny, J. CT Page 1529
Connecticut Life & Health Insurance Guaranty Ass'n v. ... , 173 Conn. 352 ( 1977 )
Broadrick v. Oklahoma , 93 S. Ct. 2908 ( 1973 )
Buckley v. Valeo , 96 S. Ct. 612 ( 1976 )
Burt v. Blumenauer , 299 Or. 55 ( 1985 )
Stanson v. Mott , 17 Cal. 3d 206 ( 1976 )
Board of Aldermen v. Bridgeport Community Antennae ... , 168 Conn. 294 ( 1975 )