DocketNumber: No. CV91 050 08 95
Citation Numbers: 1992 Conn. Super. Ct. 4094, 7 Conn. Super. Ct. 568
Judges: BURNS, J.
Filed Date: 5/5/1992
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
The defendant has filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action, arguing that the complaint is not CT Page 4095 justiciable. The defendant's motion is supported by a memorandum of law and other supplementary memoranda.
The plaintiff has objected to the motion, arguing that the complaint is justiciable and that the court can enter an order requiring the governor to enter into a trust agreement with the plaintiff tribe. The plaintiff has supported its objection with a memorandum of law and other supplementary memoranda.
Oral argument was heard by the court (Burns, J.) at short calendar on January 21, 1992.
The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the court's authority to hear the case before it. See Practice Book 142. Justiciability is properly raised in a motion to dismiss. See Pelligrino v. O'Neill,
(1) that there be an actual controversy between or among the parties to the dispute; (2) that the interests of the parties be adverse; (3) that the matter in controversy be capable of being adjudicated by judicial power; (4) that the determination of the controversy will result in practical relief to the complainant.
Pelligrino v. O'Neill, supra 673 (citations omitted).
The plaintiff is seeking a writ of mandamus ordering the defendant to negotiate a trust agreement with the plaintiff tribe, arguing that the governor is required to enter into such an agreement pursuant to General Statutes
the governor shall enter into a trust agreement with each willing indigenous tribe. Any such trust agreement shall define the powers and duties possessed by the tribe that is party to the agreement and shall be consistent with the recommendations on trust agreements contained in the final report of the Indian Affairs Task Force made pursuant to CT Page 4096 special act 87-103.
General Statutes
The defendant has made no claim that the case does not meet the first and second of the requirements for justiciability, actuality of controversy and adversity of the interests of the parties. Rather, the defendant contends that the matter "[cannot] be adjudicated by judicial power because there is no final report containing trust agreement recommendations"; Memorandum in Support, 3; and that no final report will exist in the future because the Task Force no longer exists, having concluded its legislatively authorized business. The defendant argues that such a report is a condition precedent and a jurisdictional prerequisite to the governor's duty to enter into a trust agreement, that in the absence of such a report the court cannot enter an order forcing the governor to enter into a trust agreement, and that the complaint is therefore non-justiciable.
A motion to dismiss is the proper vehicle with which to assert an alleged lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Practice Book 143(1). In ruling upon a motion to dismiss, the court should construe the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light. Reynolds v. Soffer,
"A court has subject matter jurisdiction if it has the authority to adjudicate a particular type of legal controversy. Such jurisdiction relates to the court's competency to exercise power, and not to the regularity of the court's exercise of that power." State v. Malkowski,
It is clear that General Statutes
A motion to dismiss does not involve an inquiry into the merits of the case. See Reitzer v. Board of Trustees of State Colleges,
The defendant cites Pelligrino v. O'Neill, supra, as authority for the proposition that the plaintiff's complaint is not justiciable. The plaintiffs in Pelligrino sought a judgment against the governor, the state treasurer, the state comptroller, the chief court administrator, the speaker of the House of Representatives, and the president of the Senate, declaring that the state's financing of the judicial system violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights because of the delay in the disposition of their cases. Id., 672. The CT Page 4098 Supreme Court declined jurisdiction noting that while the plaintiffs' right to the administration of justice without delay was constitutionally protected, the constitution vested in the legislature the exclusive authority to create additional judgeships, a power that the legislature decline to exercise. Id., 678-681. The court concluded that "[j]ust as the exercise of judicial power by the legislature is constitutionally prohibited, so is the legislative power prohibited to the judiciary." Id., 679 (citations omitted). No such encroachment on legislative or executive power is presented in this case. The legislature itself enacted the statute imposing upon the governor the duty to "enter into a trust agreement with each willing indigenous tribe"; General Statutes
The existence or non-existence of Task Force recommendations on the subject of trust agreements does not affect the court's authority to hear the plaintiff's action, but instead impermissibly implicates the merits of the complaint. See Reitzer v. Board of Trustees of State Colleges, supra, 201. The plaintiff's complaint is, therefore, justiciable. The defendant's motion to dismiss is denied.
BURNS, J.
Upson v. State , 190 Conn. 622 ( 1983 )
State v. Malkowski , 189 Conn. 101 ( 1983 )
Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Costle , 179 Conn. 415 ( 1980 )
Reynolds v. Soffer , 183 Conn. 67 ( 1981 )
Beccia v. City of Waterbury , 185 Conn. 445 ( 1981 )
Clark v. Gibbs , 184 Conn. 410 ( 1981 )
Retzer v. Board of Trustees of State Colleges , 2 Conn. App. 196 ( 1984 )