DocketNumber: No. CV95 0551848
Citation Numbers: 1998 Conn. Super. Ct. 669
Judges: WAGNER, JUDGE TRIAL REFEREE.
Filed Date: 1/28/1998
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
On November 20, 1995, D'Addeo's filed an apportionment complaint against Connecticut Cooling Total Air, Inc. ("Total Air") alleging that, at the time of the accident, Gwara was an employee of Total Air and that Marconi alone had the obligation to provide a reasonably safe means through which Gwara could gain access to the various floor levels of the subject building. D'Addeo's further alleges that if any liability arises out of Marconi's contract with D'Addeo's, Total Air is also bound by that contract pursuant to the terms of the contract between D'Addeo's and Total Air and therefore is likewise obligated to indemnify Marconi.
On July 24, 1996, Total Air filed a motion to strike D'Addeo's apportionment complaint on the grounds that (a) because Gwara was an employee, Total Air is immune from CT Page 670 liability by virtue of General Statutes §
On June 18, 1996, D'Addeo's filed a two count cross-claim against Total Air alleging that pursuant to the terms of the contract between Marconi and D'Addeo's, Total Air was obligated to indemnify and defend D'Addeo's for any losses incurred as a result of Gwara's injuries. In the second count D'Addeo's alleges that the negligence of Total Air was the sole cause of Gwara's alleged injuries because at the time of the accident Total Air was in exclusive control of the premises, D'Addeo's had no reason to anticipate Total Air's negligence, and D'Addeo's reasonably relied on Total Air not to be negligent.
On July 24, 1996, Total Air filed a motion to strike D'Addeo's cross-claim on the ground that there is no basis for D'Addeo's cross-complaint because Total Air is not D'Addeo's co-defendant, as required by Practice Book § 116.
I. Motion to Strike Apportionment Complaint
P.A. 95-111(c), codified as General Statutes §
General Statutes §
(c) In a negligence action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property occurring on or after October 1, 1987, if the damages are determined to be proximately caused by the negligence of more than one party, each party against whom recovery is allowed shall be liable to the claimant only for his proportionate share of the recoverable economic damages and the recoverable noneconomic damages except as provided in subsection (g) of this section."
Total Air argues that it cannot be made an apportionment defendant because in the present case Total CT Page 671 Air is Gwara's employer and, as such, it is shielded from liability by virtue of General Statutes §
General Statutes §
Recently the Supreme Court has confirmed in Skuzinskiv. Bouchard Fuels. Inc.,
In the present case D'Addeo's alleges that Total Air subcontracted with D'Addeo's to perform heating and air conditioning work on the site and that pursuant to the terms of such subcontract, Total Air is bound by the contract between Marconi and D'Addeo's and therefore has the obligation to compensate Marconi for the losses incurred. Thus, D'Addeo's seeks apportionment of the liability attributable to Total Air. This court need not address the exact nature and extent of the alleged independent legal relationship and whether the agreement at issue required Total Air to hold D'Addeo's harmless from liability, since these issues cannot be resolved on a motion to strike. In the present case Total Air's obligation is based on its alleged contractual obligation to indemnify Marconi. Because the Workers' Compensation Act does not bar claims based upon an express agreement by the employer to hold harmless a third party, D'Addeo's apportionment complaint is legally sufficient.
As a second ground in support of its motion to strike, Total Air argues that a claim for indemnification is inappropriate in an apportionment complaint. It is true that the apportionment complaint makes reference to the words `indemnification' and `indemnity' but our Supreme and Appellate Courts have, on more than one occasion, reminded us that words are not talismans capable of transforming, by the mere fact that they are used in the allegations, the true essence of a claim. State v. Wilkins,
D'Addeo's pertinent prayer for relief seeks a determination by the factfinder of a percentage of liability, if any, attributable to the apportionment defendant, Connecticut Cooling Total Air, Inc. The relief thereby sought is not consistent with a claim for indemnification. In indemnity, the party held legally liable shifts the entire loss to another because of some special relationship existing between them. Durand v. TMCManufacturing, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. 396077 (June 15, 1993, Hennessey, J.) (
Since both grounds raised by Total Air fail to undermine the legal sufficiency of the apportionment complaint, its motion to strike is denied.
II. Motion to Strike Cross-Claim
Total Air moves to strike D'Addeo's cross-claim on the ground that a cross-claim can only be filed by a defendant against a co-defendant and, therefore, is procedurally insufficient because Total Air is not a defendant in the action brought by Marconi. D'Addeo's argues that after July 1, 1995, by virtue of Public Act 95-111, codified as General Statutes §
D'Addeo's cross-claim seeks indemnification from Total Air for any damages D'Addeo's may be required to pay to Marconi as the result of Gwara's injuries. Indemnification is a claim for reimbursement in full from one on whom primary liability is claimed to rest. Kyrtatas v. Stop Shop, Inc.,
In any civil action governed by General Statutes §
General Statutes §
A defendant in any civil action to which section
52-572h of the general statutes applies may serve a writ, summons and complaint upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable pursuant to said section for a proportionate share of the plaintiffs damages in which case the demand for relief shall seek an apportionment of liability. Any such writ, summons and complaint, hereinafter called the apportionment complaint, shall be served within one hundred twenty days of the return date specified in the plaintiff's original complaint . . . . The person upon whom the apportionment complaint is served, hereinafter called the apportionment defendant, shall be a party for all purposes including all purposes under section52-572h of the General Statutes.
From the express language of the statute, it is clear that an apportionment defendant's status as a party is in all respects, identical to that of an original defendant and an apportionment defendant has available all defenses and all remedies available to an original defendant. Consequently our rules of practice relating to the filing of a cross-complaint apply to an apportionment defendant in the same manner as they apply to an original defendant. Thus, it is concluded that the term `party to the action' in Practice Book § 116 includes a third party defendant impleaded by way of an apportionment complaint filed pursuant to General Statutes §
This conclusion is buttressed by a review of the legislative history of General Statutes §
This language makes it clear that the legislature intended that a third party defendant is, for all purposes, a party to the action by virtue of the apportionment complaint filed against it on November 20, 1995, Total Air is a party to the action brought by Marconi against D'Addeo's and, therefore, is amenable to a cross-claim pursuant to Practice Book § 116.
Total Air's motion to strike D'Addeo's cross-claim is denied.
WAGNER, JUDGE TRIAL REFEREE