DocketNumber: No. CV98-0585474
Citation Numbers: 2000 Conn. Super. Ct. 2809, 26 Conn. L. Rptr. 548
Judges: BERGER, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 2/28/2000
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
There is really no factual issue concerning whether the respondent was practicing law; he concedes this in his brief. Nevertheless, the respondent maintains that there can be no contempt of this court's suspension order because first, the respondent believes that the filing of the appeal created an automatic stay and second, the respondent was simply acting upon advice of counsel.
The exclusionary language in the context of "actions concerning attorneys pursuant to chapter 2"; Practice Book sec; 61-11(b); has apparently not been construed by any court. There are, however, several cases addressing the exclusion from application of § 61-11's automatic stay in the context of support orders and juvenile matters. See, e.g., In re Bromell G.,
Particularly noteworthy is our Supreme Court's broad interpretation in In re Bromell G., of what constitutes a "juvenile matter" as used in sec; 4046, which at the time provided that the automatic stay provision was not applicable "to juvenile matters brought pursuant to chapters 31 through 40." In reBromell G., supra,
Surely that same broad interpretation given to "juvenile matters" would also apply to "actions concerning attorneys." Moreover, unlike the "technical distinction" that occurred inBromell, the present action is clearly an action brought pursuant to chapter 2 of the Practice Book.
Finally, our Supreme Court in Statewide Grievance Committee v.Rozbicki, noted that "[d]isciplinary proceedings are for the purpose of preserving the courts from the official ministration of persons unfit to practise in them. . . . The proceeding to disbar [or suspend] an attorney is neither a civil action nor a criminal proceeding, but is a proceeding sui generis, the object of which is not the punishment of the offender, but the protection of the court. . . . Once the complaint is made, the court controls the situation and procedure, in its discretion, as the interests of justice may seem to it to require. . . . [T]he power of the courts is left unfettered to act as situations, as they may arise, may seem to require, for efficient discipline of misconduct. . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotations ] omitted.) Statewide Grievance Committee v. Rozbicki,
In light of this compelling interest, the automatic stay argument simply makes no sense. Rather, the respondent's argument falls within the ambit of Practice Book sec; 61-12 which allows for discretionary stays in those matters not covered by the automatic stay provisions. Therefore, the respondent's first argument must fail.
"The axiom is elementary that ignorance of the law excuses no one; and refuge from the consequences of one's conscious acts cannot be found behind a wall of legal advice, be it sound or unsound. . . . Our courts have held that . . . a defendant, in an action in equity, may seek to mitigate damages or ameliorate the decree by showing that he acted in good faith, innocently, by inadvertence, or upon competent legal advice. But, even in civil cases, the rule is that while such reliance on counsel may exonerate the defendant from any intention to do a legal wrong, it does not relieve him from responsibility for the wrong which he committed." State v. Trumbull,
Finally, it must be stressed that this is an attorney
disciplinary action; this is not a case involving a layperson. While this court recognizes that not every attorney may know the practice rules for our court, Mr. Egbarin had been a member of the bar since 1987 and had indeed appeared in front of this court on a number of occasions. He knows, or surely should know, our practice rules. See Greenwich v. Kristoff,
It is this court's finding that this second argument must also fail. As noted previously, no evidence was taken on the contempt issue and, thus, a further hearing is required on whether this court should take any appropriate action as a consequence of the respondent's continued practice.
Berger, J.