DocketNumber: No. CV 93-0344272
Citation Numbers: 1994 Conn. Super. Ct. 7303
Judges: HODGSON, JUDGE
Filed Date: 7/12/1994
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
The function of a motion to strike is to test the legal sufficiency of a pleading. Practice Book § 152; Ferryman v. Groton,
The accident at issue in this case is alleged to have occurred on May 14, 1990. This suit was commenced by service on the defendant on February 1, 1993. The special defense to which the motion to strike is addressed is as follows: "The plaintiff failed to bring her claim or suit within two years of the accident as required by the policy."
Public Act 93-77, which took effect on May 20, 1993, provides in applicable part that "no underinsured motorist claim pending on December 8, 1992 or brought after said date and prior to the effective date of this act, shall fail by reason of any contractual limitation in a motor vehicle insurance policy which limits the time within which such claim shall be . . . commenced for a period of time less than that allowed under §
The cited amendment, Section 2 of P.A. 93-77, expanded the time period for making uninsured and underinsured motorist claim under a motor vehicle policy to three years from the date of the accident, plus certain tolling periods.
The defendant takes the position that the cited provisions of P.A. 93-77 cannot constitutionally be applied to affect insurance contracts entered into before its passage.
Addressing a similar time limit in Aetna Life Casualty Co.v. Braccidiferro,
The defendant has not asserted that the reasoning ofBraccidiferro is for any reason inapplicable to the case now before this court.
The plaintiff's motion to strike the defendant's special defense is granted, as the two-year limitation invoked by the defendant is unenforceable as a matter of law.
Beverly J. Hodgson, Judge