DocketNumber: No. CV96 032 49 02
Citation Numbers: 2000 Conn. Super. Ct. 15117
Judges: WHITE, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 12/7/2000
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
On June 25, 1999, the defendant filed a "motion to correct report of referee, " pursuant to Practice Book §
The essential facts of this case, as found by the referee, are as follows: "This case deals with the rights and responsibilities of the parties in connection with a German Shepherd dog named Martina, including the training and certification of the animal in accordance with the Schutzhund method of dog training and the rights to Martina's offspring . . . . [I]t is not disputed that the parties entered into an oral agreement whereby plaintiff placed Martina with the defendant. As part of the agreement defendant agreed to care for the dog. Plaintiff subsequently conveyed a 50% interest in the dog with the understanding that the defendant would continue to be responsible for its care and training . . . . It was also admitted that [as of] April of 1994 the dog had not obtained the one or more of the certifications the plaintiff had sought and that in April 1995 [the plaintiff] demanded the return of the dog . . . . [I]t was agreed at trial that Martina was spayed at the defendant's request in 1996." (Corrected report.)
According to the referee, the defendant had four defenses: "(1) that the agreement was too vague and indefinite to be enforced; (2) that since it was an oral agreement which was not to be performed within one year CT Page 15119 enforcement was barred under the statute of frauds; (3) that the defendant performed all the obligations required by him and (4) that any failure to perform was excused on the grounds that it would have been impossible considering a particular medical condition to which the dog in question is alleged to have suffered from." (Corrected report.)1 The disease Martina suffers from is called megaesophagus.
The referee reached the following conclusions that are relevant to the pending motions: the "sum of the evidence demonstrated that the parties had agreed as to who was to have custody and possession of the animal, who was to train it, what kind of certification was expected as a result of the training, that the dog was to be bred and that the process of breeding would go to the plaintiff'; "after the plaintiff conveyed a 50 [percent] interest in Martina to the defendant Mr. Henvy became entitled to a portion of the profits in an amount which corresponded to his ownership interest since [there] was no credible testimony as to any other arrangement"; the agreement was sufficiently detailed to be enforceable; the statute of frauds did not bar enforcement because "each party performed numerous acts in support of the agreement that would constitute part performance"; the defendant failed to establish his defenses of impossibility of performance; the defendant failed to establish his claim of accord and satisfaction; the defendant failed to notify the plaintiff prior to having Martina spayed; the spaying "had the effect of destroying the economic value of this animal"; the defendant breached the agreement;"based upon defendant's breach of the agreement there is no doubt that the measure of damages suggested by Judge Fuller in the case cited by the plaintiff, the value of the dog, is the appropriate standard to use in this matter"; "[b]ased upon the testimony of all the witnesses the undersigned finds that value of Martina prior to the action of the defendant in ordering that the dog be spayed to be $54,000"; and that "[a]s a one half-owner plaintiff's damages would amount to the sum of $27,000."
The defendant objects to the acceptance of the corrected report of the attorney trial referee for eight reasons, which may be summarized as follows: (1) the referee failed to file the corrected report as soon as practicable; (2) the referee's conclusion that the agreement was enforceable could not be reached on the facts; (3) the referee incorrectly concluded that the plaintiff rebutted the defendant's statute of fraud claim; (4) the referee failed to strike a sentence in his report that stated, "[i]n addition other witnesses testified that it was their experience as dog breeders that the hereditary form of this disease evidenced itself much earlier than in the case of Martina," because this testimony came from dog breeders who were incompetent to give such testimony and the plaintiff failed to establish a sufficient foundation for their testimony; (5) the referee's conclusion that the defendant CT Page 15120 failed to establish his defense of impossibility of performance and, consequently, his defense of accord and satisfaction was not supported by the facts; (6) the measure of damages in this case should have been one of contract, not tort; (7) the referee's conclusion that the value of the dog was $54,000 was not supported by the evidence; (8) the referee's conclusion, that it was incumbent upon the defendant to notify the plaintiff prior to taking an action which had the effect of destroying the economic value of the dog, could not be reached on the facts because as a co-owner the defendant had a right to protect the health of the dog.
The defendant also takes nine exceptions to the corrected report pursuant to § 19-13 of the Practice Book. As the court has noted, however, § 19-13 was repealed, effective January 1, 2000. Accordingly, the court need not consider this motion.
The court has reviewed the record, excerpts of which were provided by the defendant, and notes at the outset that nowhere in his objection does the defendant refer to pages in the voluminous record of the proceedings before the referee in support of his argument.
The standard of review the court applies when considering objections to an attorney trial referee's report is clear error. Meadows v. Higgins,
The defendant's first objection regards the length of time that it took the referee to rule on the defendant's motion to correct. The defendant cites Crowley Holmes v. Trimboli, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. 317588 (August 6, 1999, Skolnick, J.) (
Second, the defendant argues that the referee's conclusion that the agreement was enforceable is not supported by the facts found at trial because: "there was no agreement as to when the dog was to be bred, the number and kind of litters [Martina] might have produced, and what was to happen if breeding could result in a serious health risk to the dog." (Objection, p. 1.) In response, the defendant contends that this is a finding of fact that has adequate support in the record. CT Page 15122
"The existence of a contract is a question of fact to be determined by the trier on the basis of all the evidence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) John M. Glover Agency v. RDB Building, LLC,
Third, the defendant objects to the conclusion that the plaintiff rebutted the defendant's statute of frauds claim because, according to the defendant, there was no part performance as to the breeding of Martina. The defendant's challenge to this conclusion lacks merit. The record is replete with evidence to support the referee's finding that the acts of the parties were of such a character that could be accounted for only by the existence of some contract. "[A]cts on the part of the promisee may be sufficient to take a contract out of the statute [of frauds] if they are such as clearly refer to some contract in relation to the matter in dispute . . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ubysz v. DiPietro,
Fourth, the defendant claims that the referee erred in denying his request made in his motion to correct to delete a sentence in the report which reads: "In addition other witnesses testified that it was their experience as dog breeders that the hereditary form of this disease evidenced itself much earlier than in the case of Martina." (Objection, p. 2.) According to the defendant, the referee overruled his objection to this testimony during the trial. The plaintiff argues that this objection goes to the weight of the testimony presented at trial, rather than admissibility, and that the defendant's witnesses were competent to testify because they are "very experienced breeders." (Plaintiff's response to objections, p. 2.) [T]he competency of a witness is a matter peculiarly within the discretion of the trial court," here, the attorney trial referee, "and [his] ruling will be disturbed only in a clear case of abuse or of some error in law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)State v. Aponte,
Fifth, the defendant objects to the conclusion made in the report that "defendant has failed to establish his defense of impossibility of performance and consequently his claim of accord and satisfaction." The defendant argues that the conclusion "could not properly be reached on the basis of the subordinate facts found, because the only medical testimony in the case indisputably established that there was a serious health risk to the dog if she were bred." (Objection, p. 2.) The plaintiff argues that there was "substantial evidence that expert dog breeders have successfully bred dogs with megaesophagus," and that "there has been no showing that this would satisfy the doctrine of impossibility of performance."
A party claiming impossibility of performance must show: "(1) the event made the performance impracticable; (2) the nonoccurrence of the event was a basic assumption on which the contract was made; (3) the impracticability resulted without the fault of the party seeking to be excused; and (4) the party has not assumed a greater obligation than the law imposes." O'Hara v. State,
Sixth, the defendant complains that the referee applied the wrong measure of damages in making his recommendation as to damages, arguing that "[t]he conclusion of the [referee] that the measure of damages is [the] `value of the dog' . . . could not properly be reached on the basis of the subordinate facts, because this was a contract cause of action, not a tort cause of action." (Citation omitted.) (Defendant's objection, p. 2.) As to the measure of damages, the report concludes that "based upon defendant's breach of the agreement there is no doubt that the measure of damages suggested by Judge Fuller in the case cited by the plaintiff, the value of the dog, is the appropriate standard to use in this matter." (Corrected report, ¶ 12.) In the case cited by the plaintiff; Altieriv. Nanavati,
"[C]ontract damages are ordinarily based on the injured party's expectation interest and are intended to give him the benefit of the bargain by awarding a sum of money that will, to the extent possible, put him in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Colby v. Burnham,
Although the referee's conclusion is not well articulated, this court finds sufficient support for it. Upon an examination of the corrected report and the record, the court finds that there was a breach of contract, that the contract was primarily intended to raise profits through the sale of puppies, that the value of future profits is speculative and that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate his damages to a reasonable degree of certainty, and that the appropriate measure of damages in such a case is the diminution of fair market value of Martina. The referee found that by spaying her, the defendant effectively destroyed all economic value in her. Therefore, the referee concluded that diminution in market value was equal to her value at the time of the breach, i.e., $54,000, and the defendant's share in the co-ownership arrangement was $27,000.
The defendant argued that the referee's determination was "one hundred percent speculative," and that the fair market value should have been somewhere between "zero and fifteen hundred [dollars]." (Transcript, oral argument, August 9, 2000, pp. 14-16.) The defendant's disagreement is, again, with the referee's acceptance of the credibility and weight of the testimony by the plaintiff. According to the defendant, the plaintiff testified that he had paid $18,000 for each of the two dogs who had the same father as Martina, and that these dogs were four and five years old at the time. (Transcript, oral argument, August 9, 2000, pp. 14-15.)3
The plaintiff also testified that when these other two dogs were younger, they were worth three to four times of that amount. (Transcript of Fleischer, November 12, 1998, pp. 7-8.) According to the defendant, the referee arrived at the determination of damages in the amount of $34,000 by multiplying $18,000 three times. (Transcript, oral argument, August 9, 2000, p. 16.) The defendant's argument is with the referee's assessment of the credibility and weight of the testimony by witnesses. This is precisely the kind of determination by a trier of fact that this court cannot overturn absent a showing of clear error. Meadows v.Higgins, supra,
Seventh, the defendant objects that the $54,000 value assigned to Martina was "purely speculative" because there was no evidence "as to the effect on the value that was due to the form of megaesophagus which the [referee] acknowledged could result in impairment of the value of the litters (paragraph 11, corrected report)." (Objection, pp. 2-3.) The plaintiff argues that there was ample evidence to support this finding. The court agrees. CT Page 15126
"That damages may be difficult to assess is, in itself, insufficient reason for refusing them once the right to damages has been established."Griffin v. Nationwide Moving Storage Co.,
Eighth, and finally, the defendant argues that the referee's conclusion, that it was incumbent upon the defendant to notify the plaintiff prior to taking an action which had the effect of destroying the economic value of the dog, could not be reached on the facts because as a co-owner the defendant had a right to protect the health of the dog. The referee found that it was not so dangerous to breed Martina with her condition that the contract was rendered impossible, or stated another way, that she could have been allowed to breed. The referee also found that by spaying Martina. the defendant destroyed all economic value in Martina. (Corrected report, ¶ 10.) The referee's statement that it was incumbent on the defendant to inform the plaintiff is not material to the referee's conclusion that the defendant breached the contract.
Upon an examination of the attorney trial referee's report and the record, the court concludes that judgment should enter in accordance with the referee's recommendations. Accordingly, judgment is entered for the plaintiff in the sum of $27,000, plus costs.
White, J.