DocketNumber: No. 0120732
Citation Numbers: 1995 Conn. Super. Ct. 11721
Judges: McDONALD, J.
Filed Date: 10/13/1995
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
In the first count, Sherwood alleges that on October 1, 1993, it owned property located at 211 Brookside Road in Waterbury and that the Tax Assessor of the City valued that property at one million, seven hundred thousand dollars. Sherwood claims the valuation of the property was grossly excessive, disproportionate, and unlawful and should be reassessed at a lower evaluation.
The defendant has filed a motion to strike the first count of Sherwood's complaint on the ground that it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Ralston Purina v.Board of Tax Review of the Town of Franklin,
A motion to strike tests the legal sufficiency of a pleading. Whalen v. Ives,
The defendant argues that based on Ralston Purina v. Boardof Tax Review of the Town of Franklin, supra, the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The defendant argues that Ralston Purina stands for the proposition that taxpayers are not entitled to an interim reduction in their tax assessment, and that "the statutory revaluation is the exclusive remedy provided by the legislature for changes in value based on market conditions." The defendant argues that Sherwood is seeking an interim revaluation of its property, and this remedy may not be granted by the court.
In response, the plaintiff points out correctly that it has not alleged the assessment was the result of a prior city-wide revaluation. The plaintiff argues that a tax appeal can be taken from any grand list year, irrespective of whether a city-wide revaluation has occurred or not.
In Ralston Purina, supra, the plaintiffs appealed the defendant board of tax review's refusal to reduce the assessed valuation of certain of the plaintiffs' real and personal property. The plaintiffs claimed that the fair market value of their property had declined substantially since the last decennial revaluation conducted by the town. The trial court sustained the appeals, and, from the judgments against it, the town appealed. The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in ruling that the defendant was required to adjust the plaintiffs' tax assessment in the interim period between decennial revaluations of real property.
In Ralston Purina, the court held that the decennial revaluation mandated by General Statutes §
Viewing the facts in the most favorite light to the plaintiff, as this court must, Westport Bank Trust Co. v.Corcoran, Mallin Aresco,
The count does not allege that the assessment was made during a prior city wide assessment. Ralston Purina has also recognized certain exceptions to the exclusive application of §
"In deciding upon a motion to strike . . ., a trial court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint; . . . and `cannot be aided by the assumption of any facts not therein alleged.' . . . Where the legal grounds for such a motion are dependent upon underlying facts not alleged in the plaintiff's pleadings, the defendant must await the evidence which may be adduced at trial, and the motion should be denied." LiljedahlBros. v. Grigsby,
Under these circumstances, the plaintiff has stated sufficient facts upon which the court may grant relief. Accordingly, the motion to strike as to the first count is denied.
McDONALD, J. CT Page 11724