DocketNumber: No. CV 97-0567020S
Citation Numbers: 1999 Conn. Super. Ct. 10096, 25 Conn. L. Rptr. 207
Judges: RITTENBAND, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 7/13/1999
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
This memorandum of decision deals with the motion for summary judgment dated September 26, 1997 filed by the Defendants, First National Supermarkets, Inc., the Beneson Capital Company, Charles CT Page 10097 B. Beneson Family Trust, BWB Holding Company (hereinafter referred to as Defendant "First National") and the motion for summary judgment filed by the Defendant Capitol Sweeping Services, Inc. dated October 7, 1997 (hereinafter referred to as "Capitol") which latter motion has adopted the memoranda of First National supporting the motion for summary judgment.
1. On February 4, 1995, at approximately 10:45 a.m. the Plaintiff entered the parking lot of Edwards Supermarket on New Britain Avenue, Hartford, Connecticut, which supermarket was owned by First National, to purchase various goods and products sold by Edwards Supermarket.
2. When the Plaintiff was walking down the main aisle of said parking lot toward the store's main entrance, he slipped and fell on hard packed snow and/or ice sustaining injuries. Said area in which the Plaintiff fell was icy and slippery.
3. At said time and place said parking lot had yet to be snow plowed or sanded. Several cars were parked in the parking lot and, therefore, the snow where the plaintiff fell was hard packed due to these cars.
4. First National had hired Capitol to perform snow and plowing and sanding at said supermarket parking lot.
5. Snow began to fall that day at approximately 4:00 a.m. By 10:00 a.m. approximately 4 inches of snow had fallen. Snow continued to fall until 10:00 p. m. at which time total accumulation in the Hartford area was 9.7 inches. (See affidavit of Robert Gilman, certified meteorologist).
6. Prior to February 4, 1995, no precipitation, in any form, had fallen since January 27, 1995, when trace amounts of precipitation fell. No significant precipitation occurred since January 20, 1995. (See affidavit of Robert Gilman).
7. Prior to February 4, 1995, the parking lot of the supermarket was clear of any ice and snow. There had been no CT Page 10098 precipitation for several days prior. (See affidavit of Wendell Labbe, manager of the subject supermarket). Mr. Labbe's affidavit further states that beginning in the early morning of February 4, 1995, the snow began and continued to snow heavily all day long.
8. On February 4, 1995, at approximately 10:45 a.m. and for about one hour before, the snow precipitation was extremely light. (Affidavit of Plaintiff).
9. The only means of entrance and egress for customers of said supermarket was the store's main entrance which the Plaintiff was approaching when he fell. (Plaintiffs Affidavit). . . . the Defendant admitted at oral argument that the market entrance the Plaintiff intended to use was the only practical means of entrance or exit on the day of his fall." (Page 3 of Plaintiffs supplemental brief dated May 24, 1999).
A party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Dougherty v.Graham,
The primary case in Connecticut regarding the duty of care as to snow and/or ice removal is Kraus v. Newton,
"We believe that in the absence of unusual circumstances, a property owner, in fulfilling the duty owed to invitees upon his property to exercise reasonable diligence in removing dangerous accumulations of snow and ice, may await the end of a storm and a reasonable time thereafter before removing ice and snow from outside walks and steps. To require a landlord or other inviter to keep walks and steps clear of dangerous accumulations of ice, sleet or snow or to spread sand or ashes while a storm continues is inexpedient and impractical."
The issue then is what qualifies as "unusual circumstances." The Appellate Court has addressed this issue in two cases. In Sinertv. Olympia York Development Co.,
The Plaintiff, in his memorandum dated May 7, 1999, sets forth the following facts that he claims makes the situation one of "unusual circumstances":
1. Other properties and land owners had plowed the snow and/or sanded, and local streets had been plowed and/or sanded. CT Page 10100
2. The snow was extremely light for about one hour before the plaintiffs fall.
3. That there was no alternative means of ingress and egress of the store.
4. The snow where he fell was packed down and slippery because of cars traveling over it.
This Court finds that, as long as the snow was continuing, whether the local streets and some of the driveways and sidewalks of a number of other properties had been plowed and/or cleared of snow and ice is irrelevant to the rule set down in Kraus, supra and does not constitute an unusual circumstance. (See paragraph No. 1 above). Further, the fact that the snow was packed down and slippery because of cars traveling over it is certainiy not an unusual circumstance when the snow storm has not stopped. It is perfectly natural or usual for parking lots and other areas to become packed down by cars traveling over them while the snow is still falling. (See paragraph No. 4 above).
The affidavit of meteorologist Robert Gilman states that it snowed continuously on the day of the accident from 4:00 a.m. until 10:00 p. m. Plaintiff states in his affidavit that he observed "extremely light" snow precipitation at the time he fell and for about one hour prior thereto. However, taking the factual situation in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, extremely light means that it is still continuing, so there is really no dispute as to whether it was continuing. According to Kraus, supra, it is whether the storm stopped, not whether the precipitation was severe or light. As a matter of fact, in this case Mr. Gilman's affidavit indicates that the snow continued beyond the approximately 10:00 a.m. period adding another 5.7 inches to what had already fallen at the time of the accident or close thereto of 4 inches for a total of 9.7 inches. It is clear that the snow did not stop and continued until 10:00 p. m. Therefore, there is no issue of fact as to whether the snow storm had been in continual progress up to the time of the Plaintiffs fall. It had been. (See Par. number 2 above).
Plaintiff has also stated that an unusual circumstance could be whether there was pre-existing ice or snow. However, the affidavits of Mr. Gilman and Mr. Labbe clearly indicate that the parking lot was clear of ice and snow at 4:00 a.m. when the snow CT Page 10101 started to fall on February 4, 1995. These affidavits are uncontroverted.
This leaves the issue of the relevance of the fact that there was only one customer entry and exit to and from the store, and whether that was an unusual circumstance. The Plaintiff cites the case of Cooks v. O'Brien Properties, Inc.,
For the foregoing reasons, this Court concludes that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the above-mentioned Defendants' motions for summary judgment are granted.
Rittenband, J.