DocketNumber: No. CV 00 0436015
Citation Numbers: 2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 2684, 29 Conn. L. Rptr. 6
Judges: JONES, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 2/13/2001
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
The Town has moved to strike the Amended Complaint. In its motion the Town asserts that the Amended Complaint fails to set out a cognizable cause of action in either count. A motion to strike may be used to challenge the legal sufficiency of a pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Conn. Prac. Bk. §
The court shall address each count in turn. As to highway defect, plaintiff Agostinho Dasilva in the First Count of the Amended Complaint alleges that Conn. Gen. Stat. Sec.
Conn. Gen. Stat. Sec.
[a]ny person injured in person or property by means of a defective road or bridge may recover damages from the party bound to keep it in repair. . . . No action for any such injury shall be maintained against any town, city, corporation or borough, unless written notice of such injury and a general description of the same, and of the cause thereof and of the time and place of its occurrence, shall, within ninety days thereafter be given to a selectman or the clerk of such town, or to the clerk of such city or borough, or to the secretary or treasurer of such corporation. (Emphasis added.)
The plaintiff specifically alleges in the First Count of the Amended Complaint that the deteriorated condition of the Maple tree made the travel section of the roadway a "defective road" as that term is used in the statute. The plaintiff alleges further that the Town breached its duty in this regard by failing to remove the maple tree, and/or by failing to prune or otherwise remove that portion of the tree which presented a risk to those traveling upon the highway. The plaintiff does CT Page 2686 not allege that prior to its fall the tree branch was near ground level nor that it obstructed the route of travel.
Citing, Comba v. Town of Ridgefield,
It was a condition that could cause injury, but that injury could result even to one who was not a traveler on the highway. A person could be injured by the limb; but the use of the highway, as such, would not necessarily have led to the injury. Id.
Applying the precedential analysis and directive of Comba, supra, this court must grant the motion to strike the plaintiff's claim presented under §
In the Second Count of his Amended Complaint the plaintiff alleges that defendant Town of Wallingford is liable in negligence. In this regard, the plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that by virtue of C.G.S. §§
The court finds that inasmuch as the duty to which the plaintiff refers in the Second Count is a governmental one, the Town would not be legally responsible for the negligence as. alleged. See Elliott v. Waterbury,
Plaintiff's third and final count is predicated upon a claim of nuisance. To maintain a cognizable cause of action in nuisance against a municipality such as the Town of Wallingford a plaintiff must prove "that the defendant[s], by some positive act, intentionally created the conditions alleged to constitute a nuisance." Elliott v. Waterbury,supra, at 421. The defendant argues that this count that does not contain a factual allegation of a positive act. The defendant points out that although paragraph 12 of the third count alleges that "the defective condition of the tree was caused by a positive act of the municipality," CT Page 2687 the alleged "positive act" articulated in the third count is set out in paragraph 8 thereof as follows: "the maple tree . . . was in a state of disrepair and was overgrown, diseased, infested or insect ridden so as to endanger those individuals in and about its area." The defendant argues and the court agrees that the facts alleged in the third count do not comprise an allegation of an intentional "positive act" as contemplated by the pleading requirements for nuisance in this context. See Bacon v.Rocky Hill,
For the foregoing reasons the court grants the defendant's motion to strike each of the three counts set out in the plaintiff's Amended Complaint, dated July 25, 2000.
Clarance J. Jones, Judge