DocketNumber: No. MV 99 0203450S
Citation Numbers: 2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 5977, 29 Conn. L. Rptr. 716
Judges: AGATI, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 5/7/2001
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
The defendant in this action has filed a motion to dismiss the Part B information. The basis for the defendant's motion to dismiss is that the state cannot treat the defendant in the present case as a four-time offender. The defendant claims that the state and this court are bound by the actions of the court in G.A. #4 in 1997 and must consider the pending charges against the defendant as a second-time offender. The defendant's argument is that because he was treated as a three-time first offender previously by the court in G.A. #4, the prosecution of the present charge would lead to a second conviction, and not a fourth conviction. Therefore, the penalties the defendant would face would be as a second offender and not a fourth offender. CT Page 5978
General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) §
(h) Penalties for operation while under the influence. Any person who violates any provision of subsection (a) of this section shall:
(1) For conviction of a first violation, (A) be fined not less than five hundred dollars nor more than one thousand dollars and (B) be (i) imprisoned not more than six months, forty-eight consecutive hours of which may not be suspended or reduced in any manner or (ii) imprisoned not more than six months, with the execution of such sentence of imprisonment suspended entirely and a period of probation imposed requiring as a condition of such probation that such person perform one hundred hours of community service, as defined in section
14-227e , and (C) have his motor vehicle operator's license or nonresident operating privilege suspended for one year; (2) for conviction of a second violation within ten years after a prior conviction for the same offense, be fined not less than five hundred dollars nor more than two thousand dollars and imprisoned not more than one year, ten consecutive days of which may not be suspended or reduced in any manner, and have his motor vehicle operator's license or nonresident operating privilege suspended for two years; (3) for conviction of a third violation within ten years after a prior conviction for the same offense, be fined not less than one thousand dollars nor more than four thousand dollars and imprisoned not more than two years, one hundred twenty consecutive days of which may not be suspended or reduced in any manner, and have his motor vehicle operator's license or nonresident operating privilege suspended for three years; and (4) for conviction of a fourth and subsequent violation within ten years after a prior conviction for the same offense, be fined not less than two thousand dollars nor more than eight thousand dollars and imprisoned not more than three years, one year of which may not be suspended or reduced in any manner, and have his motor vehicle operator's license or nonresident operating privilege permanently revoked upon such fourth offense. For purposes of the imposition of penalties for a second, third or fourth and subsequent offense pursuant to CT Page 5979 this subsection, a conviction under the provisions of subsection (a) of section14-227a in effect on October 1, 1981, or as amended thereafter, a conviction under the provisions of either subdivision (1) or (2) of subsection (a) of this section or a conviction under the provisions of section53a-56b or53a-60d shall constitute a prior conviction for the same offense.
The court will consider the penalty provisions as of July 18, 1999, being aware that these penalty provisions have been amended subsequently. The amended penalties, however, could not be applied to this defendant since the present offense predates the effective date of the amendments. See Public Acts 1999, No. 99-255.
The court must first review §
The defendant's claim is that although the defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of driving under the influence under §
In reviewing §
"To determine the intent of the legislature, we first consider whether the statutory language yields a plain and unambiguous resolution. . . . If the words are clear and unambiguous, it is assumed that [they] express the intention of the legislature . . . and we need inquire no further. . . . The words of a statute must be interpreted according to their ordinary meaning unless their context dictates otherwise." (Brackets in original; citations omitted; internal quotation marks CT Page 5980 omitted.) State v. Mattioli,
The defendant has provided the court with a transcript of defendant's plea and sentencing of the GA #4 matters that took place on August 26, 1997. The defendant pleaded guilty to each of the three individual driving while under the influence charges. Each of his pleas of guilty resulted in a conviction. Therefore, the defendant has, as he appears before this court, three prior convictions for driving under the influence in violation of §
"Although we recognize the fundamental principle that criminal statutes are to be construed strictly, it is equally fundamental that the rule of strict construction does not require an interpretation which frustrates an evident legislative intent. . . . Moreover, there is a presumption that the legislature intends to accomplish a reasonable and rational result rather than a difficult and possibly bizarre one." State v.Burns,
The court concludes that the second part of the information (Part B) filed by the state as against this defendant is not in violation of §
Agati, J.