DocketNumber: No. 32 18 05
Citation Numbers: 1996 Conn. Super. Ct. 2991, 16 Conn. L. Rptr. 409
Judges: MORAGHAN, J.
Filed Date: 4/4/1996
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
The first count of the seven-count complaint alleges negligence on the part of Pitney Bowes by, inter alia (1) failing to implement precautionary procedures such as a designated driver program; (2) failing to properly supervise the outing; (3) failing to warn its employees of the hazards of drinking and driving; (4) failing to properly monitor the consumption of alcohol of its employees; (5) allowing Stelmaszek to drive his automobile when they knew or should have known he was intoxicated; (5) allowing an unrestricted amount of alcohol to be consumed by its employees; and (6) service of more than one alcoholic beverage to any one person for consumption at one time, and/or offering or delivering an unlimited number of drinks at the outing in violation of Sec.
In the second count, the Kaysers allege negligence on the part of Pitney Bowes on the basis of vicarious liability for the conduct of its employee Stelmaszek. The third count also sounds in negligence and is directed towards Stelmaszek for operating his vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, and in violation of numerous Connecticut regulations and statutes. Count four purports to allege a cause of action against Bajoros and Capellaro's Grove for gross negligence. This count is premised on the factual allegations of the previous counts as well as the allegations that Bajoros and Capellaro's Grove, inter alia, (1) failed to properly supervise the outing; (2) permitted the improper and unsupervised consumption of alcohol at the outing; (3) failed to warn co-defendant Pitney Bowes or its employees of the hazards of drinking and driving; (4) permitted the employees of Pitney Bowes, including Stelmaszek, to have unlimited access to alcoholic beverages at the outing; (5) failed to discourage or prevent the employees of Pitney Bowes, including Stelmaszek, from drinking and driving; and (6) violation of regulation Sec.
Count six claims a cause of action against Bajoros and Capellaro's Grove for recklessness. The Kaysers incorporate the allegations of the previous counts and further allege that Stelmaszek, after consuming alcohol provided by Bajoros and Capellaro's Grove, "acted with a disregard for the rights and CT Page 2993 safety of others and/or in a wanton or reckless manner in one of more of the following ways . . . in that . . . [they]: (a) failed to properly supervise or monitor the outing with respect to the consumption of alcohol by the persons in attendance; (b) failed to discourage or otherwise prevent John Stelmaszek from operating his vehicle under the conditions then and there existing; (c) permitted an unrestricted open tapped keg of beer to exist under the circumstances; (d) failed to warn or otherwise instruct the persons in attendance about the hazards of drinking and driving; (e) permitted defendant Pitney Bowes' employees, and other persons in attendance at said outing, including John Stelmaszek, to have unlimited access to alcoholic beverages . . . despite the fact that they knew or should have known it was unreasonable to do so under the conditions; . . . [and] (l) [Bajoros] . . . or the representatives of Capellaro's sold, offered, or otherwise delivered more than one alcoholic beverage to any one person for consumption at one time and/or offered or delivered an unlimited number of drinks at that time in violation of Connecticut Regulation §
BAJOROS' AND CAPELLARO GROVE'S MOTION TO STRIKE
Bajoros and Capellaro's Grove filed a motion to strike counts four, five and six of the complaint on the ground that they fail to state legally sufficient causes of action. As to count four, these defendants argue that there is no recognized cause of action in Connecticut for gross negligence for the service of alcohol. Similarly, Bajoros and Capellaro's Grove argue that there is no recognized cause of action for the negligent service of alcohol resulting in injury to another. Count six is alleged to be insufficient "in that it fails to allege an element essential to a claim for willful, wanton and reckless misconduct," namely, the allegation of willfulness.
In their brief filed in opposition, the Kaysers respond that counts four and five are legally sufficient because their allegations of gross negligence and negligence, respectively, are based on more than mere service of alcohol to Stelmaszek. Specifically, the Kaysers argue that counts four and five include allegations that codefendant Pitney Bowes served alcohol to its employees at the outing, and that Bajoros and Capellaro's Grove were grossly negligent in failing to warn Pitney Bowes of the CT Page 2994 hazards of drinking and driving, among other things. The Kaysers also allege that Bajoros and Capellaro's Grove were negligent and/or grossly negligent by failing to supervise the activities at the outing "in a manner unrelated to the . . . service of alcohol." Thus, the Kaysers conclude that counts four and five are legally sufficient.
The Kaysers assert that count six states a legally sufficient cause of action for recklessness because, although they did not specifically include the word "willful" in the allegations of count six, they have pleaded facts sufficient to support a cause of action for recklessness. Specifically, the Kaysers argue that paragraph 28 of count six lists twelve ways in which Bajoros and Capellaro's Grove acted recklessly, including that the defendants "acted with a disregard for the rights and safety of others . . . in that [they] . . . failed to properly supervise or monitor the outing . . . failed to warn or . . . instruct the persons in attendance about the hazards of drinking and driving . . . permitted defendant Pitney Bowes' employees . . . to have unlimited access to alcoholic beverages . . . [and] had actual or constructive knowledge that John Stelmaszek was intoxicated yet permitted him to consume additional alcohol under the circumstances and thereafter leave the outing in his vehicle . . . ." Thus, they claim that their failure to include the "buzz word" of willfulness on the part of the defendants does not render count six legally insufficient.
PITNEY BOWES' MOTION TO STRIKE
Pitney Bowes has filed a motion to strike the first count of the complaint for legal insufficiency on the ground that "said count seeks to impose liability upon Pitney Bowes for the negligent service of alcohol[,] which cause of action is not recognized in Connecticut." In its brief, Pitney Bowes relies onBoehm v. Kish,
The Kaysers answer that Pitney Bowes' motion to strike should be denied because the allegations of negligence in count one rest on more than mere service of alcohol to Stelmaszek; rather, count one alleges that Pitney Bowes was negligent by failing to warn, monitor, or supervise the outing, which was held during the company's regular working hours. Further, the Kaysers allege that Pitney Bowes was negligent, as the organizer of the outing, by CT Page 2995 failing to establish precautionary procedures such as a designated driver program. Thus, the Kaysers argue, their allegations of negligence are based on more than mere service of alcohol, and as such, count one is legally sufficient. Finally, the Kaysers argue that count one states a legally sufficient claim for negligence for the service of alcohol because the issue of negligence is a factual question for the jury.
The function of a motion to strike is "to test the legal sufficiency of a pleading." RK Constructors, Inc. v. Fusco Corp.,
COUNTS FOUR AND FIVE
Bajoros and Capellaro's motion to strike counts four and five of the complaint, should be and are hereby denied. While some courts have held that there is no common law cause of action for gross negligence for service of alcohol; Bioski v. Castelano,
By contrast, in this case, the Kaysers' complaint alleges negligence and gross negligence on the basis of more than simply furnishing alcohol to Stelmaszek. The complaint recites numerous other grounds on which the Kaysers base their allegations of gross negligence and negligence, to wit: failure to properly supervise and monitor the distribution of alcohol, failure to warn codefendant Pitney Bowes of the dangers of drinking and driving, and permitting the employees of Pitney Bowes to have unlimited access to alcoholic beverages at the outing, among other things. In sum, the Kaysers' carefully drafted complaint is sufficient to withstand a motion to strike. CT Page 2996
It should be pointed out that while some courts have rejected the theory of gross negligence as a separate tort doctrine;Stebbins v. Staschke,
It should be remembered that this court has previously held, as have other courts, that there is a recognizable cause of action for the negligent and grossly negligent furnishing of alcohol to others. See Dufficy v. Mohring,
COUNT SIX
The motion to strike count six is also denied. While the Kaysers concede that they have not specifically used the word "willful" in count six, they argue, and their argument is persuasive, that they have pleaded facts in support of count six sufficient to withstand a motion to strike. The Kaysers' failure to use the "buzz word" "willful" does not render the complaint deficient. "The mere use of the words reckless and wanton by the plaintiffs will be insufficient to raise an actionable claim of reckless and wanton misconduct. . . . To survive a motion to CT Page 2997 strike, the plaintiffs must plead actual facts which [support their claim] . . . not just conclusions." (Internal quotations marks omitted; citations omitted.) Keson v. Unkel, supra. Accordingly, the motion to strike count six is denied.
COUNT ONE
Next, addressing Pitney Bowes' motion to strike count one of the complaint, that motion too, should be denied. Pitney Bowes' argument is that there is no recognized cause of action for the negligent furnishing of alcohol to another, relying on State v.Wassil,
Count one is legally sufficient because it contains factual allegations in addition to mere negligent service of alcohol. In particular, the Kaysers allege failure to supervise, failure to warn, and violations of Sec.
Finally, this court respectfully invites the Appellate Courts of this state to reconsider and clarify the issues of negligence, gross negligence, and proximate cause as they relate to improper service of alcohol to others. In the interim, the well-pleaded facts of this complaint are sufficient to withstand the defendants' motions to strike, and, accordingly, the motions are denied in their entirety.
Moraghan, J.