DocketNumber: No. CV 97 0057089 S
Citation Numbers: 1998 Conn. Super. Ct. 8295, 22 Conn. L. Rptr. 335
Judges: SFERRAZZA, J.
Filed Date: 7/6/1998
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
The first count of the complaint avers that Phelps negligently supervised a wrestling match between Reynolds and another student wherein Reynolds was thrown to the gymnasium CT Page 8296 floor striking an area of the floor which became exposed when two wrestling mats separated. The claims of negligence specify an improper pairing of contestants, improper lookout, and unsafe equipment. The second count asserts that the principal, Erardi, negligently failed to safeguard Reynolds by keeping the premises and equipment safely supervised. The third count is an indemnification claim, against the town under G.S. §
The identifiable person aspect of this exception to qualified immunity embraces a narrowly defined, identifiable group of foreseeable victims. Burns v. Board of Education,
Phelps contends that the injuries sustained by Reynolds were the result of action by another student his wrestling opponent, who threw Reynolds to the ground, and that §
The allegations of the complaint include claims that CT Page 8297 Reynolds' injury occurred because of the absence of the shock absorbing mat at the point where Reynolds struck the floor. The bout was sanctioned by Phelps as part of physical training and was not a fight unrelated to education which happened to break out on school property. The objective of wrestling is to subdue and pin one's opponent by maneuvers and throws.
The pleadings and affidavits submitted reveal that a genuine factual dispute exists as to, causation. Qualified immunity remains a matter for a trier-of-fact to resolve after the presentation of evidence. The motion for summary judgment is denied as to the first and seventh counts.
In order to remove the protection of qualified immunity from Erardi, the plaintiffs must demonstrate that Reynolds was a member of a discrete, identifiable class exposed to imminent harm from Erardi's exercise of discretion. Bonamico v.Middletown, supra. Consequently, the court must determine whether Reynolds was a member of a discrete class exposed to imminent harm as a result of Erardi's decision to have Phelps supervise the class.
The plaintiffs rely on the recent case of Purzycki v.Fairfield,
In Purzycki, supra, the superintendent of schools was denied such immunity under circumstances where one young child was tripped by another while the children frolicked in an unsupervised hallway on the way to recess. It was schoolpolicy to leave the hallways unmonitored during such daily migrations. Our Supreme Court held that "because the school CT Page 8298 administrators . . . had reason to foresee the danger that could occur on a daily basis, " id., 111, the school administration faced liability for maintaining a policy of unsupervised hallways.
In sharp contrast, in the present case Erardi assigned Phelps to supervise Reynold's class and his physical education. The plaintiffs submitted nothing contradicting the fact that Erardi made such an assignment of supervision. That harm might befall Reynolds because Phelps allegedly performed inadequately at this duty is the kind of remote, generalized danger which our Supreme Court found insufficient to undermine qualified immunity inEvon v. Andrews,
In Evon v. Andrews, supra, the plaintiffs claimed that municipal employees failed to conduct reasonable, safety inspections and issue orders to enforce safety provisions which may have prevented a fire which tragically killed the plaintiffs' decedents. Our Supreme Court ruled that the risk that at some unspecified, future date a fire might ignite at the tenement building in question failed to subject the tenants of that building to imminent harm, a necessary factor to remove the municipal employee's qualified immunity. Id., 507. The court quoted approvingly, "the adoption of a rule of liability where some kind of harm may happen to someone would cramp the exercise of; official discretion beyond the limits desirable in our society." Id., 508.
The allegations against Erardi, as a principal who undisputedly assigned a teacher to supervise Reynolds' activities, are so remote from the claimed injury, striking an unpadded portion of floor during a wrestling bout, that the court holds, as a matter of law, Reynolds was not subject to imminent danger from Erardi's, as opposed to Phelps', exercise of discretionary duty. Erardi's decision to have Phelps supervise the gym class is just the type of official action that ought not be "cramped" by fear of liability.
The motion for summary judgment is granted as to the second and eighth counts. CT Page 8299
The invocation of §
The plaintiffs concede that the negligent acts alleged were the result of discretionary decision on the parts of Phelps and Erardi. Thus, §
To recapitulate, he court grants summary judgment for the defendants as to the even-numbered counts and denies the motion as to the odd-numbered counts.
SFERRAZZA, J.