DocketNumber: No. CV99-0586891
Citation Numbers: 2000 Conn. Super. Ct. 6566
Judges: RUBINOW, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 5/17/2000
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
As drafted, the fourth count of the complaint incorporates relevant portions of the third count. The third count of the complaint alleges, inter alia, that Saint Francis Hospital and Medical Center owed a duty to Talisha Cannady, and that this duty was breached in the course of the provision of care for her pregnancy, labor and delivery of the minor plaintiff, Tanajae Crawford. These allegations, set forth in paragraphs 1 through 5 of the third count, have been incorporated into Paragraphs 11-15 of the fourth.1 Through use of this convention, the plaintiff-mother thus has specifically alleged, in the fourth count, the hospital's status as a health-care provider owing a duty to her and to Tajanae Crawford, "in utero"; the intimate relationship between the plaintiff-mother and Tajanae Crawford during the times at issue; the breach of the hospital's duty through the negligent provision of medical services; and the causation of injuries and losses to the minor-plaintiff. The fourth count of the complaint adds allegations that the defendant Saint Francis Hospital and Medical Center "knew or should have known that [its] conduct was likely to cause unreasonable risk of severe psychological, physiologic and emotional distress" to Talisha Cannady, and that, as the result of this careless and negligent delivery of health care to Talisha Cannady, she has suffered and will continue to CT Page 6568 suffer from severe psychological, physiologic and emotional distress, impairing her ability to carry on and enjoy life's activities.
In considering the defendant hospital's present arguments, the court has heeded the legal principles related to the motion to strike. "The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)Peter-Michael, Inc. v. Sea Shell Associates,
Connecticut is a "fact pleading" state. Section
Applying these principles to the fourth count of the complaint, the court finds that the plaintiff-mother has set forth the basis of her action without ambiguity. Despite the defendant's claims of lack of clarity, the fourth count explicitly alleges that as a patient receiving services provided by the defendant hospital, Talish Cannady herself was owed a duty of care, as was the child she carried; that this duty was breached; and that the stated injuries proximately resulted from this breach. The fourth count clearly establishes a claim based upon negligent infliction of emotional harm to the subject of tortious conduct. SeePamela B. v. Ment, supra,
It is been well said that "[a] mother's concerns during delivery for her own welfare and that of her child are so interwoven as to be legally inseparable. Where the child remains a part of the mother's physical being, concerns for the child's welfare during delivery procedures are concerns for the mother's well being." Golymbieski v. Equia, Docket No. CV95-0125140, judicial district of Waterbury (Fasano, J., May 22, 1997). In a case such as that presented here, where the plaintiff-mother does not occupy the status of a mere "bystander" during pregnancy, labor and delivery, she is entitled to pursue the legal theory of negligent infliction of emotional harm. See Montinieri v. Southern New EnglandTelephone Company,
As to the defendant's argument that the fourth count of the complaint fails to state a legally sufficient cause of action, a fair reading of the facts alleged in this count must incorporate reference to the facts asserted in the third count, as described above. Viewed from this perspective, the fourth count of the plaintiffs complaint discloses allegations that the defendant health-care provider, Saint Francis Hospital and Medical Center, demonstrated conduct that involved an unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress to its patient, Talisha Cannady. With these specific allegations in mind, it is reasonable to conclude that "the facts alleged in the plaintiffs complaint do indeed satisfy the Montinieri test." Crumb v. Waterbury Hospital Health Center, supra,
WHEREFORE, the defendant's motion to strike (#123) is hereby DENIED, and the plaintiffs objection to the defendant Saint Francis Hospital's motion to strike (#127) is hereby SUSTAINED.
BY THE COURT,
N. Rubinow, J.