DocketNumber: No. CV 00 0439399 S
Judges: ZOARSKI, JUDGE TRIAL REFEREE.
Filed Date: 2/13/2003
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
In count one the plaintiff alleges the following facts all of which are incorporated by reference in counts two through four. On March 11, 1998, Edwards was driving a car owned and insured by the plaintiff through American. Edwards did not have automobile insurance. As Julio Ferrer was attempting to enter the passenger side of the car, Edwards began driving the vehicle, with Julio Ferrer hanging on to the passenger door. As a proximate result of Edwards' negligence and carelessness in the operation of the vehicle, Julio Ferrer suffered massive internal injuries that resulted in his death.
Counts one and two allege claims in negligence and recklessness, respectively, against Edwards, who is not a party to the motion currently before the court. In count three the plaintiff alleges that she obtained automobile insurance from American, which provided uninsured motorist coverage. She further alleges a breach of contract on the part of American because they denied her benefits to which she was entitled under the insurance contract. In count four the plaintiff alleges that American denied her claim in bad faith. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that she was denied benefits because she is a foreigner and cannot speak English.
On March 12, 2002, American filed a motion to strike count four of the complaint on the ground that it "is legally insufficient in that it does not allege sufficient facts to support a claim of bad faith . . ."
As required by Practice Book §
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaints . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)Peter-Michael, Inc. v. Sea Shell Associates,
American moves to strike the fourth count of the plaintiff's complaint on the ground that the plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to support a claim of bad faith. American argues in support of its motion that the plaintiff has only alleged that American denied her claim and that allegation alone does not rise to the level of bad faith.
The plaintiff, in her memorandum of law in opposition argues: (1) that she has alleged more than just a denial of coverage, (2) that she was denied coverage because American improperly considered her ethnicity in making the determination to deny her benefits and (3) that this allegation when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff is sufficient to allege a bad faith claim.
"Bad faith means more than mere negligence; it involves a dishonest purpose." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gupta v. New Britain GeneralHospital,
Furthermore, within every contract there is an "implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing [which] has been applied . . . in a variety of contractual relationships, including . . . insurance contracts . . ." CT Page 2322 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Verrastro v. Middlesex Ins. Co.,
The plaintiff has sufficiently alleged all three of these elements. The plaintiff has sufficiently pled that there was an insurance contract with the defendant and that she was due benefits under that contract in case of an accident caused by an uninsured driver. The plaintiff has also sufficiently pleaded that she suffered financial loss from the denial of benefits that were owed to her pursuant to the contract. Finally, the plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded that the defendant was acting in bad faith in denying her benefits because she was a foreigner and could not speak English.
The defendant's motion to strike is denied because the plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded a claim for bad faith.
Howard F. Zoarski Judge Trial Referee
CT Page 2323